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1 Brain Drain, Occupational Choice under
Risk, and Endogenous Growth
1.1 Introduction
The recognition of human capital as a growth engine in the theoretical and empirical growth
literature raised the question on the statistical significance of human capital flight (brain drain)
from less industrialized countries and its influence on growth. The brain drain rates (the pro-
portion of working individuals above 25 with tertiary education working abroad) estimated by
Docquier and Marfouk (2004) in 2000 were not negligible, for instance, from Croatia (29,4%),
Bosnia and Herzegovina (28.6%), Macedonia (20.9%), Serbia and Montenegro (17.4%), Slovakia
(15.3%), Romania (14.1%), Greece (14%). These countries export prevailingly high-educated
individuals despite the migration of some low-skilled migrants.
The influence of brain drain on growth is still a contradictory issue. From on hand, brain drain
is ex–post seen as detrimental to growth of the sending country as it decreases the level of human
capital (see Miyagiwa (1991), Haque and Kim (1995), Wong and Yip (1999)). From the other
hand, brain drain from the source country may exert ex–ante a positive effect on human capital
formation and growth. The intuition in the work of Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Stark et
al. (1997), Beine et al. (2001) is as follows: due to the prospect of migration agents have an
incentive to invest in education; still, because not all leave the source country, a probability
exists that the level of the average human capital increases and stimulates growth at home (the
so–called brain gain theory).
The assumption on the occupational choice of the brain drain literature rests on the setting
that agents in the domestic country remain either low–skilled or become skilled workers, whose
earnings are safe. In this respect the brain drain literature omits two growth relevant factors,
which may further influence its results. Those are the existence of (i) risk–taking (skilled) en-
trepreneurship and (ii) risk in the occupational choice of educated workers. Uncertainty in the
employment generating (skilled) entrepreneurship and the educational decision of workers could
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ex–ante decrease the share of those willing to invest in human capital. These two factors could
be especially important for testing the robustness of the traditional brain gain theory, which
does not exclude the existence of a favorable effect of skilled outmigration on growth.
Our incentive to extend the brain gain analysis with the topic of uncertainty in occupational
choice has empirical and theoretical grounds as well. (Risk–taking) entrepreneurship has been
emphasized as a growth engine empirically (see Audretsch and Thurik (2000), Audretsch et
al. (2002), and Carree et al. (2002)) and theoretically (see Romer (1990), Chou and Shy
(1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Schmitz (1989), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Iyigun and
Owen (1999), Clemens and Heinemann (2006), Clemens (2008), and Clemens and Heinemann
(2009)). Our motivation to model entrepreneurs as skilled agents stems additionally from the
recent empirical observation that human capital of entrepreneurs is a favorable prerequisite for
the establishment and growth of a firm (see van Praag and van Stel (2011), Kim et al. (2006),
Taye (2006)). Risk in human capital investment (of workers), on the other hand, has been high-
lighted as an economic factor decreasing educational investment in the theoretical discussion
by Levhari and Weiss (1974), Rillaers (1998), Krebs (2003). By incorporating the occupational
choice under risk in the probabilistic brain gain theory, we look for answers to the following
questions: (i) Does skilled outmigration erode entrepreneurship and eventually decrease human
capital accumulation? (ii) Do risk measures reduce the incentive of risk averse and risk–bearing
skilled agents to invest in human capital and in this way decrease the likelihood that brain gain
takes place? (iii) What is the quantitative impact of skilled migration and risk in occupational
choice on growth and welfare? We discuss these issues in what follows.
The unexplored relationship between occupational choice under risk and brain drain in the
context a two–period overlapping generations endogenous growth model with human capital
accumulation is the core issue of our analysis. The model draws on the work of Kanbur (1979),
and Clemens (2008) for occupational choice under risk and Beine et al. (2001) for human capi-
tal accumulation and probabilistic brain drain. The domestic economy consists of two sectors:
a traditional and a modern sector both producing an identical consumption good but by a
different technology. At the beginning of life ex–ante homogeneous and risk–averse agents si-
multaneously make a human capital decision and an occupational choice entailing either certain
or uncertain income. An agent may decide either to become high–skilled by investing educa-
tional time in one’s human capital or to remain low–skilled both periods. Low–skilled workers
obtain sure income in the traditional sector, educated become skilled workers or entrepreneurs
(who employ skilled workers) in the modern sector. High–skilled workers are ex–ante unaware
of their labor productivities, while entrepreneurs experience variation in their profits due to
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a technology shock, which is beyond their control. Some high–skilled workers are randomly
selected to work abroad for a higher foreign wage at the beginning of the second period. In
equilibrium the expected utility of ex–ante homogeneous and risk averse agents is equal due to
the expected utility arbitrage argument, which determines the distribution of individuals across
occupations.
Our assumption that would–be entrepreneurs are home bound (they do not migrate and do not
establish a business abroad, i.e. migrants are employed as skilled workers) could be justified
by the empirical evidence that the average propensity to set up a business with more than
20 workers in the OECD countries is lower for foreigners than for natives according to OECD
(2010) in Table 1.3 (an exception to this rule among the countries in Western Europe is the
UK with foreigners, who are more prone to set up firms than natives). This empirical evidence
makes us believe that migrants abroad take up an occupation rather as a worker than an en-
trepreneur. Moreover, van Praag (2009) shows that the perception of status1 is correlated with
the probability of opting for entrepreneurship, which is evidence for our assumption that it is
skilled workers (and not agents determined to develop their own business) who migrate abroad.
Growth in our model depends positively on the share of those willing to obtain education. The
decision on education, on the other hand, is tantamount to willingness to take on risk because
skilled workers are subject to risk in their earnings stemming from ex–ante unknown labor pro-
ductivity, while entrepreneurs obtain income dependent on a technology shock. The educational
decision of skilled workers, moreover, is influenced by the probability of migration. That is how
the interplay between brain drain and occupational choice under risk determines the economic
development of the domestic country.
According to our theoretical model, a higher brain drain rate biases the occupational choice of
agents away from entrepreneurship and may increase skilled workers’ employment if the share
of skilled wage earners remaining at home is relatively low (lower than 36% for a brain drain
probability of 30% and lower than 56.9% for a brain drain probability of 5% and under the
assumption of a foreign wage, which is 4.8 time higher than the domestic skilled labor income).
A higher gap between the earnings of skilled workers in the domestic country and abroad de-
creases entrepreneurship but increases skilled workers’ employment. A larger risk measure in
the occupational choice of both entrepreneurs and skilled wage earners reduces their respective
shares. As a consequence of the equilibrium occupational choice, growth improves with a larger
skilled migration probability only if the share of skilled wage earners in the domestic coun-
1Notice that we drop the issue of status in the risky occupational choice of entrepreneurs. For a discussion on
this topic see Clemens (2006)
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try improves, but unambiguously rises with a higher wedge between skilled workers’ earnings at
home and abroad. On the other hand, a higher risk measure in the occupational choice of skilled
employees decreases human capital accumulation, while a higher risk measure in entrepreneurial
profits has an ambiguous effect on growth. Our calibration shows that in terms of growth and
welfare the brain drain probability has a stronger (positive) effect than the gap in skilled wages
between the foreign and the domestic country in the short and the long run. Larger risk in
the occupational choice of skilled workers’ exhibits a stronger (negative) impact on growth and,
therefore, long–term welfare compared to risk of entrepreneurial profits. However, larger risk
in entrepreneurial profits has a much more pronounced negative effect on short–term welfare
compared to the risk in skilled workers’ earnings.
This paper is divided as follows: In Section 1.2 the general assumptions of the model are pre-
sented. In Section 1.3 we specify the market equilibrium. In Section 1.4 and 1.5 we conduct a
sensitivity analysis and calibration. In Section 1.6 we perform a welfare analysis. Section 1.7 is
devoted to the conclusion.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 The Household Sector
Ex–ante homogeneous and risk averse agents live for two periods in the framework of an overlap-
ping generations model. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which he inelastically
supplies to the market. The population is normalized to one, which means that each generation
is equal to 0.5 and there is no population growth.
At the beginning of life agents make an educational and occupational choice. An agent may
remain uneducated both periods. Those who decide to gain human capital work as low–skilled
when young and spend some time in education ν, which is predetermined by the government.
At the second period the educated agent may become either a skilled worker or an entrepreneur.
Following Yakita (2003) we assume that low–skilled (young and middle–aged) living at period
t obtain a base wage wt augmented by the low–skilled human capital h
l
t = ht−1γt, where γt > 0
is the knowledge spillover (determined endogenously), while ht−1 is the average human capital
of the previous period. Total low–skilled human capital is in practice inherited for free.
A skilled worker i born at period t obtains the base wage wt+1 augmented by ex–ante un-
known abilities ai and the human capital h
w
t+1 when middle–aged at period t+ 1. Skilled work-
ers’ abilities a follow a lognormal distribution with mean and variance equal to E[ln a] = µa,
V ar[ln a] = σ2a.
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An entrepreneur j born at period t obtains profit pijt+1 when middle–aged at period t+1, which
is influenced by a production idiosyncratic shock θ following a lognormal distribution with mean
and variance equal to E[ln θ] = µθ, V ar[ln θ] = σ
2
θ . Let the profit per entrepreneur’s human
capital pijt+1 be augmented by the entrepreneurial human capital h
e
t+1. Moreover, we assume
that the risk in skilled workers’ earnings is lower than the technological risk in entrepreneurs’
profits σa < σθ in order to replicate the empirical observation that entrepreneurs’ income is
riskier than workers’ wages. The correlation between a and θ is zero.
The winning tickets to leave the home country in the second period are distributed randomly
only among educated workers. The probability that a skilled worker is selected to go abroad
is equal to pa. If a skilled worker obtains the winning ticket to work abroad, one receives a
foreign wage which is a share φf > 1 of skilled workers’ productivity in the domestic country2,
i.e. even abroad the agent obtains earnings in correspondence to one’s abilities. Firm owners
do not migrate abroad. Throughout this paper we use the index w for skilled workers, e for
entrepreneurs, l for low–skilled workers, f for the foreign economy and t for a period if not
otherwise stated.
An individual born at t who decides to invest in education and become a high–skilled worker
at period t+ 1 consumes cwt in the first and c
w
it+1 in the second period if employed as a skilled
worker at home and cfit+1 if one is abroad. The expected lifetime utility of a skilled worker i
with abilities ai who stands a probability of migration p
a at period t+ 1 is,
V wi,t,t+1 = ln(c
w
t ) + β(1− pa) ln(cwit+1) + βpa ln(cfit+1) 0 < β < 1 (1.1)
where β is the discount factor of future utility of consumption. The first and second period
consumption is exactly equal to the obtained income at the respective period due to the lack of
a capital market,
cwt = (1− ν)wthlt (1.2)
cwit+1 = aih
w
t+1wt+1 (1.3)
cfit+1 = φ
faih
w
t+1wt+1 (1.4)
The human capital of skilled workers and entrepreneurs is linear in educational time ν with
A > 0,
hkt+1 = (1 +Aν)ht k ∈ {w, e} (1.5)
2Our assumption on the foreign wage is a simplification of the postulation of Beine et al. (2001), who set the
income growth abroad after education to be higher than the income growth at home.
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Because entrepreneurs and skilled workers have to spend the same time ν in school (which is
determined by the government), their human capital across periods is equal, i.e. hwt = h
e
t ∀t.
Still, we keep the indices e and w for tractability.
An agent born at t who decides at the beginning of one’s life to gain human capital and to
become an entrepreneur at period t+ 1 consumes in both periods, cet and c
e
jt+1. The welfare of
an entrepreneur is then,
V ej,t,t+1 = ln(c
e
t ) + β ln(c
e
jt+1) (1.6)
Total income is spent on consumption at the respective period,
cet = (1− ν)wthlt (1.7)
cejt+1 = h
e
t+1pijt+1 (1.8)
Low–skilled born at t consume in both periods their total income and have, therefore, welfare
equal to,
V lt,t+1 = ln(c
l
t) + β ln(c
l
t+1) (1.9)
clt = wth
l
t (1.10)
clt+1 = wt+1h
l
t+1 (1.11)
1.2.2 Production Sectors
There are two sectors in the economy operating in a perfectly competitive market (traditional
and modern) both producing an identical consumption good but by a different technology. The
price of the good is normalized to 1 in both sectors for simplicity. In the traditional sector the
production is linear in the human capital of low–skilled labor H lt ,
Qt = BH
l
t (1.12)
where B > 0 is a productivity parameter, H lt = h
l
tL
l
t with L
l
t equal to the demanded share of
low–skilled labor in the traditional sector.
The modern sector, on the other hand, comprises pet skilled entrepreneurs who demand skilled
workers. The technology in the modern sector is identical for each entrepreneur and assumes
the following form,
fjt = θjt(h
e
t )
1−α(hwt L
w
jt)
α 0 < α < 1. (1.13)
where the subscript j stands for a firm j; Lwjt signifies the demanded skilled workers by en-
trepreneur j; θjt is a lognormally distributed idiosyncratic technology shock at period t, which is
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non–diversifiable and uncorrelated across entrepreneurs; we normalize µθ =
−σ2θ
2(1−α) and µa =
−σ2a
2
to avoid size effects stemming from the means of the statistic distributions.3
We assume that entrepreneurs employ skilled labor when the technology shock θjt has realized
so that they do not have to lay off skilled labor force in case of bad realization of the shock. We
further assume that agents cannot switch between professions, which ensures lack of dynamics
in the labor supply decision.
1.3 Market Equilibrium
1.3.1 Labor Market Equilibrium in the Traditional Sector
The profit of the representative firm in the traditional sector,
Πt = BH
l
t − wthltLlt (1.14)
is zero because low–skilled labor is the only input of production and it is remunerated according
to its marginal productivity. The optimization of the profit with respect to the low–skilled labor
Llt implies that the base wage is exactly equal to the productivity parameter in the traditional
sector,
wt = B (1.15)
Because in the labor market equilibrium the supply of low–skilled must be equal to the demand
for low–skilled, it should hold that
Llt = 1− pwt − pet −Mt (1.16)
where it can be shown that Mt =
pa
1−pa p
w
t is the equilibrium share of migrants with p
w
t equal to
the share of skilled workers remaining in the domestic country.
1.3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium in the Modern Sector
As the production of an entrepreneur exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to the
human capital of skilled workers, each entrepreneur obtains a profit (managerial wage) after the
wage bill is paid. The profit (managerial wage) of an entrepreneur is defined as,
pijt = θjt(h
e
t )
1−α(hwt L
w
jt)
α − hwt Lwjtwt (1.17)
3Notice that by this assumption we postulate that E(a) = 1 and E(θ) = exp(−α/(1−α)σ2θ/2), i.e. it is possible
that E(a) ≷ E(θ), but what matters for the mean preserving spread of expected profits and expected skilled
wages (as we will see later) is that E(a) = E(θ
1
1−α ) = 1.
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The average labor costs in the modern sector are independent of the moments of the lognormal
distribution. This result stems from the normalization of the mean of skilled workers’ abilities,
which we undertook in section 1.2.2. Entrepreneur j maximizes the profit (managerial wage) in
the modern sector with respect to skilled labor, which yields the skilled labor demand of firm
j,
Lwjt =
(αθjt
wt
) 1
1−α
(1.18)
Because the share of skilled workers’ income in the production of a firm (if we consider the
optimal demand for high–skilled workers) is,
αfjt = h
w
t L
w
jtwt (1.19)
the profit (managerial wage) of an entrepreneur should be defined as,
pijt = (1− α)θjt(het )1−α(hwt Lwjt)α (1.20)
Plugging (1.18) into (1.20), we obtain,
pijt = (1− α)θ
1
1−α
jt h
e
t
( α
wt
) α
1−α
(1.21)
Now it remains to determine the base skilled wage in (1.21) in order to find the profit of
entrepreneur j. We use the individual demand for skilled workers (1.18) to obtain the aggregate
demand for skilled workers.
( α
wt
) 1
1−α
∫
θ∈Θ
∫ pet
0
θ
1
1−α
jt f(θ)dθdj = p
w
t (1.22)
Because of the normalization of µθ in Section 1.2.2, the labor market equilibrium for high–skilled
is independent of the moments belonging to f(θ),
( α
wt
) 1
1−α
pet = p
w
t (1.23)
Then the base wage, which should be equal to the base wage in the traditional sector in equation
(1.15), can be derived after we rearrange equation (1.23),
α(pet )
1−α
(pwt )
1−α = wt (1.24)
and, moreover, we have that the expected skilled wage is equal to
α(pet )
1−α
(pwt )
1−α h
w
t = wth
w
t (1.25)
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The expected high–skilled wage (1.25) increases with the share of entrepreneurs pet and the
human capital of skilled wage earners hwt but decreases with the share of skilled workers p
w
t .
If we plug equation (1.24) in (1.21), we obtain that the profit (managerial wage) is,
pijt = (1− α)θ
1
1−α
jt h
e
t (p
w
t )
α(pet )
−α (1.26)
The entrepreneur’s income (1.26) decreases with the share of entrepreneurs pet but increases
with their human capital het and the share of skilled workers p
w
t .
The expected profit (managerial wage) after integrating equation (1.26) over the realization of
the technology shock in the modern sector is defined as,
E(pijt) = (1− α)het (pwt )α(pet )−α (1.27)
The base profit (the profit (1.26) per entrepreneur’s human capital unit) is,
pijt = (1− α)θ
1
1−α
jt (p
w
t )
α(pet )
−α (1.28)
The base expected profit or managerial wage (integrating (1.28) over the technology shock in
the modern sector) is defined as,
pit = (1− α)(pwt )α(pet )−α (1.29)
1.3.3 Total Output
The output in the modern sector is summation of the income of entrepreneurs and skilled
workers. Given equations (1.25) and (1.26), we come up with total production in the modern
sector equal to,
Yt = p
w
t wth
w
t
∫
a∈A
aif(a)da+ p
e
t
∫
θ∈Θ
pijtf(θ)dθ
Yt = (p
w
t h
w
t )
α(hetp
e
t )
1−α (1.30)
The output in the traditional sector is summation of the income of low–skilled workers,
Qt = wth
l
t
(
1− p
w
t
1− pa − p
e
t
)
(1.31)
Because the modern and traditional sector produce identical goods, we let the share of low–
skilled income to total income in the economy be constant over time and equal to b in line with
the neoclassical growth theory,
Qt
Qt + Yt
= b (1.32)
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If we rearrange (1.32) and apply (1.30) and (1.31), we obtain a relationship between the low–
skilled income and high–skilled income defined by the endogenous variables in the model,
wth
l
t
(
1− p
w
t
1− pa − p
e
t
)
=
b
(1− b)(p
w
t h
w
t )
α(hetp
e
t )
1−α (1.33)
Until now we defined the endogenous income variables (the skilled and low–skilled wage, the
entrepreneur’s profit, total income in the traditional and modern sector) in terms of the share of
entrepreneurs pet and skilled workers p
w
t in the population and γt, but we have not yet determined
how agents select occupations. This is our next step.
1.3.4 Equilibrium Occupational Choice
Proposition 1.1 In equilibrium ex–ante homogeneous and risk averse individuals should be ex–
ante indifferent between an occupation of a low–skilled worker, who obtains safe income, and a
risk–bearing high–skilled individual. The indifference of economic agents between an occupation
under risk and non–risky profession, even with a strict preference for migration of high–skilled
workers, defines endogenously the distribution of individuals across occupations in the domestic
country.
The ex–ante indifference of agents for choosing an occupation with risky or certain income
stems from the fact that all individuals are risk averse and ex–ante homogeneous. If individuals
were not ex–ante homogeneous and had advantage over the others in exercising a profession,
they would self–select into it. If ex–ante homogeneous agents were not indifferent to exercise an
occupation, because it brought higher utility, they would choose the profession with the highest
welfare, which would lead to the extinction of a specific occupation. Therefore,
E(V ej,t,t+1) =
∫
θ∈Θ
[
ln((1− ν)wthlt) + β ln((1 +Aν)htpijt+1)
]
f(θ)dθ =
E(V wi,t,t+1) =
∫
a∈A
[
ln((1− ν)wthlt) + β ln(ai(1 +Aν)htwt+1φp
a
)
]
f(a)da =
V lt,t+1 = ln(wth
l
t) + β ln(wt+1h
l
t+1)
The above integration boils down to finding the mean of E(ln aβi ) and E(ln θ
β
1−α
j ),
E(ln aβi ) = −β
σ2a
2
E(ln θ
β
1−α
j ) = −β
σ2θ
2(1− α)2
We substitute for the definitions of the expected utilities, use the normalization of µa and µθ
that we did in Section 1.2.2 as well as equation (1.33) and obtain a system of three equations
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and three unknowns (pwt , p
e
t , γt),
ln
[
((1− ν)wthlt)(hwt wt+1)βexp

− βσ2a2
Ł
(φf )p
aβ
]
= ln
[
((1− ν)wthlt)(het+1pit+1)βexp

− βσ2θ
2(1−α)2
Ł]
(1.34)
ln
[
((1− ν)wthlt)(hwt+1wt+1)βexp

− β σ2a2
Ł
(φf )p
aβ
]
= ln
[
(wth
l
t)(wt+1h
l
t+1)
β
]
(1.35)
wth
l
t
(
1− pwt1−pa − pet
)
= b(1−b)(p
w
t h
w
t )
α(hetp
e
t )
1−α (1.36)
Proposition 1.2 The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs, (low–)skilled workers, migrants and
the human capital spillover are constant over time and equal to4,
pe =
F
b(1− pa) +N + F (1.37)
pw =
(1− pa)N
b(1− pa) +N + F (1.38)
M =
paN
b(1− pa) +N + F (1.39)
Ll =
b(1− pa)
b(1− pa) +N + F (1.40)
γ = (1− ν) 1β (φf )paexp
(
− σ
2
a
2
)
(1 +Aν) (1.41)
where F = (1− α)(1− b)(1− pa)(1− ν) 1β exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 ), N = α(1− b)(φf )p
a
exp(−σ2a2 )(1− ν)
1
β
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.1
Corollary 1.1 The base wage wt and the expected base income of entrepreneurs pit are constant
over time.
Proof. The base wage wt and the expected base profit pit should be constant if the distribution
of agents across professions is constant.
Proposition 1.3 Risk averse and skilled agents (entrepreneurs and skilled workers) obtain a
risk and skill premium over the certain low–skilled wage because of higher labor productivity and
as reimbursement for facing uncertainty in income. The risk premium that entrepreneurs gain
is higher than the risk premium of skilled workers as firm owners bear more risk, i.e. σ2θ > σ
2
a
by assumption.
4The share of low–skilled could be calculated by the assumption that the population share is normalized to
one, while M = p
a
1−pa p
w. From now on we leave the time subindex for the variables which are proved to be
constant.
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Proof. The expected risk premium of entrepreneurs over the expected skilled wage φt,
φt = E(pijt)− whwt
φt = (1− α)
(pw
pe
)α
het
[
1− exp
(
− 1
2
( σ2θ
(1− α)2 − σ
2
a
)) 1
(φf )pa
]
(1.42)
is always positive because of the assumptions that φf > 1, 0 < α < 1 and σ2θ > σ
2
a,
(φf )p
a − exp
(
− 1
2
( σ2θ
(1− α)2 − σ
2
a
))
> 0⇔ pa lnφf︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> −1
2
( σ2θ
(1− α)2 − σ
2
a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
The risk and skill premium of skilled workers over the sure income of low–skilled φ′t,
φ′t = whwt − wht−1γ
φ′t = wht−1[(1 +Aν)− γ] (1.43)
is always positive under the assumption that 1 +Aν > γ. Therefore, the expected risk and skill
premium of entrepreneurs over the low–skilled income is positive under the same assumption.
1.3.5 Income Distribution and Growth
Having made the assumption in equation (1.33) and with the help of equations (1.25) and
(1.27), we can determine the income distribution in terms of income shares. The income share
of low–skilled workers is, as we assumed, equal to b. Therefore, the income shares of high–skilled
agents, entrepreneurs, and high–skilled workers are respectively,
Yt
Qt + Yt
= (1− b) E(pijt)p
e
Qt + Yt
= (1− b)(1− α) wh
w
t p
w
Qt + Yt
= (1− b)α (1.44)
In line with the neoclassical growth theory, income shares are constant. Entrepreneurs’ in-
come and high–skilled workers’ earnings are lognormally distributed because of the presence
of the lognormally distributed idiosyncratic technological shock and skilled workers’ abilities
respectively. Low–skilled workers obtain a uniform low–skilled wage. As we already showed,
entrepreneurs and skilled workers obtain a risk and skill premium over the safe low–skilled
wage because they bear occupational risk and are more productive after education. Expected
entrepreneurs’ profits are higher than expected skilled workers’ wages because entrepreneurs
experience a higher variance in their income distribution by assumption.
It remains to determine only the growth of average human capital in the economy. The average
human capital in the economy is equal to the human capital which is accumulated by skilled
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individuals and the human capital which is inherited for free by low–skilled. Therefore, the
growth rate gh in the economy is,
1 + gh =
pw(1 +Aν)
1−M +
pe(1 +Aν)
1−M +
(
1− pw1−pa − pe
)
γ
1−M (1.45)
After substituting for the equilibrium occupational choice and rearranging, we obtain for gh,
1 + gh = (1 +Aν)
pw
1−M
( 1− α
α(φf )pa
exp
(
− 1
2
( σ2θ
(1− α)2 − σ
2
a
))
+
α(1− b) + b
α(1− b)
)
(1.46)
where pe/pw = 1−α
α(φf )pa
exp
(
− 12
(
σ2θ
(1−α)2 − σ2a
))
, M = papw/(1 − pa) and the equilibrium share
of skilled workers pw in (1.46) has been already defined in the previous subsection.
1.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we provide a sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium occupational shares, the
growth equation and the income variables with respect to the probability of migration pa, the
wedge between the skilled wage at home and abroad φf , and the risk measures σa and σθ.
Proposition 1.4
(i) The influence of pa on pw for pw ≶ (1−p
a)2 lnφf
1+(1−pa) lnφf , and the influence of p
a on pe and Ll is,5
∂pw
∂pa
≷ 0 ∂p
e
∂pa
< 0
∂Ll
∂pa
< 0
(ii) The influence of φf on pw, pe, and Ll is,
∂pw
∂φf
> 0
∂pe
∂φf
< 0
∂Ll
∂φf
< 0
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.2.
As we see from Proposition 1.4, an increase in the probability of skilled workers’ migration
improves the share of skilled workers remaining at home only if the equilibrium share of skilled
workers in the domestic country is relatively small. This result can be explained as follows:
from one hand, a higher skilled migration probability increases the expected welfare of skilled
workers (for a constant expected skilled wage), which attracts more agents in education; from
the other hand, the competition between skilled agents remaining in the domestic country rises
and the expected skilled wage and, therefore, utility fall with higher pa, reducing the share of
native agents willing to become skilled employees; third the negative impact of pa on pw can
5The structure ∂y
∂x
≶ 0 if a ≷ b is to read: ∂y
∂x
< 0 if a > b and ∂y
∂x
> 0 if a < b in all propositions
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be strengthened by the ex–post decline in the share of domestic educated workers due to skilled
outmigration. Only if the first effect is stronger than the others, a larger brain drain rate leads
to a higher share of skilled wage earners (net of migration). For the positive effect of pa on pw to
take place, the equilibrium share of skilled workers should not exceed 56.9% if pa = 0.05, 44.5%
if pa = 0.2, and 36.6% if pa = 0.3 for a value of φf = 4.8, which we use in our calibration.6
These threshold values of pw are far beyond the empirically observed shares of skilled workers
in Eastern Europe. An increase in pa, on the other hand, decreases the equilibrium share of
entrepreneurs and low-skilled workers. Entrepreneurship falls with pa because the relatively less
risky foreign wage is attractive enough for risk-averse agents to switch away from risk-bearing
firm ownership to the end of migration. The share of low-skilled individuals decreases with pa
because agents perceive the opportunity to invest in human capital, which is a prerequisite to
earn a higher foreign wage abroad, as more rewarding despite the presence of risk in skilled
earnings.
A higher wedge in the payment between skilled workers’ income at home and abroad φf has
a clear positive effect on the equilibrium share of skilled workers remaining at home but a
negative influence on the share of entrepreneurs and low-skilled individuals. This effect is a
natural consequence of the improvement of skilled workers’ welfare due to a rise in φf .
Proposition 1.5
(i) The influence of the risk measure σa on p
w, pe, and Ll is,
∂pw
∂σa
< 0
∂pe
∂σa
> 0
∂Ll
∂σa
> 0
(ii) The influence of the risk measure σθ on p
w, pe, and Ll is,
∂pw
∂σθ
> 0
∂pe
∂σθ
< 0
∂Ll
∂σθ
> 0
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.2.
As we see from Proposition 1.5, a higher risk measure σa reduces the equilibrium share of risk-
averse skilled workers. The equilibrium share of entrepreneurs and low-skilled workers increases
with σa due to risk aversion. In the same token, the risk measure σθ has a negative effect on
the share of entrepreneurs and a positive effect on the share of skilled and low-skilled workers
due to risk aversion.
6For higher φf the threshold pw improves.
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Proposition 1.6 The influence of pa, φf , and σa as well as σθ on growth g
h is,
(i)
∂(1 + gh)
∂pa
> 0 if pw <
(1− pa)2 lnφf
1 + (1− pa) lnφf
(ii)
∂(1 + gh)
∂φf
> 0
(iii)
∂(1 + gh)
∂σa
< 0
(iv)
∂(1 + gh)
∂σθ
≷ 0
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.3.
In general all parameters which decrease the share of low–skilled agents lead to a rise in the
accumulation of human capital. This effect can be explained with the inferiority of human cap-
ital which low–skilled possess compared to the knowledge of skilled workers and entrepreneurs.
In other words, due to the assumption that 1 + Aν > γ, low–skilled do not contribute to the
human capital accumulation as much as skilled agents. Therefore, the influence of brain drain
on growth is positive only if pa induces a higher equilibrium share of domestic skilled workers
by decreasing the share of low–skilled. This condition is fulfilled if pw < (1−p
a)2 lnφf
1+(1−pa) lnφf . It should
be noticed that the share of entrepreneurs falls but this is only to the advantage of the share of
skilled workers at home (who have equal human capital as entrepreneurs). On the other hand,
brain drain has an ambiguous impact on growth if pw declines with higher pa because the effect
of pa on the share of skilled migrants M remains unclear.
A rise in the wedge between the payment of skilled wage earners at home and abroad φf leads
to a stronger growth rate because it makes agents switch away from the low–skilled profession
to a profession as skilled workers. Even though entrepreneurship declines, it is to the advantage
of the share of skilled wage earners at home, who attain the same level of education. In other
words, the falling entrepreneurship rate does not exercise any effect on growth as long as pw
increases overproportionally (i.e. if more agents from the low–skilled sector decide to become
skilled wage earners in the domestic country). Moreover, a loss in the population share results
due to a rising share of skilled migrants, which boosts additionally the accumulation of average
human capital.
A higher risk in skilled workers’ earnings σa makes more individuals opt for a profession as en-
trepreneurs but also low–skilled, which implies that the total share of skilled agents remaining
at home falls. As a result, the growth rate declines, also due to the falling share of skilled mi-
grants, which reduces the human capital per person in society (all other things being constant).
A higher risk in entrepreneurial profits σθ leads to a rising share of skilled workers but also
low–skilled out of the pool of entrepreneurs. In this way the total share of domestic skilled
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falls, which would reduce human capital accumulation if there were no other effects on growth.
However, a higher share of skilled employees at home is accompanied with a higher share of
migrants, which enhances the average human capital of agents (all other things being constant)
through the positive effect of a declining population on growth.
Proposition 1.7
(i) The influence of pa, φf σa and σθ on the short–run low–skilled income is,
∂(whlt)
∂pa
> 0
∂(whlt)
∂φf
> 0
∂(whlt)
∂σa
< 0
∂(whlt)
∂σθ
< 0
(ii) The influence of pa, φf σa and σθ on the short–run expected high–skilled wage is,
∂(whwt )
∂pa
< 0
∂(whwt )
∂φf
< 0
∂(whwt )
∂σa
> 0
∂(whwt )
∂σθ
< 0
(iii) The influence of pa, φf σa and σθ on the short–run expected entrepreneurial profit is,
∂E(pijt)
∂pa
> 0
∂E(pijt)
∂φf
> 0
∂E(pijt)
∂σa
< 0
∂E(pijt)
∂σθ
> 0
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.4.
Proposition 1.7 makes statements about the short–run development of the income of economic
agents, i.e. before the parameters’ changes are incorporated in growth. In the short run a higher
probability of skilled migration decreases the entrepreneurs–skilled workers ratio, which leads to
a fall in the expected skilled wage (via the base wage) and to a rise in expected profits (via the
expected profit per efficiency labor unit). This outcome is in response to the stronger competi-
tion on the labor market for skilled workers and the weaker competition among entrepreneurs.
The low–skilled wage grows due to an improving spillover γ despite the decline in the base wage
induced by higher pa.
The increase in the gap between the foreign and domestic skilled wage decreases the expected
income of skilled workers but increases the expected earnings of entrepreneurs because of im-
provement in the skilled workers–entrepreneurs ratio. Higher φf makes low–skilled income rise
due to a larger spillover of human capital γ despite the fall in the base wage.
Skilled workers’ risk in earnings σa decreases the competition among the falling share of edu-
cated wage earners and raises it for the growing share of entrepreneurs, which drives expected
skilled wages up and leads to a fall in expected entrepreneurs’ profits. The income of low–skilled
also falls due to a lower spillover γ although the base wage grows.
Higher entrepreneurial risk σθ makes some agents deviate to the relatively safer professions
of a skilled or low–skilled worker, which increases the expected profits of entrepreneurs (who
experience lower competition) and decreases the nominal income of all workers (due to the fall
in the base wage in response to stronger competition on the labor market).
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Proposition 1.8 The long–run influence of pa, φf , and the risk measures σa and σθ on the
long–term income of economic agents depends on the impact of pa, φf , σa and σθ on growth g
h.
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.4.
Proposition 1.8 considers what is the effect of pa, φf , σa and σθ on the long–term income of
individuals. While in the short term the sensitivity of income with respect to pa, φf , σa and σθ
is determined by the distribution of agents among occupations, in the long term the growth of
average human capital is decisive for the influence of pa, φf , σa and σθ on the income variables.
This can be explained as follows: the direction of change in earnings in response to a change
of a parameter depends on the base income (which is related to the distribution of agents
across professions) and on the growth of average human capital. In the long run a parameter
change will be incorporated in the growth of average human capital so many times so that the
growth effect will dominate the short run effect of altered occupational choice. In this way
we can conclude that long–term earnings will be completely dependent on the influence of the
parameters on growth.
1.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model by defining the parameters: α, b, β, σa, σθ, A, p
a and φf to match
empirical data for the benchmark model (BM). We assume that at period t = 0 the average
human capital is h0 = 1. Furthermore, human capital grows at an annual growth rate of 0.025,
which implies that if an agent lives for 60 years (we exclude the retirement), and each period is
30 years, we come up with the value A = 6.03 in the growth equation.
We choose β = 0.74, which implies that the annual discount factor of expected utility for 30
years is 0.99. The educational time ν is set at 0.5, which reflects that agents have to invest 15
years in education in the first period of their life before they become skilled.
The value of b and α are defined to correspond to an empirically observable entrepreneurial
income share. For b = 0.5 and α = 0.6 we obtain that the entrepreneurial income share is equal
to 20%, which is close to the quoted profit share in the economic literature (See Clemens (2008),
Clemens and Heinemann (2009)).
The measures of risk σθ (0.67) and σa (0.4) are chosen to target a skilled workers’ share of
approximately 18% and a high–skilled entrepreneurial rate of 3%. These calibration targets
imply that the total share of educated is around 21% in line with empirical data by Eurostat
(See Appendix 1.9.5). We obtain the targeted value of 3% entrepreneurship rate as follow: (i)
first, we consider that the share of skilled entrepreneurs out of total entrepreneurs (according
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to Morris (2011) who uses data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)) is approxi-
mately 41.5%,7 (ii) second, the average entrepreneurship rate in the Eastern European countries
is approximately 7%–10% according to Xavier et al. (2012) performing their analysis also with
data of GEM (depending on whether Latvia and Estonia are respectively excluded or not).
This implies that the share of (skilled) entrepreneurs is around 3-4%. Nevertheless, we target
an entrepreneurship rate of 3% to mimic the relatively higher job creation of fewer (skilled)
entrepreneurs according to Morris (2011).
For the baseline model under brain drain we set the probability of skilled outflow at 5%, which
corresponds to the emigration probability of high–skilled from Eastern Europe according to
Docquier and Marfouk (2004) (See Appendix 1.9.5 for brain drain rates of separate countries).
For φf we assume that it is equal to 4.8, which reflects the observed gap in the average high–
skilled remuneration in Eastern Europe vs. Western and Northern Europe among skilled workers
according to Eurostat (See Appendix 1.9.5). Based on our calculations with data from Euro-
stat, the average annual remuneration of high–skilled employees in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia for the period 2003 till 2008 is approximately 8300 euro per year,
while the average annual remuneration for the same period of high–skilled employees in Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and Sweden is around 40 000 euro, which
implies φf = 4.8.
By the resulting specifications we obtain a skill premium equal to approximately 2.56 in the
benchmark model. It is higher than the observed skill premium of the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Bulgaria and Romania but lower than the observed skill differential in remuneration in Slovenia
and Cyprus according to Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) (See Appendix 1.9.5).
The sensitivity analysis of the parameter pa as well as φf , σa and σθ are shown in Table 1.1.
We present the calibration analysis of higher pa (which is increased stepwise by 100% compared
to the benchmark in order to replicate empirically observed brain drain rates), φf (which is in-
creased by 50% and 100%), σa and σθ (both increased by 25% and 50% to reflect the observed
trends for the share of skilled workers and entrepreneurs). We compare alternative steady states
given changes in the parameters of interest and do not explore a transition from one equilibrium
occupational choice to the other. We report the income variables in Table 1.1 for t = 1 (notice
that h0 = 1) so that the low–skilled income, depending on the average human capital from the
previous period, is defined.
7The formula for calculation is the sum of high–growth (0.04) and moderate growth entrepreneurship rate (0.06)
out of total entrepreneurship plus the low–growth share of entrepreneurship, who are educated 0.04 + 0.06 +
0.9 · 35% = 41.5%, where 35% is the share of skilled entrepreneurs attaining low–growth in their firms. We
also assume that all agents with high–growth and low–growth firms are skilled.
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Table 1.1: Calibration Results for pa, φf , σa, σθ
BM pa1 p
a
2 p
a
3 φ
f
1 φ
f
2 σa,1 σa,2 σθ,1 σθ,2
pw 0.1826 0.1923 0.2017 0.2107 0.1856 0.1878 0.1761 0.1683 0.1857 0.1873
pe 0.03 0.0292 0.0283 0.0273 0.0299 0.0298 0.0302 0.0305 0.0138 0.0053
Ll 0.7778 0.7572 0.7344 0.7093 0.7747 0.7726 0.7844 0.7923 0.7907 0.7976
γ 1.5711 1.6993 1.8379 1.9879 1.6033 1.6265 1.502 1.4216 1.5711 1.5711
gh 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.0255 0.0259 0.0238 0.0224 0.0244 0.0242
E(pijt) 4.7482 4.977 5.2168 5.4682 4.8063 4.848 4.6217 4.4717 7.6234 13.5974
whwt 1.1694 1.1333 1.0983 1.0644 1.16 1.1533 1.1907 1.2172 0.8529 0.5799
whlt 0.4576 0.4797 0.5028 0.527 0.4632 0.4672 0.4454 0.431 0.3338 0.2269
1+Aν
γ 2.5555 2.3627 2.1845 2.0197 2.5042 2.4685 2.6731 2.8243 2.5555 2.5555
Parameters calibrated as follows: pa1 = 0.1, p
a
2 = 0.15, p
a
3 = 0.2, φ
f
1 = 7.2, φ
f
2 = 9.6, σa,1 = 0.5,
σa,2 = 0.6, σθ,1 = 0.8375, σθ,2 = 1.005
As it is evident in Table 1.1, doubling the benchmark brain drain rate from 0.05 to 0.1, we
obtain that the share of skilled workers increases by 5.3% (from 0.1826 to 0.1923), while if
brain drain rises from 0.05 to 0.2, the share of skilled workers at home improves by 15.4%
(from 0.1826 to 0.2107). This result stems from the fact that risk–bearing entrepreneurs and
low–skilled workers are disadvantaged in terms of expected utility compared to skilled workers
with a growing probability to obtain a higher foreign expected wage abroad. As a result, growth
increases to 0.027 when the benchmark brain drain reaches a value of 0.1 and to 0.031 when the
skilled outmigration becomes as high as 0.2. Due to the increase in competition among skilled
workers, their expected nominal wage falls by 3.1% (from 1.1694 to 1.1333) if pa reaches 0.1 and
by 8.98% (from 1.1694 to 1.0644) if pa reaches 0.2. The expected profit of entrepreneurs goes
up due to the lower competition among entrepreneurs by 4.8% (from 4.7482 to 4.977) when
the skilled outmigration rises to 0.1 and by 15.2% (from 4.7482 to 5.4682) when the skilled
outmigration attains a value of 0.2. Low–skilled, who are fewer, are allowed to inherit a higher
share of the average human capital from the previous period γ, and their total income increases
although their base wage, which is pegged to the base wage of skilled agents, falls. Similar in
magnitude to the reaction of the expected profit to changes in pa is the response of the short–run
low–skilled wage to changes in pa.
A higher wedge between the remuneration of educated at home and abroad φf improves the
expected utility of skilled agents, whose share increases, at the cost of the population of en-
trepreneurs and low–skilled. Doubling φf from 4.8 to 9.6, we obtain a rise in pw equal to 2.8%
(from 0.1826 to 0.1878). Because φf increases the incentive of low–skilled to obtain education,
growth rises to 0.0259 when φf improves to 9.6. As a consequence of the lower competition
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between entrepreneurs, expected profits go up by approximately 2.1% (from 4.7482 to 4.848)
when φf attains 9.6. The expected skilled wages fall by 1.38% (from 1.1694 to 1.1533) in the
same case because of more intense competition, while low–skilled income improves by 2.1%
(from 0.4576 to 0.4672) due to rising γ despite a declining base wage.
A higher risk measure σa in Table 1.1 decreases the incentive effect of individuals to accumulate
human capital: some prefer employment as low–skilled or entrepreneurs. The fall in pw is equal
to 7.8% (from 0.1826 to 0.1683) when σa rises by 50%. Growth rate falls to 0.0224 in this case
because the economy ends up with more low–skilled agents. The weaker competition among
skilled workers makes the expected skilled wage go up by 4.1% (from 1.1694 to 1.2172) when
σa reaches 0.6. Entrepreneurs’ expected profits decrease by 5.8% (from 4.7482 to 4.4717) in the
same case, while the low–skilled wage decreases by 5.8% (from 0.4576 to 0.431) because of a
lower spillover of human capital accumulation γ (in spite of a higher base wage).
Higher σθ discourages agents to become entrepreneurs due to risk aversion. They switch away
from entrepreneurship to occupations as skilled and low–skilled workers. Entrepreneurship falls
by 82.3% (from 0.03 to 0.0053) when σθ rises to 1.005. The increase in the share of skilled
workers is not high enough to compensate for the fall in entrepreneurship, which would lead to
higher growth, because some agents prefer to obtain an occupation in the low–skilled sector.
That is why the growth rate falls to 0.0242 with σθ increasing by 50%. Entrepreneurs obtain
higher expected profits, which rise by a factor of 2.86 (from 4.7482 to 13.5974) for an increase
in σθ to 1.005 because of the lower competition. In the same case the expected skilled wage
declines by 50.4% (from 1.1694 to 0.5799) due to higher competition on the skilled labor market.
Low–skilled wages fall (because of a decline in the base wage) by 50.4% (from 0.4576 to 0.2269)
if σθ rises by 50%.
Having discussed the size effects of pa, φf , σa and σθ on the occupational choice and the short–
run income, we can conclude the following: First, brain drain has a stronger positive influence
on the endogenous variables compared to the wedge in skilled earnings between the foreign
and the domestic country; Second, the risk in skilled workers’ earnings has a larger (negative)
influence on growth than the risk in entrepreneurs’ profits. Third, the risk in entrepreneurs’
profits leads to stronger changes in the income of all professions compared to the risk in skilled
workers earnings. As will see later, this causes the dominance of σθ in terms of short term
welfare compared to σa.
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1.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section we perform a welfare analysis by determining the welfare of young agents Vy,t,
agents who have reached their middle age: Ve,t (entrepreneurs), Vsw,t (skilled workers), Vlsw,t
(low–skilled workers) and migrants Vm,t at period t. V
d
t is the sum of the lifetime utilities of all
domestic individuals at a specific point, while V˜ dt = V
d
t /(1 −M) is the average welfare of the
population remaining at home at the same period, M being the share of migrants as we earlier
mentioned (the index d stands for the domestic country). Vt measures not only the utility of
the domestic population but also considers the lifetime welfare of migrants abroad. The average
welfare of all agents V˜t is equal to total welfare Vt because the population share is normalized
to one.
We report V˜ dt , which is important for government’s decision making, as well as V˜t, which is
essential for the decision making of the social planner. We estimate the average domestic
welfare of the remaining individuals in the source country (and not total domestic welfare) in
order to avoid understatement of the welfare measure due to the fall in the population share
in response to a rising brain drain probability.8 For the ex–post welfare analysis we need the
following definitions,
Vt = 0.5Vy,t + p
e
t−1Ve,t + p
w
t−1Vsw,t + (0.5− pet−1 − pwt−1 −Mt−1)Vlsw,t +Mt−1Vm,t
V dt = 0.5Vy,t + p
e
t−1Ve,t + p
w
t−1Vsw,t + (0.5− pet−1 − pwt−1 −Mt−1)Vlsw,t
Vy,t = E(V
e
j,t,t+1) = E(V
w
i,t,t+1) = V
l
t,t+1
Ve,t =
∫
θ∈Θ
ln(pijt)f(θ)dθ
Vsw,t =
∫
a∈A
ln(whwt ai)f(a)d(a)
Vm,t =
∫
a∈A
ln(whwt φ
fai)f(a)d(a)
Vlsw,t = ln(wht−1γ)
We perform the welfare analysis from period t = 1 till period t = 4, i.e. we look at the influence
of the parameters on the welfare of the individuals for the next 120 years with t = 1 being the
period of an initial parameter change (h0 = 1). Following Soares (2008), we define our social
welfare function for each period and do not give weight to future generations in order to make
our results independent of the welfare weight of next generations.
It is already known that the influence of a parameter on long–run welfare in an overlapping
8This problem does not exist when we consider total welfare, which comprises of the welfare of the domestic
population and migrants.
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generations setting is determined by the impact of the same parameter on growth (see Yakita
(2004), Wong and Yip (1999)). This is a normal consequence of the fact that welfare depends
positively on growth and that the further in future welfare is computed, the higher is the change
in welfare due to the accumulation of the new parameter over many periods through growth.
From here we can expect that the long–term influence of pa, φf , σa and σθ on (domestic) welfare
is reciprocal in sign to the impact of pa, φf , σa and σθ on growth.
Alternative values of pa, φf , σa and σθ change the lifetime utility of young agents in the period
of the introduction of a new parameter t = 1 because it has an impact on the occupational
choice (and, therefore, future remuneration and growth). Alternative values of pa also influ-
ence the welfare of middle–aged in the same period although agents are not allowed to switch
occupations and γ is constant. A rise in pa leads to a fall in the share of middle–aged skilled
workers, which decreases unexpectedly the skilled labor supply and leads to adjustment in the
base wages and the base profit in t = 1. Higher φf raises the welfare of middle–aged migrants
in t = 1, while pa raises the total utility of migrants in t = 1 because of the sudden increase
in their share M (for constant pw) during the same period. Moreover, higher σa or higher σθ
reduces respectively the expected utility of young and middle–aged skilled workers or young
and middle–aged entrepreneurs in all periods due to their risk aversion.
The theoretical value of ex–post welfare is equal to the ex–ante expected welfare of the agents
who incur risk in their occupational choice. All young agents have the same ex–post expected
utility by the equilibrium occupational choice condition. We keep the occupational choice of
middle–aged equal to the occupational choice of the previous period (which is the benchmark
occupational choice for t = 1). This is presented by the subindex t− 1 in the share of middle–
aged pet−1, pwt−1 and Mt−1 belonging to the welfare equations above, which implies that the
decision on an occupation is taken at period t − 1. The welfare of migrants is not explicitly
shown in the following analysis but can be easily deducted from Table 1.2.
We follow the calibration analysis and assume that the starting point in the economy is t = 0,
while we consider the realization of the income variables at period t = 1. This allows for deter-
mination of the human capital of low–skilled. We increase (stepwise) the brain drain rate and
the gap in skilled remuneration at home and abroad by 100%. We do not report pa = 0.15, as
its influence on welfare compared to pa = 0.1 and 0.2 is qualitatively the same. Risk measures
in the sensitivity analysis are raised by 25% and 50%.
As we see from Table 1.2 in t = 1 (the period of the parameter change with occupational choice
of middle–aged fixed to the benchmark), higher brain drain results in higher expected welfare
of young agents. This can be explained with the positive effect of higher expected growth trig-
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Table 1.2: Transitional Welfare Analysis with Respect to pa, φf , σa, σθ
BM pa1 p
a
2 φ
f
1 σa,1 σa,2 σθ,1 σθ,2
Vy,t=1 −0.8127 −0.7574 −0.6619 −0.7973 −0.8327 −0.8571 −1.0462 −1.3317
Vem,t=1 0.155 0.0917 0.0211 0.155 0.155 0.155 −0.6341 −1.5986
Vsw,t=1 0.0765 0.1187 0.1658 0.0765 0.0315 −0.0235 0.0765 0.0765
Vlsw,t=1 −0.7817 −0.7396 −0.6925 −0.7817 −0.7817 −0.7817 −0.7817 −0.7817
V˜ dt=1 −2.0507 −2.0432 −2.0356 −2.043 −2.1062 −2.1741 −2.9654 −4.0833
V˜t=1 −2.0944 −1.9763 −1.7992 −2.0801 −2.1944 −2.3166 −3.0003 −4.1075
Vy,t=2 0.4747 0.5494 0.749 0.5303 0.4025 0.3139 −0.0859 −0.7633
Vem,t=2 0.8949 0.9126 0.9779 0.9157 0.8679 0.8349 0.5792 0.1935
Vsw,t=2 0.8164 0.7558 0.6642 0.8026 0.7894 0.7564 0.5008 0.115
Vlsw,t=2 −0.0418 −0.024 0.0412 −0.021 −0.0688 −0.1018 −0.3575 −0.7432
V˜ dt=2 −1.0344 −1.0075 −0.9266 −0.9985 −1.1269 −1.2406 −2.295 −3.8225
V˜t=2 −1.0808 −1.0146 −0.8359 −1.0375 −1.2185 −1.3875 −2.3316 −3.8474
Vy,t=3 1.7622 1.9397 2.3415 1.8633 1.6304 1.4687 1.1745 0.4827
Vem,t=3 1.6348 1.7116 1.8931 1.6817 1.5736 1.4985 1.3036 0.9096
Vsw,t=3 1.5563 1.5548 1.5794 1.5687 1.4951 1.4201 1.2252 0.8311
Vlsw,t=3 0.6981 0.775 0.9564 0.7451 0.6369 0.5619 0.3669 −0.0271
V˜ dt=3 −0.0181 0.0936 0.3461 0.0539 −0.1577 −0.3292 −1.3 −2.8388
V˜t=3 −0.0671 0.08 0.4179 0.012 −0.2517 −0.4782 −1.3392 −2.8663
Vy,t=4 3.0496 3.33 3.9339 3.1963 2.8583 2.6236 2.435 1.7287
Vem,t=4 2.3747 2.5107 2.8083 2.4478 2.2793 2.1622 2.028 1.6257
Vsw,t=4 2.2962 2.3538 2.4946 2.3348 2.2008 2.0838 1.9496 1.5472
Vlsw,t=4 1.438 1.574 1.8716 1.5112 1.3426 1.2255 1.0913 0.689
V˜ dt=4 0.9982 1.1947 1.6187 1.1063 0.8116 0.5822 −0.3049 −1.8551
V˜t=4 0.9465 1.1747 1.6717 1.0616 0.7152 0.431 −0.3468 −1.8853
Parameters calibrated as follows: pa1 = 0.1, p
a
2 = 0.2, φ
f
1 = 9.6, σa,1 = 0.5, σa,2 = 0.6, σθ,1 = 0.8375,
σθ,2 = 1.005
gered by a rising share of skilled workers in the economy. In the first period the only losers
are middle–aged entrepreneurs because they experience a sudden fall in the skilled labor force,
which drives skilled earnings and middle–aged skilled workers’ welfare up and reduces expected
profits and the welfare of firm owners. Low–skilled earnings and the welfare of low–skilled
middle–aged surge due to a rise in the base skilled wage, which is pegged to the low–skilled base
wage. All in all, average welfare at t = 1 rises because of the prevailing positive effect of higher
brain drain on the expected welfare of young, and middle–aged workers. In the second period
after the introduction of a higher migration probability, middle–aged skilled workers experience
lower welfare because the positive effect which higher growth has on their earnings is dominated
by the negative effect of stronger competition. In the third period middle–aged skilled work-
ers’ payment recovers from the negative effect of competition if brain drain is relatively strong
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(pa = 0.2), for relatively small skilled outmigration pa = 0.1 skilled workers’ remuneration and
welfare remain lower than the benchmark also in this period. In the fourth period all agents
in society are winners compared to the benchmark due to improving gh. Average (domestic)
welfare in all periods exceeds the benchmark social utility.
A rise in the wedge in payment of educated between the domestic and the foreign country in-
duces higher welfare for the young agents in the same period because of improved human capital
accumulation. The income and welfare of (low)–skilled middle–aged agents in the first period
remains constant. Middle–aged skilled workers become temporarily losers in t = 2 because of
the increased competition in spite of the improvement in human capital accumulation. Average
(domestic) welfare exceeds the benchmark in every period due to improvement in growth.
Higher risk in the occupational choice of skilled workers σa has a negative impact on the ex-
pected welfare of young individuals in t ≥ 1 reflected by a reduction in the accumulation of
human capital and disutility due to higher skilled income variance. The welfare of middle–aged
entrepreneurs and middle–aged low–skilled workers in the first period remains the same because
the occupational choice for middle–aged is fixed. The welfare of middle–aged skilled workers
falls as they experience higher variance in the income distribution although their base wages
are constant in t = 1. All in all, average (domestic) welfare deteriorates in the first period. This
trend is preserved next periods due to dropping human capital accumulation. The expected
utility of middle–aged skilled workers also decreases in all periods after t = 1 because of de-
clining growth and because the disutility in response to a higher risk measure dominates the
positive effect of lower competition on skilled wages.
In the period of the introduction of a higher risk measure in the occupational choice of en-
trepreneurs σθ, young agents experience a decline in expected welfare due to a declining growth
rate and disutility due to a rise in the volatility of entrepreneurs’ profits. The same is valid
for t > 1. The welfare of all middle–aged workers in t = 1 remains the same. Entrepreneurs
experience a decline in utility in t = 1 because of the higher risk in income they incur. The
lower competition among entrepreneurs for t > 1 driving their expected profits up is not strong
enough to result in higher welfare because agents are risk averse and experience disutility due
to the presence of a larger risk measure in their profits. Average (domestic) welfare in t = 1
falls. The same applies for all periods after period t = 1, which can be explained with declining
human capital accumulation making agents worse off.
According to Table 1.2, an increase in the entrepreneurial technological risk has a stronger
(negative) impact on social utility compared to a rise in the occupational choice risk of skilled
workers in the short run. This result can be explained with the relatively larger effect which
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σθ exerts on the income distribution. In the very long run, however, the impact of a larger risk
measure in the human capital of skilled workers is expected to exert a stronger (negative) effect
on welfare because of its stronger negative effect on growth. The (positive) impact of higher
brain drain on V˜t and V˜
d
t is on average larger than the impact of φ
f , which is valid for the short
and the long run.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the relationship between occupational choice under risk and brain
drain in the context a two–period overlapping generations endogenous growth model with human
capital accumulation. The model draws on the work of Kanbur (1979), and Clemens (2008)
for occupational choice under risk and Beine et al. (2001) for probabilistic brain drain. At
the beginning of life ex–ante homogeneous and risk–averse agents decide among occupations
as low–skilled in the traditional sector, entrepreneurs or skilled workers in the modern sector.
High–skilled workers, who are allowed to migrate, experience variation in their income due to
ex–ante unknown labor productivities (at home and abroad), while entrepreneurs are subject
to a technology shock, which is beyond their control. The equilibrium occupational choice is
dictated by equality in the utilities of all agents. Growth depends on the share of agents, who
decide to take up a profession as skilled (either skilled workers or entrepreneurs) and remain in
the domestic country. That is how brain drain and risk in the occupational choice of educated
play a vital role in human capital accumulation.
Theory predicts that higher brain drain rates bias the occupational choice of individuals away
from entrepreneurship, but the total share of educated agents rises if the proportion of skilled
workers in the population net of skilled migration is relatively low (lower than 36% for a brain
drain probability of 30% and lower than 56.9% for a brain drain probability of 5% and for
domestic skilled wage, which is 4.8 time lower than the foreign one). Entrepreneurship becomes
a less attractive occupation for a higher wedge between the skilled earnings at home and abroad,
but the share of educated workers improves. The occupational risk in entrepreneurship and
skilled workers’ employment makes agents deviate respectively to alternative employment.
Growth increases in response to a larger brain drain rate if the share of skilled workers in the
domestic country improves. Human capital accumulation rises in the wedge between the skilled
wage in the domestic and the foreign country and falls in the risk of skilled workers’ earnings
but behaves ambiguously with respect to the technological risk of entrepreneurial profits.
Our calibration shows that brain drain has a stronger (positive) effect on growth and welfare
than the gap in skilled earnings between the foreign and the domestic country in the short and
25
the long run. The risk measure in the occupational choice of skilled workers leads to a higher
decline in growth than the risk in entrepreneurs’ profits, so the former has a stronger negative
effect on welfare in the long run. However, an increase in the risk in entrepreneurs’ profits has
a stronger (negative) effect on social utility in the short run compared to the risk in skilled
workers’ earnings.
Given the unfavorable effect of a higher risk measure on welfare, the construction of an insurance
system for skilled agents may be considered as an extension of the model. Another omission in
the probabilistic brain drain theory is the assumption that young agents cannot borrow when
they make their educational decision. Nevertheless, post socialist Eastern European countries
have experienced a gradual opening of the credit markets although borrowing constraints still
exist. In this respect it is relevant to examine the impact of (probabilistic) brain drain for
different levels of borrowing constraints on economic development and welfare.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2
By equating E(V wi,t,t+1) = E(V
e
j,t,t+1), we obtain a relationship between p
e
t and p
w
t ,
pet
pwt
=
1− α
α(φf )pa
exp
(
− σ
2
θ
2(1− α)2 +
σ2a
2
)
By equating E(V wi,t,t+1) = V
l
t,t+1, we obtain the human capital spillover γt,
γt = (1− ν)
1
β (φf )p
a
(1 +Aν)exp
(
− σ
2
a
2
)
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By applying additionally the equilibrium condition (1.33) and the assumption that the pop-
ulation share is equal to one, we obtain the equilibrium values of pw, pe, Ll and γ, cited by
Proposition 1.2, which are constant over time.
1.9.2 Proof of Proposition 1.4 and 1.5
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the equilibrium value of pw by 1− pa, we obtain,
pw
′
=
α(1− b)(φf )paexp(−σ2a2 )(1− ν)
1
β
b+ α(1−b)1−pa (φ
f )paexp(−σ2a2 )(1− ν)
1
β + (1− α)(1− b)(1− ν) 1β exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 )
∂pw
′
∂pa
= pw
′
lnφf − (p
w′)2
α(1− b)exp(−σ2a2 )(φf )pa(1− ν)
1
β[ α(1− b)
(1− pa)2 exp
(
− σ
2
a
2
)
(φf )p
a
(1− ν) 1β + α(1− b)
1− pa exp
(
− σ
2
a
2
)
(φf )p
a
(1− ν) 1β lnφf
]
∂pw
′
∂pa
= pw
′
lnφf − (pw′)2
[ 1
(1− pa)2 +
1
1− pa lnφ
f
]
The above expression is unambiguously positive if
lnφf − pw′
( 1
(1− pa)2 +
lnφf
1− pa
)
> 0⇔ pw′ < (1− p
a)2 lnφf
1 + (1− pa) lnφf
and negative if
lnφf − pw
( 1
(1− pa)2 +
1
1− pa lnφ
f
)
< 0⇔ pw′ > (1− p
a)2 lnφf
1 + (1− pa) lnφf
Notice that pw
′
= pw. Dividing the numerator and denominator of the equilibrium value of pw
by (φf )p
a
, we obtain
pw
′′
=
α(1− b)(1− pa)(1− ν) 1β exp(−σ2a2 )
b(1−pa)
(φf )pa
+ α(1− b)exp(−σ2a2 )(1− ν)
1
β + 1−α
(φf )pa
(1− b)(1− pa)(1− ν) 1β exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 )
∂pw
′′
∂φf
=
(pw
′′
)2pa
α(1− b)(1− ν) 1β exp(−σ2a2 )
[ b
(φf )1+pa
+
(1− b)
(φf )pa+1
(1− α)(1− ν) 1β exp
(
− σ
2
θ
2(1− α)2
)]
> 0
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the equilibrium value of pw by exp(−σ2a2 ), we ob-
tain,
pw
′′′
=
α(1− b)(1− pa)(φf )pa(1− ν) 1β
b(1−pa)
exp(−σ2a
2
)
+ α(1− b)(φf )pa(1− ν) 1β + (1− α)(1− b)(1− pa)(1− ν) 1β exp(−
σ2
θ
2(1−α)2 )
exp(−σ2a
2
)
∂pw
′′′
∂σa
= − (p
w′′′)2
α(1− b)(φf )pa(1− ν) 1β
σa
[ b
exp(−σ2a2 )
+ (1− α)(1− b)(1− ν) 1β
exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 )
exp(−σ2a2 )
]
< 0
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∂pw
∂σθ
=
(pw)2
α(φf )paexp(−σ2a2 )
exp
(
− σ
2
θ
2(1− α)2
) 1
(1− α)σθ > 0
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the equilibrium value of pe by 1− pa, which results
in pe
′
, we obtain,
pe
′
=
(1− α)(1− b)(1− ν) 1β exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 )
b+ α1−pa (1− b)(φf )paexp(−σ
2
a
2 )(1− ν)
1
β + (1− α)(1− b)(1− ν) 1β exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 )
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′
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αexp(−σ2a2 )(φf )p
a
1− pa
(
lnφf +
1
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the equilibrium value of pe by exp(− σ2θ
2(1−α)2 ), which
results in pe
′′
, we obtain,
pe
′′
=
(1− α)(1− b)(1− pa)(1− ν) 1β
b(1−pa)
exp(− σ
2
θ
2(1−α)2 )
+ α(1− b)(φf )pa exp(−
σ2a
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exp(− σ
2
θ
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σ2a
2 )
exp(− σ2θ
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< 0
The sensitivity analysis for Ll with respect to pa, φf , σa, and σθ can be conducted in the same
manner.
1.9.3 Proof of Proposition 1.6
The impact of pa on growth gh for ∂p
w
∂pa > 0 is defined as,
∂(1 + gh)
∂pa
=
∂(pw + pe)
∂pa︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1 +Aν)
1−M +
∂Ll
∂pa︸︷︷︸
<0
γ
1−M +
Ll
1−M
∂γ
∂pa︸︷︷︸
>0
+
(1 + gh)
(1−M)2
∂M
∂pa︸︷︷︸
>0
It is easier to see that the share of skilled agents pe + pw increases in case of ∂p
w
∂pa > 0 or
pw < (1−p
a)2 lnφf
1+(1−pa) lnφf as Proposition 5 claims, which can be explained as follows: although it is
true that some entrepreneurs will be also attracted to become skilled workers, i.e. pe declines,
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the total effect on pw will be positive because of the rising share skilled workers coming from
the pool of low–skilled. Moreover, the human capital of both entrepreneurs and skilled workers
is the same, so switching to another skilled profession among skilled does not have any influence
on the total value of their human capital. Notice that Llγ = b(1−b)α(1 + Aν)p
w, which implies
that for ∂p
w
∂pa > 0 the impact of p
a on growth is eventually defined as,
∂(1 + gh)
∂pa
=
∂(pw + pe)
∂pa︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1 +Aν)
1−M +
∂(Llγ)
∂pa︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1
1−M +
(1 + gh)
(1−M)2
∂M
∂pa︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
The effect of pa on growth is ambiguous for ∂p
w
∂pa < 0, i.e. if p
w > (1−p
a)2 lnφf
1+(1−pa) lnφf as Proposition 5
claims because the differential ∂M∂pa is ambiguous.
The impact of φf on growth is in the same toke equal to,
∂(1 + gh)
∂φf
=
∂(pw + pe)
∂φf︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1 +Aν)
1−M +
∂(Llγ)
∂φf︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1
1−M +
(1 + gh)
(1−M)2
M
φf︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
The effect of σa on growth is,
∂(1 + gh)
∂σa
=
∂(pw + pe)
∂σa︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1 +Aν)
1−M +
∂(Llγ)
∂σa︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
1
1−M +
(1 + gh)
(1−M)2
∂M
∂σa︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0
The effect of σθ on growth is,
∂(1 + gh)
∂σθ
=
∂(pw + pe)
∂σθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1 +Aν)
1−M +
∂Ll
∂σθ︸︷︷︸
>0
γ
1−M +
(1 + gh)
(1−M)2
∂M
∂σθ︸︷︷︸
>0
≷ 0
The total share of skilled agents pw + pe declines, as some entrepreneurs decide to switch to the
low–skilled profession (the share of skilled workers increases out of the pool of entrepreneurs).
Although this redistribution of agents across professions implies that there will be more agents
who carry less human capital to the accumulation function, 1 + Aν > γ, the impact of σθ on
growth is inconclusive because higher σθ implies a higher share of skilled migrants, which boosts
growth through the population effect of declining 1−M .
1.9.4 Proof of Proposition 1.7 and 1.8
The short–run income variables for h0 = 1 and t = 1 are defined as follows,
wh0γ = α
α(1− α)1−αexp
(
− 1
(1− α)
σ2θ
2
− ασ
2
a
2
)
(1− ν) 1β (1 +Aν)(φf )αpa
whw1 = α
α(1− α)1−αexp
(
− 1
(1− α)
σ2θ
2
+
(1− α)σ2a
2
) 1
(φf )pa(1−α)
(1 +Aν)
E(pij1) = α
α(1− α)1−αexp
( α
(1− α)2
σ2θ
2
− α
2
σ2a
)
(φf )αp
a
(1 +Aν)
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from where the short run influence of pa, φf , σa, and σθ on the above income variables is,
∂(wh0γ)
∂pa
= wh0γα lnφ
f > 0
∂(wh0γ)
∂φf
= wh0γ
paα
φf
> 0
∂(wh0γ)
∂σa
= −wh0γασa < 0 ∂(wh0γ)
∂σθ
= −wh0γ 1
(1− α)σθ < 0
∂(whw1 )
∂pa
= −whw1 (1− α) lnφf < 0
∂(whw1 )
∂φf
= −whw1
(1− α)pa
φf
< 0
∂(whw1 )
∂σa
= whw1 (1− α)σa > 0
∂(whw1 )
∂σθ
= −whw1
1
(1− α)σθ < 0
∂E(pij1)
∂pa
= E(pij1)α lnφ
f > 0
∂E(pij1)
∂φf
= E(pij1)
αpa
φf
> 0
∂E(pij1)
∂σa
= −E(pij1)ασa < 0 ∂E(pij1)
∂σθ
= E(pij1)
α
(1− α)2σθ > 0
The long–term equilibrium wages and profits in the model for h0 = 1 are,
wht−1γ = αα(1− α)1−αexp
(
− 1
(1− α)
σ2θ
2
− ασ
2
a
2
)
(1− ν) 1β (1 +Aν)(φf )αpa(1 + gh)t−1
whwt = α
α(1− α)1−αexp
(
− 1
(1− α)
σ2θ
2
+
(1− α)σ2a
2
) 1
(φf )pa(1−α)
(1 +Aν)(1 + gh)t−1
E(pijt) = α
α(1− α)1−αexp
( α
(1− α)2
σ2θ
2
− α
2
σ2a
)
(φf )αp
a
(1 +Aν)(1 + gh)t−1
In the long–run t −→ ∞ the impact of pa, φf , σa, and σθ (designated with x below) on the
income variables depends not only on the short–run changes in occupational choice but also on
the growth rate gh,
∂(wht−1γ)
∂x
=
∂w
∂x
ht−1γ + w
∂γ
∂x
ht−1 + wγ(t− 1)(1 + gh)t−2∂(1 + g
h)
∂x
∂(whwt )
∂x
=
∂w
∂x
hwt + w(t− 1)(1 + gh)t−2
∂(1 + gh)
∂x
(1 +Aν)
∂E(pijt)
∂x
=
∂pi
∂x
het + pi(t− 1)(1 + gh)t−2
∂(1 + gh)
∂x
(1 +Aν)
1.9.5 Empirical Data
Table 1.3: Measures of Wage Structure in Selected Eastern European States in 1988-92
p90/p10
Bulgaria 1.88
Cyprus 3.43
CzechRepublic 1.61
Romania 1.88
Slovakia 1.61
Slovenia 2.93
Y ugoslavia 2.40
Source: Freeman and Oostendorp (2000)
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Table 1.4: Annual Earnings of Employees in Full–time Jobs in Selected European States
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Bulgaria 2039.5 2205.5 2436.9 2699.7 3205.8 4082.7 2778.35
Hungary 8298.3 8928.9 9346.4 9183.1 9731.7 − 9097.68
Greece 19410.4 − − − − − 19410.4
Poland − 7334.3 − − − − 7334.3
Romania − 3018.5 3996.8 4860.2 6512.2 7443.1 4305.13
Slovakia 5090.3 6033.4 6828.5 7744.6 9431.7 − 7025.7
Austria 38952 39101 40819 41653 42956.9 44363 41307.48
Denmark 49401.9 51076.9 52031.2 52803.7 52767.3 55248.7 52221.62
Finnland 31679 32950 34249 34891 36616 38775 34860
Germany 42900 43700 44300 44863 46000 47300 44843.83
Spain − 22965.1 23556 25124.7 25073.1 − 24179.73
Sweden 35805.4 34602.8 35224.4 36122.2 37806.8 37837.5 36233.18
UK 41614.8 44131.1 − 47282.7 48478.8 − 45376.85
Source: Eurostat
Online Source Path: In the database of Eurostat under Population and Social Conditions, Labor
Market, Earnings, Gross earnings - annual data, Average annual gross earnings by occupation;
Employees: ISCO1: Legislators, senior officials and managers; ISCO2 Professionals; ISCO3
Technicians and associate professionals; ISCO4 Clerks; ISCO5 Service and shop and market
sales workers; Last accessed on 1.12.2013.
Table 1.5: Brain Drain Rates (%) of Total Migrants from Selected Eastern European States
1990 2000
Bulgaria 2.7 5.8
Bosnia&Herzegovina − 28.6
Croatia − 29.4
CzechRepublic − 9.9
Hungary 13.5 12.1
Greece 18.9 14.0
Latvia − 10.2
Lathuania − 11.8
Macedonia − 20.9
Poland 12.8 12.3
Romania 11.1 14.1
Serbia&Montenegro − 17.4
Slovakia − 15.3
Slovenia − 11.0
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
33
Table 1.6: Share of Skilled (%) in Population from Selected Eastern European States (age 15-64)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bulgaria 17.7 17.9 17.8 18.2 18.5 18.9 19.2 19.4 20.1 20.7
CzechRepublic 10.0 10.4 11.0 11.4 11.6 12.4 13.4 14.5 15.9 17.0
Hungary 13.1 14.2 14.5 15.0 15.4 16.4 16.9 17.2 18.1 19.0
Greece 15.7 17.6 17.7 18.7 19.2 19.8 20.0 21.0 22.3 23.0
Poland 11.6 12.8 13.9 14.9 15.7 16.5 18.1 19.8 20.7 21.5
Romania 7.9 8.7 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.7 11.2 11.9 13.0 13.6
Slovakia 9.6 10.4 11.4 11.9 11.9 12.3 13.4 15.1 16.5 17.0
Slovenia 14.4 15.7 16.7 17.8 18.5 19.0 19.6 20.2 21.6 23.0
Latvia 15.1 16.7 17.1 17.6 18.8 21.0 21.7 22.5 23.6 25.1
Lithuania 19.8 21.2 22.0 22.4 24.1 25.4 25.5 27.0 27.9 28.8
Source: Eurostat
Online Source Path: In the Database of Eurostat under Population and Social Conditions ⇒
Education and training⇒ Educational attainment, outcomes and returns of education⇒ Main
indicators on education attainment: time series and regional data ⇒ Persons with a given
education attainment, by age and sex (%) ⇒ Persons with tertiary education attainment by
age and sex (%); Last accessed on 1.12.2013.
Table 1.7: Entrepreneurship Share of Firms Owners according to Education and Firms’ Growth
Entrepreneur′s Educational Attainment HG MG LG
College 31% 29% 23%
Post− graduate 23% 22% 12%
Total 54% 51% 35%
Source: Morris (2011), Data based on GEM Adult Population Surveys 2006-2010
High Growth (HG), Moderate Growth (MG) and Low–Growth (LG) Firms
HG: above 20% per year, MG: from 5% or 20% per year LG: below 5% per year
Table 1.8: Entrepreneurship Rate in Population of Selected Eastern European States
Enterpr. Rate %
Bosnia&Herzegovina 7.5
Croatia 8
Estonia 13.5
Latvia 14.5
Hungary 9
Greece 6
Macedonia 7.5
Poland 9
Romania 9
Slovakia 6.5
Slovenia 5
Source: Xavier et al. (2012)
Entrepreneurship Rate: % of adult population (18–64 years) involved in entrepreneurship in 2012
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2 Brain Drain, Borrowing Constraints, and
Endogenous Growth in an Economy with
Perfect Physical Capital Mobility
2.1 Introduction
The theoretical literature is still not unanimous on what is the impact of brain drain on the
economic development of the source country. While Miyagiwa (1991), Haque and Kim (1995),
Wong and Yip (1999) argue that brain drain decreases growth because ex–post the level of
human capital declines, there are authors such as Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Stark et al.
(1997), and Beine et al. (2001), who support the idea that brain drain may increase growth for
a relatively small skilled migration rate because it stimulates ex–ante the investment in human
capital (the so–called brain gain theory). One of the merits of our work in this respect is that
we test the robustness of the brain gain theory by relaxing its assumption that agents in the
domestic country are completely excluded from the credit market when they invest in human
capital. In reality borrowing is allowed although it may be constrained, which is an additional
channel to influence the investment in human capital when brain drain takes place.
The theoretical and empirical significance of borrowing constraints for educational attainment,
on the other hand, has already been verified. Buiter and Kletzer (1992), Galor and Zeira (1993),
Ljungqvist (1993), De Gregorio (1996), Christou (2001) theoretically emphasize the unfavorable
impact of (exogenously imposed) constrained borrowing on education.1 De Gregorio (1996) and
Flug et al. (1998) show that borrowing constraints exert a negative effect on secondary educa-
tion, while Mimoun (2008) finds a positive impact of higher borrowing on secondary and tertiary
enrollment in education in aggregate terms. Vandenberghe (2007) estimates that parental in-
come increases the likelihood of agents to attend high education in Poland (33% rise in parental
income leads to an increase in university enrollment of 3%) as well as in Hungary (33% rise
1For models relating human capital investment to endogenous borrowing constraints see De la Croix and Michel
(2007), Andolfatto and Gervais (2006).
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in parental income leads to an increase in university enrollment of 20%, which, nevertheless,
should be treated with caution because of the small sample size).
The empirical relevance of brain drain, on the other hand, has already been tested by Docquier
and Marfouk (2004). They estimate significantly high levels of skilled outmigration from East-
ern European countries. In 2000 the proportion of working individuals above 25 with tertiary
education from some European transition countries, which are already part of the EU, such
as Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, working abroad
ranges from 10% to 30%. These countries exhibit predominantly higher outmigration rate of
skilled rather than low–skilled individuals.
Intuitively, probabilistic brain drain and liberalized borrowing constraints should be comple-
ments in inducing higher educational investment. As we shall see later, however, the brain gain
effect does not hold in case of relatively liberalized borrowing constraints, because agents do
not have an incentive to invest in education in response to rising skilled outmigration if they
already avail of some economic resources. In such a setting we are additionally able to define the
aggregate savings rate and the impact of brain drain and credit market liberalization on it. The
investigation of this relationship has never been attempted in the brain drain literature because
of the assumption that individuals are deprived of physical capital. Moreover, we are interested
in the welfare effects which result in response to changes in the brain drain phenomenon and
the relaxation of borrowing.
Our model is embedded in the literature on human capital accumulation within a three–period
overlapping generations model and probabilistic brain drain (see Beine et al. (2001)) as well as
borrowing constraints in an environment of perfect physical capital mobility (see De Gregorio
(1996)). Young obtain income as low–skilled augmented by an exogenous borrowing constraint
and invest in optimal educational time. At the end of the first period some educated are
randomly selected to go abroad and work for a higher wage. Middle–aged agents earn income,
which is augmented by their human capital, repay the credit and save. Old agents consume their
savings and do not work. Migrants follow the same pattern of life when they are middle–aged
and old. We postulate full enforcement of credit contracts for migrants and domestic agents.
Young and middle–aged individuals at home work in the production sector supplying their la-
bor inelastically. The production sector additionally uses physical capital. Because physical
capital is perfectly mobile, the domestic interest rate is equal to the international interest rate.
Growth is triggered by human capital accumulation, which reacts to changes in the brain drain
parameters and the credit constraint.
Our theoretical model predicts that the educational time (which is the engine of human cap-
36
ital growth) increases with a higher brain drain probability and a higher wedge between the
remuneration of skilled at home and abroad only if agents are relatively patient with respect
to current consumption (i.e. if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively high).
Moreover, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution must outweigh the effects of the borrow-
ing constraint. This implies that credit constraints play a vital role in the decision to invest in
human capital when migration chances or the difference in skilled payment in the domestic and
the foreign country improve(s). More relaxed borrowing constraints increase the investment in
education and growth only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than or equal
to one.
The influence of a higher brain drain rate on the aggregate savings rate is ambiguous even if
brain drain is beneficial for growth. A higher wedge between the earnings of skilled in the foreign
and the domestic country leads to a higher aggregate savings rate only if the growth is influenced
positively and vice versa. On the other hand, the aggregate savings rate falls unambiguously
when the growth rate is negatively influenced by more relaxed borrowing constraints. In all
other cases (including the case in which growth rises), the influence of higher credit relaxation
on the aggregate savings rate is ambiguous.
According to the calibration, beneficial brain drain is evident only if borrowing constraints are
relatively tight (or at most 74% of current disposable income). This result overlaps with the
earlier brain gain literature. In case of more liberal borrowing constraints (for the credit share
out of disposable income exceeding 74%), we observe growth deteriorating brain drain. The
aggregate savings rate falls with a rise in the skilled outmigration probability regardless of the
level of borrowing constraints. All agents in the economy win in case of a larger brain drain
rate if borrowing is relatively constrained. In an environment of relatively relaxed borrowing
constraints, the sum of the discounted utilities of all (domestic) agents is higher than the bench-
mark in the short run, but middle–aged and old aged remain losers. The long–term impact of
brain drain in this case is expected to be negative.
According to our calibration, a higher wedge between skilled earnings in the domestic and the
foreign country increases the optimal time in education, growth, savings and welfare compared
to the benchmark case independent of the severity of the borrowing constraints.
More relaxed borrowing constraints in our calibration raise the optimal investment in education
and growth. The aggregate savings rate, on the other hand, decreases. Domestic welfare gain is
observed in all periods although one generation (when middle–aged and old) face a temporary
fall in utility a period after the introduction of more liberal borrowing constraints.
We would like to stress that the afore–mentioned results are obtained under the assumption
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of perfect physical capital mobility. This postulation has the property that savings decisions
are not determined by the growth of physical capital. The latter stems from the assumption
that the interest rate is exogenous, which pins down a value for the ratio of physical capital to
average human capital in the profit optimization of the representative firm, i.e. on the balanced
growth path physical capital grows at the rate of human capital. Alternatively, we can assume
that physical capital is immobile, which would imply that labor is more mobile than capital.
There is not much empirical support for this setting. Moreover, free movement of physical
capital and labor is one of the targets of the EU. That is why we calibrate our model targeting
the economies of EU Eastern European countries.
This paper is divided as follows: In Section 2.2 the general assumptions of the model are pre-
sented. In Section 2.3 we specify the market equilibrium. In Section 2.4 and 2.5 we conduct
a sensitivity analysis and calibration of the endogenous variables of interest. In Section 2.6 we
perform a welfare analysis. Section 2.7 is devoted to the conclusion.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Intertemporal Optimization of Households
Homogeneous and risk averse agents live for three periods in the framework of an overlapping
generations model. Each individual supplies inelastically one unit of labor to the market. Still,
only young and middle–aged agents work on the labor market, old individuals are retired.
Each generation is normalized to one, which means that the population equals 3. There is no
population growth.
Young agents born in period t decide on the optimal share of time νt in education, work as
low–skilled and earn income Ψ(1− νt)wthtϕ in the first period, which comprises the base wage
wt and the human capital htϕ with 0 < ϕ < 1. We assume that young agents inherit part
ϕ of the average human capital of skilled middle–aged ht from the same period.
2 Moreover,
young are allowed to borrow a share Ψ ≥ 1 of their income from the capital market at a
constant interest rate equal to r. Ψ stands for the severity of the borrowing constraints with
Ψ = 1 implying that credit markets are completely absent and with Ψ −→ ∞ meaning they
are completely liberalized. By conditioning the amount of credit on earnings, we reflect an
empirical observation that borrowing depends on current income. Total income and debt are
used for consumption (education is free of charge). Agents incur only the opportunity cost of
2This assumption helps us model the life–cycle profile of earnings with young earning the lowest income compared
to middle-aged and old at a certain period.
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not being employed during education, represented by Ψνtwthtϕ. After having gained human
capital, individuals are selected with a probability pa to migrate abroad and work for a foreign
wage, which is φf > 1 times higher than the domestic wage wt+1ht+1 in the second period of
their life.3 Middle–aged agents (at home or abroad) have to repay their debt from the first
period equal to (Ψ − 1)(1 − νt)wthtϕR where R = 1 + r and to make their optimal savings
decision in the domestic (st+1) and in the foreign country (s
f
t+1). We assume full enforcement
of credit contracts for migrants. In the third period all agents (abroad or at home) consume
the savings they have made from the second period.
The consumption stream of an agent born in t who stays in the domestic country over one’s
lifetime is: cy,t, cm,t+1, co,t+2, where the subindex y stands for young, m for middle–aged and o
for old throughout this paper. Individuals who manage to migrate in the second period consume
cfm,t+1 and c
f
o,t+2 when middle–aged and old respectively. In the whole paper we use the index
f to refer to variables connected with the foreign economy. Agents also weight present to future
consumption by a factor 0 < β < 1. Given the usual CES utility function with σ being the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the expected lifetime utility of a young worker born
at period t (where E is the expectation operator), who faces a probability of migration pa at
period t+ 1 is,
E(Vt,t+1,t+2) =
(cy,t)
1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
+ β(1− pa)(cm,t+1)
1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
+ β2(1− pa)(co,t+2)
1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
+ βpa
(cfm,t+1)
1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
+ β2pa
(cfo,t+2)
1− 1
σ
1− 1σ
(2.1)
with budget constraints,
cy,t = Ψ(1− νt)wthtϕ (2.2)
cm,t+1 = ht+1wt+1 − (Ψ− 1)(1− νt)wthtϕR− st+1 (2.3)
cfm,t+1 = φ
fht+1wt+1 − (Ψ− 1)(1− νt)wthtϕR− sft+1 (2.4)
co,t+2 = st+1R (2.5)
cfo,t+2 = s
f
t+1R (2.6)
The first period constraint holds with an equality and agents are not assumed to make savings,
because the borrowing constraint is binding. The human capital of a skilled middle–aged worker
is linear in educational time νt,
ht+1 = (1 +Aνt)ht A > 0 (2.7)
3We follow Beine et al. (2001) in modeling the foreign wage by simplifying his assumption that educated
experience higher income growth abroad compared to domestic agents.
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and ht is the average human capital of skilled middle–aged agents in the domestic country. The
optimization problem of an agent who lives at period t, t+ 1 and t+ 2 and may migrate abroad
constitutes a decision on the educational time and savings. The optimality of these decisions is
ensured by the first order conditions,
∂E(Vt,t+1,t+2)
∂st+1
= 0
∂E(Vt,t+1,t+2)
∂sft+1
= 0
∂E(Vt,t+1,t+2)
∂νt
= 0
Maximizing the expected utility with respect to savings (at home and abroad) as well as edu-
cational time, we obtain that
s∗t+1 =
ht+1wt+1 − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν)wthtϕR
1 + β−σR1−σ
(2.8)
sf∗t+1 =
ht+1wt+1φ
f − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν)wthtϕR
1 + β−σR1−σ
(2.9)
(Ψwtϕ)
(1− 1
σ
)
(1− ν∗t )
1
σ
= (1− pa)N (wt+1A+ wt(Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
(wt+1(1 +Aν∗t )− wt(Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗t )ϕ)
1
σ
+paN
(φfAwt+1 + wt(Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
(wt+1(1 +Aν∗t )φf − wt(Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗t )ϕ)
1
σ
(2.10)
where N = (1+β
−σR1−σ)
1
σ β2
R
1
σ−1
. The asterisk implies optimality. As it is evident from the above
result, savings at home and abroad are equal to a constant share of the net income earned
in the second period of agent’s life. For now we assume that equation (2.10) has a solution
ν∗t ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, as we will see later, it really has. Because we postulate that there
is no difference in the abilities of agents to accumulate human capital, educational time does
not differ among individuals. That is why there is no difference between the average and the
individual level of human capital of skilled. The same applies for the savings and consumption
decisions of agents.
In the end, we would like to discuss the case in which the borrowing constraint is binding. That
is why it is worth considering the model without credit market frictions. In this case the optimal
educational time maximizes human wealth. The expected budget constraint is defined as,
(1− νt)wthtϕ+(1− p
a)ht+1wt+1
R
+
paφfht+1wt+1
R
− cyt − (1− pa)cmt+1
R
− (1− pa)cot+2
R2
− pa c
f
mt+1
R
− pa c
f
ot+2
R2
= 0 (2.11)
Maximizing the budget constraint with respect to the educational time νt results in two possible
solutions: agents will be either investing νt = 1 or not investing in education νt = 0. This
discrete educational choice stems from the linearity of the educational time in the human capital
accumulation function. For agents to invest in education with νt = 1, it is sufficient that
wt+1
wtϕ
A
R
(1− pa + paφf ) > 1 (2.12)
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This condition holds for values of the parameters which we use in our calibration (r = 2.243,
pa ∈ (0.05− 0.2), φf ∈ (4.8− 9.6), ϕ = 0.4 and A = 1.83)4. Notice that in equilibrium the base
wage is constant.
2.2.2 Production Sector
The production sector operates in an environment of perfect competition to produce the final
output. The price of the good is normalized to 1 for simplicity. The production function is,
Qt = BK
α
t (Ht)
1−α 0 < α < 1 (2.13)
where B > 0 is a productivity parameter, Kt is physical capital, while Ht is total human
capital. Total human capital Ht at period t is equal to the raw labor lt multiplied with the
average human capital ht, i.e. Ht = ltht, or is defined as Ht = (1 − pa)ht + ϕht where the
average human capital is ht = ht(1− pa +ϕ)/lt. The representative firm maximizes its profit
pit = BK
α
t (Ht)
1−α −RKt − wthtlt (2.14)
by deciding on the optimal share of physical capital Kt to be borrowed and raw labor lt to be
employed, from where we obtain that
wt =
B(1− α)
lαt
(Kt
ht
)α
(2.15)
R = Bαl
(1−α)
t
( ht
Kt
)1−α
(2.16)
with R containing the interest rate net of depreciation. Because of the assumption of full
employment (of young and skilled middle–aged) and the inelastic labor supply, the raw labor is
equal to lt = 2−pa and is constant over time. Moreover, the ratio of physical to average human
capital Kt/ht can be determined immediately from (2.16) because R is exogenously defined and
equals the return on K abroad due to our assumption that there are no barriers to physical
capital flow. Therefore, we can also obtain an endogenous value for the base wage wt, which
turns out to be constant over time for a constant interest rate.5 The equilibrium value of w
(after substituting for Kt/ht) is independent of the labor supply but declines in R.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
In this section we define the equilibrium growth in human capital, and wealth as an intermediate
step in determining the (domestic) aggregate savings rate, which we address as a savings rate
4See Section 2.5 for the choice of parameters’ values.
5From now on we drop the time indices of the endogenous variables which are proved to be constant.
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in the rest of the paper for simplicity. Because of the exclusion of physical capital, no brain
drain paper has derived the level of the savings rate. Our work is innovative in this respect.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Growth
We have from the production side of the economy that wt = wt+1 = w, which implies that the
equilibrium educational time (2.10) can be rewritten as
(Ψϕ)(1−
1
σ
)
(1− ν∗) 1σ
=
(1− pa)N(A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
((1 +Aν∗)− (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ) 1σ
+
paN(φfA+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ) 1σ
(2.17)
with N = (1+β
−σR1−σ)
1
σ β2
R
1
σ−1
. Therefore, ν∗6 is constant over time because it depends only on the
parameters of the model. It can be proved that ν∗ has a solution in the range ∈ (0, 1). These
results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The optimal educational time ν∗ is constant and lies in the range (0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix 2.9.1
The accumulation of the average human capital ht of skilled middle–aged over time is,
gh = Aν∗ (2.18)
while the growth of average human capital ga,
1 + ga =
ht+1
ht
=
ht+1(1− pa + ϕ)
2− pa
/ht(1− pa + ϕ)
2− pa =
ht+1
ht
= 1 + gh (2.19)
is equal to the growth of the human capital of middle–aged skilled agents, according to the
balanced growth condition (2.19). The equilibrium growth rate depends exclusively on the
educational time and, therefore, grows at a constant rate. These results are summarized in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 2.2 The growth rate of average human capital Aν∗ is constant.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Wealth, Savings and (Domestic) Aggregate Savings Rate
Domestic wealth at period t is equal to the sum of the dissaved income of young, who take a
credit, and the saved income of middle–aged who stay at home as well as the credit repayment
6We drop the time index for ν∗t .
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of emigrants. Old do not save, that is why they are excluded from the calculations of the wealth
function. Given the above specification, the wealth function is defined as,
Wt = (1− pa)s∗t + (1−Ψ)(1− ν∗)whtϕ+ pa(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)wht−1ϕR (2.20)
The wealth function contains also the credit market equilibrium by which middle–aged lend
some of their savings to young and to the representative firm. Lending to young (contrary to
lending to the representative firm) constitutes a loss to Wt because it does not create economic
value via production. Substituting for the definition of s∗t in the wealth function, we obtain,
Wt =(1− pa)htw − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν
∗)wht−1Rϕ
1 + β−σR1−σ
+ (1−Ψ)(1− ν∗)whtϕ+ pa(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)wht−1Rϕ (2.21)
Wt is a function of the wage income wtht, i.e. Wt = whtf , where
f =
2− pa
(1− pa + ϕ)
[ 1− pa
1 + β−σR1−σ
− (1− p
a)(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
1 + β−σR1−σ
1
1 + gh
+ (1−Ψ)(1− ν∗)ϕ+ p
a(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
1 + gh
]
(2.22)
and ht/ht = (2− pa)/(1− pa +ϕ). Total domestic savings, on the other hand, are measured by
the growth rate of wealth reflecting an intergenerational aspect, i.e. Wt+1 −Wt = St+1. Given
that the wealth and total domestic savings increase in equilibrium by the growth of human
capital, we obtain that (1 + gh)Wt −Wt = (1 + gh)St, i.e. St = gh1+ghWt. Substituting for the
definitions of the wealth function and the savings function, it is evident that
St =
gh
1 + gh
[
(1− pa)htw − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν
∗)wht−1ϕR
1 + β−σR1−σ
+ (1−Ψ)(1− ν∗)whtϕ+ pa(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)wht−1ϕR
]
(2.23)
The savings rate, on the other hand, is equal by definition to s = St/Qt, while whtl = (1−α)Qt.
Therefore, we obtain for the savings rate that
s =
gh
1 + gh
1− α
(1− pa + ϕ)f (2.24)
where
f =
1− pa
1 + β−σR1−σ
−(1− p
a)(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
1 + β−σR1−σ
1
1 + gh
+ (1−Ψ)(1− ν∗)ϕ+ p
a(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
(1 + gh)
(2.25)
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2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we provide a theoretical sensitivity analysis of the growth equation, and the
savings rate with respect to the probability of migration pa, the wedge between the skilled wage
at home and abroad φf , and the borrowing constraint Ψ. We aim at answering the questions: (i)
What is the relationship between the brain drain phenomenon and growth when individuals are
subject to different levels of credit constraints? (ii) How does more liberal borrowing influence
human capital accumulation when brain drain is present? (iii) What is the reaction of the
savings rate to changes in the brain drain parameters and the degree of borrowing? Because
the growth of average human capital depends on the educational time only, the conditions which
determine the influence of pa, φf and Ψ on ν∗ are the same as the conditions which define the
impact of these parameters on gh. Before we begin conducting the sensitivity analysis, we
establish a positive relationship between the growth rate and the savings rate as well as the
educational time and the savings rate.
Proposition 2.3 If pa ≤ 1
2+β−σR1−σ , the relationship between the savings rate s and growth
gh, or the savings rate s and optimal educational time ν∗ is positive.7
Proof: See Appendix 2.9.2.
If we replace the parameters in the above condition with values which we use in our calibration
(β = 0.74, r = 2.243, σ = 1.4286), we obtain that for any brain drain rate lower than 34.1%,
higher growth and higher educational time lead to a higher savings rate. Our main findings
from the sensitivity analysis under the validity of Proposition 2.3 are summarized in the next
propositions.
Proposition 2.4 The influence of the probability of skilled migration pa on ν∗, gh, and s (under
the assumption of Proposition 2.3) is 8,
∂ν∗
∂pa
≷ 0 if σ ≷ ln
[(1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
]/
ln
[Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
]
∂gh
∂pa
≷ 0 if σ ≷ ln
[(1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
]/
ln
[Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
]
∂s
∂pa
≷ 0
Proof: See Appendix 2.9.3.
As Proposition 2.4 shows, a higher probability of skilled emigration can lead to higher optimal
7For the empirical relevance of the relationship between the growth and the savings rate, see Carroll and Weil
(1994).
8The structure ∂y
∂x
≶ 0 if a ≷ b is to read: ∂y
∂x
< 0 if a > b and ∂y
∂x
> 0 if a < b in all propositions
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educational time only if agents are eager to shift consumption to the future (if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is relatively high). The preference for future consumption mitigates the
decline in utility due to foregone earnings for education when young. We call this phenomenon
the incentive effect to accumulate human capital in response to pa. If σ is relatively small, the
optimal educational time decreases in pa, which can be explained as follows: agents who are
unwilling to postpone consumption will prefer to decrease their educational time in order to
counterbalance the positive effect of pa on their expected utility (all other things being constant).
This is the disincentive effect to accumulate human capital in response to pa. Moreover, for the
influence of pa on ν∗ to be defined, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is compared to a
function which depends on the borrowing constraints. This proves that borrowing constraints
do play a role in the educational choice of individuals when brain drain increases. In other
words, for different values of Ψ, either the incentive or disincentive effect to accumulate human
capital due to higher pa may take place.
A rise in the skilled outmigration probability has an ambiguous impact on s. This is due to the
fact that, from one hand, a higher brain drain rate implies a lower share of savers and thus a
lower savings rate at home, but, from the other hand, a higher share of debtors from abroad
and, therefore, a higher savings rate. Due to this trade–off the influence of pa on s remains
ambiguous even if gh and ν∗ unambiguously rise or decrease in response to a higher brain drain
rate.
Proposition 2.5 The influence of the wedge between skilled earnings at home and abroad φf
on ν∗, gh, and s (under the assumption in Proposition 2.3) is
∂ν∗
∂φf
≷ 0 if σ ≷ (Aφ
f + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)(1 +Aν∗)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ)A
∂gh
∂φf
≷ 0 if σ ≷ (Aφ
f + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)(1 +Aν∗)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ)A
∂s
∂φf
≷ 0 if σ ≷ (Aφ
f + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)(1 +Aν∗)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ)A
Proof: See Appendix 2.9.4.
Proposition 2.5 discusses the influence of the gap in skilled payment at home and abroad on
the endogenous variables of interest. An increase in φf , similar to the influence of pa, leads
to higher educational time only if agents are willing to shift relatively more consumption to
the future, i.e. in this case they are ready to forego more earnings for education in the present
period. As before, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution should be measurably higher than
a function containing the borrowing constraints, which implies that credit market frictions also
play a role in determining the relationship between ν∗, gh, s and φf . If σ is relatively small, an
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increase in φf reduces the investment in human capital because agents counterbalance the rise
in their expected utility due to higher φf (all other things being constant) by adjusting their
educational time downwards.
Higher φf ensures a higher savings rate if the educational time and growth increase in response
to φf due to Proposition 2.3. This is satisfied for a relatively high intertemporal elasticity of
substitution σ. The opposite is valid if σ is low enough.
Proposition 2.6 The influence of the borrowing constraint Ψ on ν∗, gh, and s (under the
assumption in Proposition 2.3) is
∂ν∗
∂Ψ
> 0 if σ ≤ 1
∂gh
∂Ψ
> 0 if σ ≤ 1
∂s
∂Ψ
< 0 if εν∗Ψ < 0
(εyx is the elasticity of y with respect to x).
Proof: See Appendix 2.9.5.
As we see from Proposition 2.6, more relaxed borrowing constraints increase the investment in
human capital only if agents put more weight on present consumption σ ≤ 1.9 This condition can
be explained as follows: stronger credit relaxation raises first period consumption and decreases
second period consumption (all other things being constant). Agents who are impatient and
prefer to consume immediately experience an increase in utility in response to more relaxed
borrowing constraints because their sacrifice in consumption for education is rebalanced by
higher borrowing. Agents who are relatively eager to postpone consumption to the future
experience disutility in response to higher borrowing due to the rise in the relatively less preferred
first period consumption (all other things being constant). That is why the optimal educational
decision in response to more extensive borrowing of agents who are relatively patient with
respect to consumption is unclear.
More relaxed borrowing constraints decrease the savings rate if the optimal educational time
decreases in response to higher Ψ (because of Proposition 2.3). In all other cases (even for
improving growth), the relationship between Ψ and s is ambiguous because borrowing promotes
dissaving of young agents.
9In his original paper De Gregorio (1996) uses a lognormal utility function and comes to the conclusion that
more relaxed borrowing constraints lead to higher educational investment.
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2.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model by defining the parameters: β, σ, φf , pa, B, ϕ, α, r, and A for the
benchmark model (BM) with Ψ = 1. We assume that human capital grows at an annual growth
rate of 2.5%, and an agent lives for 30 years each period, which implies that the productivity
parameter in the human capital production function is equal to A = 1.83.
For φf we assume that it is equal to 4.8, which reflects the observed wedge between the average
high–skilled remuneration in Eastern Europe vs. Western and Northern Europe according to
Eurostat (See Appendix 1.9.5). For the baseline model we set the probability of skilled outflow
at 5%, which corresponds to the emigration probability of high–skilled from Eastern Europe
according to Docquier and Marfouk (2004) (See Appendix 1.9.5 for the brain drain rates of
some EU Eastern European countries).
The interest rate at which debt is repaid r = 2.243 corresponds to an annual risk–free interest
rate of approximately ra = 4%. According to the ECB (See Appendix 2.9.6), the annual interest
rate of ten year government bonds for February 2013 of some transition countries lies in the
range from 2.01 for the Czech Republic to 5.72 for Romania and 6.29 for Hungary. Although
private debt is related to higher interest rates, the yield of government bonds is an appropriate
measure for r in our model because of the assumption that agents cannot default on their credit.
For β we choose a value of 0.74, which is derived from the assumption that the annual discount
factor of future utility is 0.99 and 0.9930 = 0.74. We set σ = 1.4286 by which we assume that
young spend around half of their time in education.
Following Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), who estimate skill differentials in earnings, we as-
sume that ϕ = 0.4, which defines an implicit skill premium between skilled (middle–aged) and
low–skilled (young). B is normalized to 1. The elasticity of physical capital in the production
function α is assumed as usual to be equal to 0.3.
By calibrating the model with the already discussed values, we end up with a benchmark ag-
gregate savings rate equal to around 14%, which is rather on the lower bound of the empirically
observed aggregate savings rates in some countries of Eastern Europe (see Appendix 2.9.6). In
fact, we can attain higher s by increasing the interest rate. However, larger R would imply
the presence of risk on the credit market, which our model excludes by assumption. If agents
stand a default probability, the optimal educational time may increase due to the probability
of avoiding the credit costs. Moreover, the aggregate savings rate could improve because it is
positively related to growth and to the income of natives net of debt costs. This is true if the
fall in migrants’ credit repayment, augmenting domestic wealth, is relatively small.
The sensitivity analysis of the parameter pa as well as φf , and Ψ are shown in Table 2.1. We
47
Table 2.1: Calibration Results for pa, φf and Ψ
BM(Ψ = 1.0) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.6009 0.613 0.6244 0.6354 0.6051 0.6084
gh 0.025 0.0254 0.0257 0.026 0.0252 0.0253
s 0.1412 0.1402 0.1389 0.1373 0.1416 0.142
BM(Ψ = 1.2) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.6579 0.6642 0.6704 0.6764 0.6606 0.6627
gh 0.0267 0.0269 0.027 0.0272 0.0268 0.0268
s 0.1325 0.1316 0.1305 0.1291 0.1328 0.1332
BM(Ψ = 1.4) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7008 0.7038 0.7068 0.7097 0.7026 0.7041
gh 0.0279 0.028 0.0281 0.0281 0.0279 0.028
s 0.1253 0.1244 0.1234 0.1222 0.1256 0.1259
BM(Ψ = 1.6) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7342 0.7352 0.7362 0.7372 0.7354 0.7365
gh 0.0288 0.0288 0.0288 0.0289 0.0288 0.0289
s 0.1194 0.1185 0.1175 0.1164 0.1197 0.1199
BM(Ψ = 1.74) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7535 0.7535 0.7536 0.7536 0.7545 0.7553
gh 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 0.0294
s 0.1159 0.115 0.114 0.1129 0.1162 0.1164
BM(Ψ = 1.75) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7548 0.7547 0.7547 0.7547 0.7557 0.7566
gh 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 0.0293 0.0294 0.0294
s 0.1157 0.1148 0.1138 0.1127 0.1159 0.1161
BM(Ψ = 1.8) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7609 0.7606 0.7604 0.7601 0.7618 0.7627
gh 0.0295 0.0295 0.0295 0.0295 0.0295 0.0296
s 0.1146 0.1136 0.1126 0.1115 0.1148 0.115
BM(Ψ = 2) pa = 0.10 pa = 0.15 pa = 0.20 φf = 7.2 φf = 9.6
ν∗ 0.7828 0.7817 0.7806 0.7794 0.7834 0.784
gh 0.0301 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.0301 0.0301
s 0.1105 0.1094 0.1084 0.1073 0.1106 0.1108
report a stepwise increase in the brain drain rate by 100% in correspondence to the observed
empirical values of pa in the range of (0.05-0.2). The gap in skilled remuneration at home and
abroad is raised by 50% and 100%. We check the predictions of the model for Ψ equal from 1.0
to 2.0 within a step of 0.2, i.e. the share of credit out of disposable income in the first period lies
between 0% to 100% in the calibration. We explicitly show the calibration results for Ψ = 1.74
and Ψ = 1.75 (although this spoils the steps in the calibration analysis), as for Ψ ≥ 1.75 the
impact of pa on ν∗ and gh reverses its sign compared to the case where Ψ ≤ 1.74.
In an opened economy where borrowing is relatively constrained Ψ 6 1.74, a higher brain drain
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rate makes agents invest more in education. This statement overlaps with the traditional result,
on which the brain gain theory is based. Accordingly, the higher skilled migration probabil-
ity increases growth. Raising the skilled migration probability from pa = 0.05 to pa = 0.1 or
pa = 0.2 (Ψ = 1.2) increases the annual growth from 0.0267 to 0.0269 or 0.0272 respectively.
A major difference in our results in case of more liberal borrowing constraints Ψ > 1.74 is the
negative influence of the higher brain drain probability on the educational incentives. This
can be explained with the disincentive effect of agents to accumulate human capital when they
avail of income for immediate consumption. The positive impact of pa on gh becomes weaker
as borrowing constraints get more relaxed (Ψ < 1.75) due to a declining incentive to invest in
education. The fall in growth for Ψ = 1.8 in response to higher pa is almost negligible, while for
Ψ = 2.0 gh declines from 0.0301 to 0.03 when pa reaches 0.1 or 0.2. This can be explained with
the stronger (negative) influence of pa on gh at more relaxed borrowing constraints (Ψ > 1.75).
The latter is a result of the propensity of agents to reduce their educational investment in re-
sponse to pa for relatively liberalized borrowing constraints.
Raising the brain drain probability (from pa = 0.05 to pa = 0.2) leads to a lower savings rate
independent of the level of the borrowing constraints. The argument for this is as follows: from
one hand, higher pa leads to capital import (because more migrants supply capital) but also
larger growth at least for Ψ ≤ 1.74, which contributes to a higher savings rate; from the other
hand, higher pa leads to a lower population share of savers, which decreases the potential for
savings. The positive effect of higher pa on s (even for Ψ ≤ 1.74) is lower than the negative
effect of pa on s so that the savings rate falls. The savings rate declines in response to higher
pa = 0.2 by 0.34 percentage points (from 0.1325 to 0.1291) when Ψ = 1.2, by 0.30 percentage
points (from 0.1194 to 0.1164) when Ψ = 1.6 and by 0.32 percentage points (from 0.1105 to
0.1073) when Ψ = 2. If pa rises to 0.1, the savings rate falls by a smaller degree by 0.09 per-
centage points (from 0.1325 to 0.1316) when Ψ = 1.2, by 0.09 percentage points (from 0.1194
to 0.1185) when Ψ = 1.6 and by 0.11 percentage points (from 0.1105 to 0.1094) when Ψ = 2.0.
A higher gap in skilled earnings at home and abroad φf improves human capital accumulation
independent of the borrowing constraints’ severity because agents invest more in education to
the end of migration. The higher educational incentive (and the higher growth) are sufficient
conditions in this case for the savings rate to rise. Still, the change in the growth rate and the
savings rate is almost negligible if φf increases to 7.2 and to 9.6. The positive effect of φf on
gh becomes weaker as borrowing relaxation rises, which implies that the impact of φf on gh
should also revert its sign at relatively large Ψ.
According to Table 2.1, more relaxed borrowing constraints (higher Ψ) increase growth by 0.38
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percentage points (from 0.025 to 0.0288) when Ψ rises from 1.0 to 1.6 and by 0.13 percent-
age points (from 0.0288 to 0.0301) when the magnitude of the credit relaxation improves from
Ψ = 1.6 to Ψ = 2.0 for a brain drain rate of 0.05. In the same case (pa = 0.05), the savings
rate falls by 2.18 percentage points (from 0.1412 to 0.1194) when Ψ rises from 1.0 to 1.6 and
by 0.89 percentage points (from 0.1194 to 0.1105) when Ψ rises from 1.6 to 2.0 because of the
augmented borrowing. Similar in quality is the impact of credit market liberalization on gh and
s when pa > 0.05.
2.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section we perform a welfare analysis by determining the welfare of young agents Vy,t,
agents who have reached their middle and old age in the domestic country, defined respectively
by Vm,t and Vo,t at period t. V
d
t is the sum of the lifetime utilities of all domestic individuals at
a specific point in time t (the index d stands for the domestic country). Vt measures not only
the utility of the domestic population but also considers the lifetime welfare of migrants abroad
at period t, where V fm,t, V
f
o,t is the welfare of middle–aged and old agents abroad respectively,
(the index f stands for the foreign country as explained earlier).
We report the average domestic welfare V˜ dt = V
d
t /n (n is the share of the remaining population),
which is important for government’s decision making, as well as average welfare V˜t = Vt/3, which
is essential for the decision making of the social planner. We calculate the average domestic
welfare of the remaining individuals in the source country (and not total domestic welfare) in
order to avoid understatement of the welfare measure due to the fall in the population share
caused by brain drain.10 For the welfare analysis we need the following definitions,
Vt = Vy,t + (1− pa)Vm,t + (1− pa)Vo,t + paV fm,t + paV fo,t
V dt = Vy,t + (1− pa)Vm,t + (1− pa)Vo,t
Vy,t = U(cy,t) + (1− pa)βU(cm,t+1) + (1− pa)β2U(co,t+1) + paβU(cfm,t+1) + paβ2U(cfo,t+2)
Vm,t = U(cm,t) + βU(co,t+1)
Vo,t = U(co,t)
V fm,t = U(c
f
m,t) + βU(c
f
o,t+1)
V fo,t = U(c
f
o,t)
10This problem does not exist when we consider total welfare, which comprises of the welfare of the domestic
population and migrants. Still, we report the average welfare of total population including migrants for
comparability with the average domestic welfare.
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Our welfare analysis is performed from period t = 0 till period t = 4 (h0 = 1) for the next 150
years, whereas we assume that in t = 0 a parameter change takes place. As proposed by Soares
(2008), the social welfare function does not discount the welfare of next generations.
We expect that the long–term influence of pa, φf and Ψ on (domestic) welfare is in accordance
with the impact of pa, φf and Ψ on growth. This results stems from the fact that the effect
of a parameter on long–run welfare in an overlapping generations setting is determined by the
impact of the same parameter on growth (see Yakita (2004), Wong and Yip (1999)).
A change in pa, φf and Ψ alters the lifetime utility of young agents in the period of alternative
values of pa, φf and Ψ (t = 0). However, pa, φf and Ψ do not influence the already established
individual welfare of middle–aged and old agents in the domestic country in the same period
(notice that wages are not affected by labor supply). Nevertheless, in t = 0 the total welfare
of middle–aged suddenly changes in response to pa because a larger share of them may migrate
and remain in the foreign country. On the other hand, rising φf in t = 0 alters the income of
middle–aged migrants abroad although it does not have any impact on the income of middle–
aged agents at home. That is why for t = 0 we include the utility of middle–aged agents in
the welfare analysis of pa and φf . We also consider the utility of middle–aged (for t = 0) in
the welfare analysis of Ψ for comparability with the welfare analysis of pa and φf although Ψ
does not exert any effect on the individual or total welfare of middle–aged domestic agents or
middle–aged migrants in this period.
For t = 0 we have that V d = Vy + (1 − pa)Vm and n = 2 − pa. For all other periods, V d =
Vy + (1− pa)Vm + (1− pa)Vo and n = 3− 2pa. The welfare of migrants is not explicitly shown
in the following analysis but can be easily deducted from Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
We report our welfare analysis in Table 2.2 and 2.3 assuming a benchmark with Ψ = 1.2 and
Ψ = 2.0 respectively. Here we find what is the impact of pa, φf and Ψ on individual welfare
and average (domestic) welfare. We increase (stepwise) the brain drain rate and the gap in
skilled remuneration at home and abroad by 100%. We do not report pa = 0.15 as its influence
on welfare compared to pa = 0.1 and 0.2 is qualitatively the same. Credit market relaxation
represented by Ψ = 1.3 and Ψ = 1.4 (with a benchmark of Ψ = 1.2 in Table 2.2) and by Ψ = 2.5
and 3.0 (with a benchmark of Ψ = 2.0 in Table 2.3) constitutes respectively a 50% and 100%
increase in the credit share out of income defined as (Ψ1 −Ψ0)/(Ψ0 − 1).
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Table 2.2: Transitional Welfare Analysis of BM (Ψ = 1.2) with Respect to pa, φf and Ψ
BM pa1 p
a
2 φ
f
1 Ψ1 Ψ2
Vy,t=0 4.769 4.8755 5.0888 4.8337 4.7721 4.7748
Vm,t=0 3.6498 3.6498 3.6498 3.6498 3.6498 3.6498
V˜ dt=0 4.2238 4.2949 4.4493 4.257 4.2254 4.2267
V˜t=0 4.2661 4.3761 4.5963 4.333 4.2677 4.2691
Vy,t=1 6.0448 6.1895 6.4798 6.1343 6.083 6.1161
Vm,t=1 4.6263 4.6354 4.6528 4.6333 4.6232 4.6206
Vo,t=1 2.6988 2.6988 2.6988 2.6988 2.6988 2.6988
V˜ dt=1 4.484 4.568 4.7543 4.5172 4.4962 4.5067
V˜t=1 4.5325 4.6598 4.9148 4.611 4.5449 4.5555
Vy,t=2 7.6619 7.8577 8.2511 7.7848 7.754 7.8341
Vm,t=2 5.8639 5.8847 5.9247 5.8799 5.8932 5.9185
Vo,t=2 3.4208 3.4276 3.4405 3.426 3.4186 3.4166
V˜ dt=2 5.6836 5.7996 6.0551 5.7329 5.7242 5.7595
V˜t=2 5.7451 5.9162 6.2593 5.8519 5.7864 5.8222
Vy,t=3 9.7117 9.9755 10.5065 9.8794 9.884 10.0347
Vm,t=3 7.4327 7.4708 7.5442 7.462 7.5121 7.5811
Vo,t=3 4.336 4.3514 4.3809 4.3478 4.3576 4.3764
V˜ dt=3 7.2041 7.3627 7.7102 7.2754 7.2966 7.3773
V˜t=3 7.2821 7.5107 7.9703 7.4265 7.3758 7.4577
Vy,t=4 12.3099 12.6642 13.3784 12.5376 12.5991 12.8535
Vm,t=4 9.4211 9.4843 9.6064 9.4697 9.5756 9.7106
Vo,t=4 5.496 5.5242 5.5784 5.5177 5.5547 5.6057
V˜ dt=4 9.1314 9.3471 9.8178 9.233 9.301 9.4497
V˜t=4 9.2302 9.535 10.149 9.4246 9.402 9.5526
Parameters calibrated as follows: pa1 = 0.1, p
a
2 = 0.2, φ
f
1 = 9.6, Ψ1 = 1.3, Ψ2 = 1.4
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Table 2.3: Transitional Welfare Analysis of BM (Ψ = 2.0) with Respect to pa, φf and Ψ
BM pa1 p
a
2 φ
f
1 Ψ1 Ψ2
Vy,t=0 4.7855 4.899 5.1262 4.8529 4.7905 4.7939
Vm,t=0 3.5312 3.5312 3.5312 3.5312 3.5312 3.5312
V˜ dt=0 4.1744 4.2511 4.4173 4.209 4.177 4.1787
V˜t=0 4.2171 4.3326 4.5638 4.2856 4.2196 4.2213
Vy,t=1 6.248 6.3947 6.6877 6.3378 6.3112 6.3539
Vm,t=1 4.6104 4.6077 4.6023 4.6133 4.6056 4.6024
Vo,t=1 2.6111 2.6111 2.6111 2.6111 2.6111 2.6111
V˜ dt=1 4.5201 4.6041 4.7917 4.552 4.5404 4.554
V˜t=1 4.5699 4.6981 4.9542 4.6484 4.5904 4.6043
Vy,t=2 8.1576 8.347 8.725 8.277 8.3146 8.4214
Vm,t=2 6.0194 6.0145 6.0042 6.0249 6.0676 6.1
Vo,t=2 3.4091 3.4071 3.4031 3.4112 3.4055 3.4032
V˜ dt=2 5.9016 6.0094 6.2503 5.9453 5.9704 6.0171
V˜t=2 5.9666 6.1321 6.4624 6.0711 6.0365 6.084
Vy,t=3 10.6508 10.8953 11.3827 10.8097 10.9539 11.1617
Vm,t=3 7.8591 7.8507 7.8332 7.8684 7.9936 8.085
Vo,t=3 4.451 4.4473 4.4397 4.455 4.4866 4.5106
V˜ dt=3 7.7053 7.8441 8.1543 7.7644 7.8656 7.975
V˜t=3 7.7902 8.0042 8.431 7.9287 7.9527 8.0637
Vy,t=4 13.9059 14.2216 14.8501 14.1173 14.4311 14.7937
Vm,t=4 10.2611 10.2474 10.2194 10.276 10.5311 10.7158
Vo,t=4 5.8113 5.8051 5.7922 5.8182 5.9108 5.9783
V˜ dt=4 10.0602 10.2389 10.6382 10.1402 10.3624 10.57
V˜t=4 10.1711 10.4478 10.9993 10.3548 10.4772 10.6876
Parameters calibrated as follows: pa1 = 0.1, p
a
2 = 0.2, φ
f
1 = 9.6, Ψ1 = 2.4, Ψ2 = 3
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As it is evident from Table 2.2, an increase of the brain drain rate for relatively tight borrowing
constraints Ψ = 1.2 raises the utility of the domestic population in all periods across all genera-
tions as there are no losers in society. This result can be explained with the positive impact of a
higher brain drain rate on the investment in human capital in an environment with constrained
borrowing. If, to the contrary, the credit market is relatively liberalized (as in Table 2.3 with
Ψ = 2.0), the (domestic) welfare improvement in response to higher skilled migration is caused
solely by an increase in young agents’ expected utility. Losers in this case are middle–aged
from t = 1 onwards and old–aged from t = 2 onwards as their consumption falls in response to
deteriorating growth. Average short term welfare improves but it is not as large as the welfare
in response to higher pa with relatively constrained borrowing. This temporary gain in utility
is expected to lose importance in the long run because of the negative impact of pa on growth
when credit constraints are relatively liberal.
A rise in the wedge of skilled earnings (Table 2.2 and 2.3) between the foreign and the domestic
country independent of the severity of borrowing constraints increases the welfare of all gener-
ations. This can be explained by the positive incentive effect which φf exerts on human capital
accumulation. There are no losers in any period in society if φf goes up to 9.6.
More liberal borrowing constraints in Table 2.2 (Ψ = 1.3 or Ψ = 1.4) make young agents better–
off but decrease the lifetime utility of middle–aged (period t = 1) and old (period t = 2) due
to higher credit costs. Middle–aged profit at period t = 2, while old at period t = 3 from the
increasing growth. All in all, the lifetime utility of the (domestic) population in all periods rises
due to more liberal credit distribution when Ψ reaches 1.3 or 1.4. The same results are obtained
in Table 2.3 where credit market liberalization (for Ψ rising to 2.5 or 3.0) also leads to welfare
improvement.
2.7 Conclusion
We build a three–period overlapping generations model with human capital accumulation sub-
ject to binding borrowing constraints in an environment of perfect physical capital mobility
(drawing on De Gregorio (1996)) and probabilistic brain drain (based on Beine et al. (2001)).
On the consumer side there are three types of agents: young, middle–aged and old. Young
agents invest optimal time in education and obtain additional income by borrowing, which is
constrained. Middle–aged individuals who remain at home earn income in correspondence to
their human capital, repay their debt and save. Savings are used for consumption in the third
period. Some educated are randomly singled out to leave the domestic country and work for
a higher foreign wage abroad (following the same lifetime pattern as at home). We postulate
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full enforcement of credit markets for migrants and natives. On the production side agents
(with the exception of old) supply inelastically their labor. Physical capital, which is perfectly
mobile, is used additionally as an input. Human capital investment, which is the triggering
growth factor, is influenced by borrowing constraints and skilled outmigration.
Our theoretical model shows that an increase in the skilled migration probability and the wedge
between skilled earnings at home and abroad could raise the optimal educational time and
growth only if agents are relatively eager to consume in the future (i.e the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution σ is high enough). Moreover, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
must outweigh the effects of the borrowing constraint, which confirms the importance of credit
constraints for the educational decision of agents when brain drain takes place. The aggregate
savings rate reacts ambiguously to changes in the outmigration of skilled agents. A sufficient
condition for the increase in the aggregate savings rate in response to a higher wedge between
the remuneration of educated at home and abroad is that growth rises. More relaxed borrowing
constraints increase growth only if agents are more prone to consume in the present σ ≤ 1.
The aggregate savings rate declines with the relaxation of the borrowing constraints if growth
decreases. In all other cases the aggregate savings rate’s behavior in response to more relaxed
borrowing constraints is ambiguous.
According to our calibration, educational time increases in response to a higher brain drain
probability only in an environment of tighter borrowing constraints (or if the share of credit
out of disposable income is lower than or equal to 74%, Ψ ≤ 1.74). The opposite is valid
when borrowing constraints are relaxed (or if Ψ > 1.74). The aggregate savings rate declines
due to a higher brain drain probability independent of the severity of borrowing constraints.
The average (domestic) welfare is also higher than the benchmark case in response to a ris-
ing brain drain rate independent of the degree of credit market liberalization in the short run.
Nevertheless, the immediate losers from a stronger brain drain probability in an setting with
relatively relaxed borrowing constraints are middle–aged and old–aged. The long–term impact
of brain drain on (domestic) social utility with relatively relaxed borrowing should be negative.
A higher wedge between the skilled wage in the foreign and the domestic country leads to higher
human capital accumulation, a higher aggregate savings rate and higher welfare compared to
the benchmark case. More relaxed borrowing constraints are good for growth but decrease the
aggregate savings rate. Credit market liberalization enhances average (domestic) welfare in all
periods although a generation of middle–aged and later old loses temporarily in terms of welfare
immediately after the introduction of more liberal borrowing constraints.
We simplified our analysis by assuming the lack of a government sector. The existence of a
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government with its taxation policies very often influences the flow of capital and investors’
decisions. The model could then be extended to describe the interaction between government
taxation, physical capital flow in a setting of human capital accumulation and brain drain.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let ν from (2.17) be defined as,
ν = 1− (Ψϕ)σ−1
/[ (1− pa)(A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)N
((1 +Aν)− (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν)ϕ) 1σ
+
pa(φfA+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)N
((1 +Aν)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν)ϕ) 1σ
]σ
and ν in the above equation is ν ≡ G(ν), where we prove that 0 < G(ν) < 1. First, for ν > 1 in
(2.17), while the RHS will be positive, the same cannot be said about the LHS unless σ = 1/2.
Second, for ν < 0 in (2.17), the LHS of (2.17) will be positive, while the RHS of (2.17) is not
positive unless σ = 1/2. To see this, assume that 1 + Aν = Dν, where D = 1+Aνν > 0 similar
to the assumption on A > 0. If (2.17) has a solution where ν < 0, for D to remain always
positive, it must hold that 1 + Aν < 0, which implies that the RHS of (2.17) is not positive
unless σ = 1/2. If ν is close to one, the LHS of (2.17) will tend to infinity, which cannot be
said about the RHS of (2.17). For ν = 0 in (2.17) there is a constraint Ψ˜, which completely
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disallows agents to invest in education. This case is not interesting for our model. That is why
we assume that Ψ < Ψ˜. Therefore, 0 < G(ν) < 1.
Furthermore, assume that P (ν) ≡ ν−G(ν). Because 0 < G(ν) < 1, it must hold that P (0) < 0
and P (1) > 0 (Notice that ν = 1 or ν = 0 are not supposed to be roots of (2.17)), which implies
that there exists at least one equilibrium value of ν in ν–P (ν) plane.
Next, we prove that ν is also unique. By the definition of P (ν) it follows that its derivative
with respect to ν is equal to, P ′(ν) = 1 −G′(ν). Because G′(ν) is always negative, it must be
that P ′(ν) is always positive. Assuming that there are more than one equilibrium in (2.17), we
can apply the mean value theorem. If ν3 is found in the area of (ν2, ν1) where ν2 > ν1, the
mean value theorem implies that P ′(ν3) =
P (ν2)−P (ν1)
ν2−ν1 . Given that P (ν1) = 0 and P (ν2) = 0 (if
ν1 and ν2 are roots, P (.) should be always zero by definition), it should hold that P
′(ν3) = 0.
Nevertheless, we proved that P ′(ν) is always positive, by which we have reached a contradiction.
Therefore, the equilibrium value of ν in (2.17) is unique and equal to ν∗.
2.9.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Differentiating f with respect to gh,
∂f
∂gh
=
(1− pa)(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
(1 + β−σR1−σ)(1 + gh)2
− p
a(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
(1 + gh)2
Differentiating f with respect to ν∗,
∂f
∂ν∗
=
(1− pa)(Ψ− 1)Rϕ
(1 + β−σR1−σ)(1 + gh)
− (1−Ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
ϕ− p
a(Ψ− 1)Rϕ
(1 + gh)
Both derivatives are positive if
1− pa
1 + β−σR1−σ
≥ pa
from where Proposition 2.3 is derived.
2.9.3 Proof of Proposition 2.4
We define F from the condition for optimal educational time, so we obtain,
F = −(Ψϕ)
(1− 1
σ
)
(1− ν∗) 1σ
+
(1− pa)N(A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
((1 +Aν∗)− (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ) 1σ
+
paN(φfA+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ) 1σ
= 0
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By applying the implicit function theorem using (2.17) (where Fz =
∂F
∂z ), we obtain for the
influence of pa on ν∗ the following,
∂ν∗
∂pa
= −Fpa
Fν∗
It is obvious that Fν∗ < 0. As far as the derivate of F with respect to p
a is concerned,
Fpa = − (A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)N
(1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ
+
(Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)N
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ
Simplifying the above expression,
Fpa = − ((1 +Aν
∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ (A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
(1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ ((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ
N
+
(1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ (Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ ((1 +Aν∗)− (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ
N
The sign of Fpa depends on the value of
F˜pa = −((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ (A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
+ (1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ (Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)
Therefore, Fpa > 0 and
∂ν∗
∂pa = −
Fpa
Fν
> 0 if
σ > ln
[(1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
1 +Aν∗ − (Ψ− 1)R(1− ν∗)ϕ
]/
ln
[Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
A+ (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
]
and the other way around. The same condition determines the relationship between growth
and brain drain. In the end, we discuss the relationship between the savings rate and the brain
drain probability. The direct effect of pa on f ,
∂f
∂pa
= −1 + g
h − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
(1 + β−σR1−σ)(1 + gh)
+
(Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ
(1 + gh)
≷ 0
is ambiguous. Therefore, the influence of pa on s is also ambiguous,
∂s
∂pa
=
∂s
∂pa︸︷︷︸
>0
+
∂s
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂pa
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂pa
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂ν∗︸︷︷︸
>0
∂ν∗
∂pa
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂pa︸︷︷︸
≷0
2.9.4 Proof of Proposition 2.5
By applying the implicit function theorem using (2.17), we obtain for the influence of φf on
ν∗,
∂ν∗
∂φf
= −Fφf
Fν∗
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The derivate of F with respect to φf is,
Fφf = p
aN
A
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ
− 1
σ
paN
Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ) 1σ+1
(1 +Aν∗)
The sign of Fφf depends on the value of
F˜φf = ((1 +Aν
∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ)A− 1
σ
(Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)(1 +Aν∗)
Therefore, Fφf > 0 and
∂ν∗
∂pa = −
F
φf
Fν
> 0 if
σ >
(Aφf + (Ψ− 1)Rϕ)(1 +Aν∗)
((1 +Aν∗)φf − (Ψ− 1)(1− ν∗)Rϕ)A
and the other way around. The conditions which lead to a change in the optimal educational
time in case of a rise in φf lead to a parallel change in growth. In the end, we discuss the
relationship between the savings rate and the wedge between skilled payment in the foreign and
the domestic country. For the partial derivative of s with respect to φf , we obtain,
∂s
∂φf
=
∂s
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂φf
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂φf
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂ν∗︸︷︷︸
>0
∂ν∗
∂φf
The influence of φf on the educational time and growth is decisive for the impact of φf on the
savings rate.
2.9.5 Proof of Proposition 2.6
By applying the implicit function theorem using (2.17), we obtain for the influence of Ψ on
ν∗,
∂ν∗
∂Ψ
= − FΨ
Fν∗
The derivate of F with respect to Ψ is,
FΨ > 0 if
1
σ
≥ 1
The condition 1σ − 1 ≥ 0 stems form the differentiation of the first term in F with respect to Ψ.
Because all other terms in F differentiated with respect to Ψ are positive, only the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution determines straightforward the relationship between Ψ and ν∗. The
latter implies that ∂ν
∗
∂Ψ = − FΨFν∗ > 0 if
1
σ ≥ 1 or σ ≤ 1. For the partial derivative of s on Ψ, we
obtain
∂s
∂Ψ
=
∂s
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂Ψ
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂gh︸︷︷︸
>0
∂gh
∂Ψ
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂ν∗︸︷︷︸
>0
∂ν∗
∂Ψ
+
∂s
∂f︸︷︷︸
>0
∂f
∂Ψ︸︷︷︸
<0
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where
∂f
∂Ψ
=
(1− ν∗)R
1 + gh
ϕ
[
− (1− p
a)
1 + β−σR1−σ
+ pa
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−(1− ν∗)ϕ < 0
Therefore, the influence of the borrowing constraints on savings will be negative if growth
decreases in response to relaxation of the borrowing constraints and is ambiguous otherwise.
2.9.6 Empirical Data
Table 2.4: Aggregate Savings Rates from Selected Eastern European States
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Av.
Bulgaria 13.2 12.6 10.8 11.6 10.8 11.3 12.5 14.6 14.4 31.3 27.9 28.1 28.7 28.9 15.2
CzechRepublic 26.9 27.8 28.2 27.0 25.8 28.0 29.2 30.7 32.5 31.3 27.9 28.1 28.7 28.9 28.6
Greece 12.4 11.4 11.6 10.2 13.9 14.1 12.1 13.2 12.6 9.5 7.1 8.3 8.0 8.6 10.9
Hungary 23.6 23.7 24.2 22.8 19.8 22.3 22.4 23.2 23.3 24.0 22.8 25.2 26.2 25.4 23.5
Poland 19.3 18.4 17.1 15.2 16.1 17.7 18.5 19.2 21.6 19.9 20.4 19.8 20.9 21.0 18.9
Romania 11.2 14.3 14.9 16.0 14.3 13.2 12.6 14.7 16.9 18.2 19.3 19.8 21.6 21.9 16.3
Slovakia 23.3 23.4 21.5 21.8 22.7 23.6 24.2 24.0 26.7 25.3 19.1 22.4 24.5 25.7 23.4
Slovenia 23.5 24.0 24.2 25.1 25.2 26.2 26.8 28.4 30.2 28.7 24.0 22.1 21.7 22.3 25.2
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators),
Last accessed on 1.12.2013
Table 2.5: Annual Interest Rates of Government Bonds with Maturities Close to Ten Years in
Selected Eastern European States
05.12 06.12 07.12 08.12 09.12 10.12 11.12 12.12 01.12 02.12
Bulgaria 5.11 5.07 4.87 4.28 3.80 3.39 3.22 3.44 3.27 3.25
CzechRepublic 3.31 3.11 2.60 2.38 2.37 2.24 1.92 1.92 1.96 2.01
Hungary 8.33 8.30 7.56 7.36 7.28 6.94 6.87 6.44 6.23 6.29
Latvia 5.15 5.07 4.67 4.45 3.92 3.52 3.32 3.24 3.21 3.22
Lithuania 5.30 4.96 4.82 4.84 4.53 4.32 4.11 4.00 3.97 4.06
Poland 5.41 5.24 4.99 4.88 4.85 4.57 4.18 3.88 3.91 3.99
Romania 6.50 6.68 6.52 6.84 6.54 6.85 6.84 6.65 5.90 5.72
Source: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html,
Last accessed on 1.12.2013
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3 The Shadow Economy, and Risky Human
Capital Accumulation in an Environment of
Productive Government Spending, and
Public Education
3.1 Introduction
The question about the economic rationale of income underreporting has been first raised by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Their work is established in a utility optimization setting,
where an agent decides how much income to report to authorities given a probability of paying
a penalty if caught underreporting. The model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) does not
explain why people report so much income to tax authorities given the empirically observed low
probability of detection. Since then economic theorists have come up with other factors, which
could explain individuals’ propensity to pay taxes such as tax morale, perception of inequity,
intrinsic motivation, tax structure, trust in government, preference for specific public goods etc.
(see Andreoni et al. (1998) and Alm (2012) for a review of studies).
In aggregate terms tax evasion has found its place in the economic research dealing with the
shadow economy. The interest of economic theorists in the shadow economy has empirical
grounds. The share of the informal sector out of official income has a significant part, for in-
stance, in European transition countries. Bu¨hn and Schneider (2012) show that the average
share of the informal sector out of GNP for 1999-2007 in some EU Eastern European countries
such as the Slovak Republic is around 18%, in Hungary is 24.4%, followed by Poland with
27.2%, the Czech Republic with 32% and Bulgaria with 35.3%.
Although the term shadow economy does not incorporate tax evasion only1, the macroeconomic
theory on growth and the informal sector has established itself as a disciple of the microeconomic
1Agents or firms which work in the shadow economy may pay their taxes but still do not meet specific standards
of production, which makes them a part of the informal economy.
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theory on tax evasion. The models relating growth to the shadow economy, which examine the
impact of alternative government policies (tax rates, penalty rate, audit rate) on the share of the
informal sector and economic development, have been mostly embedded in a physical capital
accumulation setting with at most a positive government externality on production. Loayza
(1996) explains the existence of an informal sector with the presence of a too large income tax
rate. He additionally investigates the impact of taxation on growth in an economy whose pro-
duction is augmented by government spending congested by the informal sector. Lin and Yang
(2001) disprove that the impact of higher income taxation on the size of the informal economy is
negative (a proposition by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)) modeling a dynamic portfolio choice
with AK production where the infinitely lived representative agent additionally draws utility
from a public good. Ihrig and Moe (2004) find that the income tax rate is the best policy to
reduce the informal sector if the shadow production decreases over time due to the assumption
that it is labor intensive. Chen (2003) investigates the impact of the penalty and the audit
rate and corruption costs in an economy with government externality on production, where the
representative agent chooses its optimal tax evasion, while the government sets the optimal tax
rate given tax evasion. Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2005) explore the optimal distribution of tax-
ation among capital and labor if an informal sector exists. Turnovsky and Basher (2009) extend
the analysis of the optimality of policies aiming to decrease the informal sector by including not
only the effectiveness of labor and capital taxation but tax enforcement policies as well.
A significant omission of the previous literature on the shadow economy in a growth context
is the disregard for (i) risk in the formal sector (represented here by uncertainty in the real-
ization of human capital of skilled) and (ii) public financement of the risky enterprise to gain
human capital (represented here by public education). The impact of risk in human capital
accumulation is vital for the share of the shadow economy if risk averse agents are able to
choose an occupation with less risk, for instance, in the low–skilled informal sector (incurring
only a penalty cost if detected). In this context it is relevant to investigate the qualitative and
quantitative effect of the risk measure on the informal sector and economic development and to
compare it with the impact of taxation and the usually cited tax enforcement policies on these
measures. This could answer the question whether the introduction of an insurance mechanism
in the formal economy could be wished or not. The inclusion of public education as a growth
factor enriches, on the other hand, the arsenal of policies, which a government may use when
dealing with the shadow sector. Because we expect that a tax rate may not always has the
wished favorable effect on economic development, the inclusion of a policy which is targeted
to enhance growth (such as the share of government expenditure on public education) can be
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a useful means to stimulate growth (if necessary), when the tax rate (or other policies) fight
successfully the informal sector but cause a decline in economic development. Both the risk in
human capital and public education have been highlighted as relevant to growth. Risky human
capital accumulation has been a subject of the work of Levhari and Weiss (1974), Rillaers (1998),
Krebs (2003), who confirm the negative impact of uncertainty on the investment in education
theoretically. On the other hand, Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992),
Su (2004), Blankenau (2005) model public education as a positive externality on human capital
accumulation,2 while Blankenau et al. (2007) verify empirically this relationship.
Our paper is embedded in the literature on occupational choice under risk and risky investment
in public education in a two–period overlapping generations endogenous growth model with a
shadow sector and productive government spending in production. We follow the work of Kan-
bur (1979)3 for modeling the occupational choice under risk, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) for
developing risky human capital accumulation with public education, and Loayza (1996) for the
construction of the shadow sector with a congestion effect on productive government expendi-
ture. In this model we are able to determine (i) the impact of the informal sector on growth
and long–term welfare, (ii) the effectiveness of the usually cited government policies (tax rate,
penalty rate, audit rate) but also government spending on education in combating the shadow
economy, (iii) the effect of the risk in the accumulation of human capital on the unofficial econ-
omy, and (iv) the impact of these policies, their combinations, and the risk measure on growth
and welfare.
The economy consists of two sectors: formal and informal both producing an identical con-
sumption good but by a different technology. At the beginning of life ex–ante homogeneous
and risk–averse agents make a human capital decision and an occupational choice. An agent
may decide to become high–skilled by spending certain time in education or to remain low–
skilled both periods. High–skilled work in the formal sector and have the advantage of earning
higher average wages but face occupational risk due to ex–ante unknown abilities in gaining
human capital. Low–skilled who work in the official sector obtain a sure low–skilled wage.
Low–skilled may work in the informal sector in the second period but face the probability of
paying a penalty fee if caught. We follow the empirical evidence that agents do not have an
objective idea about the audit probability (see Andreoni et al. (1998) for a review on simulation
studies) and assume that the choice to work in the informal sector depends on the individual
perception of the audit incidence. We model the shadow economy workers as low–skilled due
2Blankenau and Simpson (2004) support an alternative view.
3Kanbur (1979) endogenizes the occupational choice of agents, who have the opportunity to become either
workers or risk–bearing entrepreneurs.
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to the empirical evidence that the share of low–skilled workers who evade taxes is higher than
the share of high–skilled who do so. For instance, Pedersen (2003) shows for Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Germany and Great Britain (p. 66) that the share of blue collar workers who evade
taxes is higher than the share of white collar workers who do so. Unfortunately, no evidence
is available for Eastern European countries in this respect. In equilibrium the expected utility
of a skilled worker is equal to the expected utility of a low–skilled wage earner in the formal
sector. This determines the distribution of individuals across occupations in the formal sector.
Low–skilled in the shadow economy self–select on the basis of a relatively optimistic idea about
the audit rate. Growth in our model depends positively on the educational expenditure, which
is financed by the taxes levied in the formal sector together with the penalty fees gathered from
the informal sector. This implies that human capital accumulation hinges indirectly on the
occupational choice of economic agents, who choose to be either taxpayers or not.
We show that reduction of the shadow economy leads to improvement in growth (and, therefore,
long–term welfare). According to our theoretical results, a decrease in the shadow economy can
be attained through a lower tax rate, a higher audit rate, a higher penalty rate and a lower
risk measure. According to our calibration, a decline in the share of the informal production
(without an unfavorable impact on growth) can be reached most effectively by lower taxation in
combination with a higher share of government expenditure on education, followed by a higher
penalty. A lower risk measure ranks last in this respect. In terms of short–run welfare, a lower
risk measure attains the highest value of social utility, followed by a higher penalty rate and a
higher audit rate. However, in terms of long–term welfare, the penalty rate is superior compared
to the other policies. The risk measure ranks last in this respect. Although a lower risk measure
does not cause a substantial fall in the informal sector, it is the only parameter, which does
not create a trade–off between short–term and long–term welfare on aggregate and individual
level. This should make policy makers consider the introduction of an insurance mechanism in
the formal skilled labor market as an alternative approach to influence the unofficial economy.
On the other hand, a government which is interested in reducing the share of the informal
sector as effectively as possible should use a policy mix of lower income taxation and higher
government expenditure on public education. This approach to decrease the unofficial sector
will be accompanied, however, with a short–run welfare loss.
This paper is divided as follows: Section 3.2 presents the assumptions of the model, while Sec-
tion 3.3 the market equilibrium, Section 3.4 the sensitivity analysis, Section 3.5 the calibration,
Section 3.6 the transitional welfare analysis, Section 3.8 in the paper draws a conclusion.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Household Sector
Ex–ante homogeneous and risk averse agents live for two periods in the framework of an overlap-
ping generations model. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which he inelastically
supplies to the market. The population is normalized to one, which means that each generation
is equal to 0.5 and there is no population growth.
The occupational and educational choice made in the first period is irreversible. Those who
want to invest in education work as formal low–skilled when young and as formal skilled when
middle–aged. Those who do not invest in education find employment in the formal sector both
periods or may work in the informal sector but only when middle–aged. Low–skilled individu-
als can take a decision to switch to the informal sector after obtaining information about the
penalty rate (through personal contacts) while working as (formal) low–skilled when young and
forming a subjective perception of the audit rate in the first period of their life. Low–skilled
in education are excluded from this process.4 Although we do not include the participation of
young low–skilled in the informal economy by assumption, our model describes between 70%
and 75% of the share of agents employed in the informal sector according to Pedersen (2003).5
Individuals born at period t who decide to obtain education invest time ν and work as low–
skilled for the base wage in the formal sector wlt augmented by the low–skilled human capital h
l
t
when young. Indices l, w, and s stand respectively for variables related to low–skilled workers,
skilled workers and shadow sector workers in the whole paper. Once educated, skilled worker i
obtains the base wage wwt+1 augmented by one’s human capital hit+1 in the second period. As
agents differ with respect to their innate learning abilities (ex–ante unknown to them), they
gain different levels of human capital. The lifetime utility of skilled worker i at period t and
t+ 1 with cwt and c
w
i,t+1 measuring the consumption level is,
V wi,t,t+1 = ln(c
w
t ) + b ln(c
w
i,t+1) (3.1)
cwt = (1− τ)(1− ν)wlthlt (3.2)
cwi,t+1 = (1− τ)hi,t+1wwt+1 (3.3)
4Alternatively, we can assume that those in education may also switch to the low–skilled informal sector after
the first period, but this phenomenon will imply brain waste in the informal sector, for which no evidence is
present.
5This can be calculated with the help of Table 3.3 in Pedersen (2003) as follow: pi∗Obi
p∗Ob , where pi is the percentage
of agents at specific age i who evade taxes, while Obi is the total share of individuals interviewed at age i. p
and Ob relate to the total population of interviewees.
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with 0 < b < 1 being the utility discount factor. Due to the lack of a capital market, the first
and second period consumption is exactly equal to the obtained income at the respective period.
The income of those willing to become skilled is reduced at the tax rate τ in both periods as
they work in the formal sector. Following Yakita (2003), we assume that low–skilled workers’
human capital (in the formal and informal production) equals a share of the average human
capital of skilled workers 0 < ϕ < 1. The human capital of skilled workers, on the other hand,
grows according to,
hi,t+1 = aiDν
ξSφt h
1−φ
t 0 < ξ, φ < 1 (3.4)
where St stands for the quality of public education, measured by the mean government income
for education in total population at period t (similar to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)), ht
is the average human capital of skilled workers at period t, ai is an uninsurable risk (ex–ante
unknown abilities), which follows a lognormal distribution, ai ∼ f(−σ22 , σ2).6 The educational
expenditure is exogenous to the problem of the agent but it serves as a positive externality to
the production of new human capital. The educational time ν for high–skilled is also determined
by the government. The government expenditure on education (or quality of public education)
is not congested by a higher share of students. We find support for this assumption in the
ambiguous relationship between students’ performance and a class size. For instance, Borland
et al. (2005) argue empirically that this relationship is non–monotone and there is an optimal
class size, below which students’ attainment deteriorates. Denny and Oppedisano (2013) find
positive significant effects, and insignificant, but positive effects of a larger class on students’
performance in Great Britain and the USA respectively. However, this outcome is not replicated
in the studies of De Paola et al. (2013), and De Giorgi et al. (2012).
Agents who remain low–skilled in the formal sector in both periods of life t and t + 1 spend
total net income on consumption clt and c
l
t+1. Low–skilled who work in the formal sector pay
taxes at the rate τ as well. Their welfare is equal to,
V lt,t+1 = ln(c
l
t) + b ln(c
l
t+1) (3.5)
clt = (1− τ)wlthlt (3.6)
clt+1 = (1− τ)wlt+1hlt+1 (3.7)
We assume that only some low–skilled may work in the informal sector in the second period and
they are employed as formal workers when young. A low–skilled worker born at period t who
earns a living in the shadow economy as middle–aged obtains the base wage wst+1 augmented by
6The normalization of the expected value of the ability shock E(a) helps us avoid size effects from the mean of
the ability distribution f(a).
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the low–skilled human capital hlt+1 and faces the probability of being caught p
c and pays in this
case a penalty at a rate equal to ρ. Agents in the informal sector misperceive the real probability
of audit by attaching an individual perception weight ψ to pc. The subjective weight ψ of the
real probability to be caught in the informal sector is distributed uniformly within the range
[ψ,ψ, ], where 0 ≤ ψ < ψ ≤ 1/pc.7 A low–skilled worker j with a subjective probability of being
detected ψjp
c, who spends total income on consumption cst when young, c
sc
t+1 (if caught working
in the shadow sector), cst+1 (if not caught working in the informal sector) when middle–aged,
has welfare equal to,
V sj,t,t+1 = ln(c
s
t ) + b(1− pcψj) ln(cst+1) + bpcψj ln(csct+1) (3.8)
cst = (1− τ)wlthlt (3.9)
cst+1 = h
l
t+1w
s
t+1 (3.10)
csct+1 = (1− ρ)hlt+1wst+1 (3.11)
The assumption on ψ implies that there are agents in the economy who may consider that the
probability of detection in the shadow economy is higher or lower than the objective probability.
We show later that in equilibrium agents will naturally self–select into the shadow or the formal
sector on the basis of their perception of the probability of detection.
The penalty rate ρ is not a penalty over the evaded taxes due to the tendency of the government
to understate the evaded taxation. This is a relevant assumption for the shadow sector, which
either has no access to or does not want to use the bank system in order to avoid potential
tractability from the authorities. We assume that (i) ρ > τ to mimic the empirically observed
higher punishment rate compared to the tax rate, and that (ii) τ > pcρ, which corresponds
to the empirically observed lower expected loss rate compared to the tax rate in case of tax
evasion.
3.2.2 Production Sectors
There are two sectors in the economy (formal and informal economy) working in a perfect com-
petition setting, both producing an identical consumption good but by a different technology.
The price of the good is normalized for simplicity to 1 in both sectors.
The formal sector employs skilled and some low–skilled agents, who further bring along hu-
man capital. The total human capital of skilled and low–skilled is equal to Hwt = L
w
t ht, and
H lt = Lth
l
t with L
w
t and Lt measuring respectively the share of skilled agents and low–skilled
7The upper bound on ψ implies that agents cannot misperceive the actual audit probability to be more than
100%.
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at period t in the formal production. Following Loayza (1996), we model a positive externality
in the production function of the formal sector, represented by the government expenditure on
infrastructure Gt (including legislature, police, etc.), which is congested by the total production
of goods Yt+Qt, where Qt is the production in the shadow economy. The elasticity β measures
the productivity of public services to private services. The production function is,
Yt = A
( Gt
Yt +Qt
)β
(Hwt )
α(H lt)
1−α 0 < α, β < 1 (3.12)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter.
The shadow economy, on the other hand, works only with the human capital of low–skilled
agents. The production is linear in their human capital Hst = L
s
th
l
t with L
s
t being the share
of agents working in the informal sector. The elasticity η measures the productivity of public
services to private services in the informal economy. Government spending on infrastructure
is congested by total production. The shadow economy does not have full access to the public
goods provided by the government, that is why the spillover effect of government expenditure
is smaller compared to the formal economy. This assumption is reflected by 0 < δ < 1. The
production function of the informal economy has the following form,
Qt = B
( δGt
Yt +Qt
)η
Hst 0 < η < 1 (3.13)
where B > 0 is a productivity parameter.
3.2.3 The Government
The government collects taxes from all workers in the formal economy charging a linear tax
rate τ on income, and fines at rate ρ on earnings from the shadow economy in order to spend
them on infrastructure Gt and education St by incurring no debt. For a balanced budget the
government expenditure equals the taxes and fees that are levied,
St +Gt = τYt + p
cρQt (3.14)
If 0 < d < 1 measures the relative importance of education to infrastructure in the government
choice, and the share of the shadow economy out of the formal economy is γt, i.e. Qt = γtYt,
the distribution of government expenditure in terms of official income can be viewed as,
St = dYt(τ + p
cργt) (3.15)
Gt = (1− d)Yt(τ + pcργt) (3.16)
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3.3 Market Equilibrium
3.3.1 Labor Market Equilibrium
The profit of the representative firm in the formal sector
Πt = A
( Gt
Yt +Qt
)β
(Hwt )
α(H lt)
1−α − wwt htLwt − wlthltLt (3.17)
is maximized with respect to the share of skilled Lwt and low–skilled (young and middle–aged)
Lt in the formal economy. The equilibrium base wages of skilled and low–skilled are then
respectively defined as,
wwt = αA
((1− d)(τ + pcργt)
1 + γt
)β(ϕLt
Lwt
)1−α
(3.18)
wlt = (1− α)A
((1− d)(τ + pcργt)
1 + γt
)β( Lwt
ϕLt
)α
(3.19)
Notice that the human capital of low–skilled is a share of the average human capital of skilled
workers, hlt = ϕht.
The profit of the representative firm in the informal sector,
Πst = B
( δGt
Yt +Qt
)η
Hst − wsthltLst (3.20)
is maximized with respect to the share of low–skilled workers Lst in the shadow economy. The
base wage of low–skilled agents in the informal sector is then,
wst = B
(δ(1− d)(τ + pcργt)
(1 + γt)
)η
(3.21)
Because in the labor market equilibrium the supply of skilled and low–skilled must be equal to
the demand for (low–)skilled and due to the normalization of the population to one, it should
hold that
Lt = 1− Lwt − Lst = 1/2 + Llt (3.22)
where Llt is the population share of low–skilled middle–aged in the formal sector.
3.3.2 Equilibrium Occupational Choice
Proposition 3.1 (First stage decision process) In equilibrium homogeneous and risk averse
individuals should be ex–ante indifferent between working as a low–skilled worker in the formal
sector, who obtains a sure low–skilled wage, and a high–skilled worker in the same sector, who
bears occupational risk stemming from human capital investment. This condition determines
occupational choice of agents in the formal sector.
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Proposition 3.2 (Second stage decision process) The distribution of low–skilled agents across
the formal and informal economy is determined by the perceived probability of detection. Those
low–skilled who perceive the probability of detection as relatively small self–select into the in-
formal sector. Those low–skilled who perceive the probability of detection as relatively high
self–select into the formal sector.
The above propositions are based on the simplifying assumption that the decision process con-
cerning the occupational choice is divided in two stages. In the first stage agents decide between
a profession as skilled or low–skilled in the formal sector. In the second stage those who prefer
to remain low–skilled have the opportunity to choose employment in the formal sector or the
informal sector. In other words, an agent cannot ex–ante compare the utilities of all professions.
This result is a consequence of the assumption that young low–skilled who are not in education
obtain information about the penalty rate and form a subjective perception of the audit rate
only when they start working in the first period (for instance through personal contacts).
The propositions determine the distribution of agents across sectors. Because the agents who
decide to invest in education face risk in terms of human capital accumulation, an individual
should be ex–ante indifferent between being a high–skilled earner obtaining an ex–ante risky
wage and the sure income of a low–skilled worker in the formal sector. If this condition is not
satisfied, agents will have an incentive to deviate from the occupation which brings them lower
(expected) utility.
If an agent decides to remain low–skilled, he may choose also to migrate to the informal sector.
Low–skilled agents who perceive that the objective probability to be detected in the informal
sector is relatively small will choose to work in the shadow economy. Low–skilled agents who
overweight the objective probability to be caught in the shadow sector will prefer staying in
the formal sector. This condition implies that there is a low–skilled agent with a threshold
perception of the objective probability of detection ψ∗, who will be indifferent to work in the
formal and informal sector. All other low–skilled will have a specific preference to work either
in the shadow economy or the formal economy.
The first and the second proposition can be summarized in a system of equations. In order to
solve for the four unknowns Lwt , L
s
t , L
l
t, γt, we use the condition that the population is normal-
ized to one and equate additionally the net wage of low–skilled in the formal and informal sector.
The last condition ensures that low–skilled who work in the formal and informal economy will
not have an incentive to choose their occupation due to a difference in work payment but only
due to a subjective perception of the audit rate. The resulting system of equations is presented
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below,
E(V wi,t,t+1) = V
l
t,t+1 V
s
j,t+1(ψ
∗
j ) = V
l
t+1 w
s
t = w
l
t 1/2− Lwt − Llt = Lst
The expected utility of skilled workers (E is the expectation operator) can be easily calculated
by summing over the risk distribution, which boils down to finding the mean of E(ln abi) equal
to bµ or −bσ22 after we normalize µ. The solution of the system of equations is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 The share of agents across occupations and sectors, as well as the share of
the informal sector are constant over time and equal to8,
Ls =
M − 1
2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
Lw =
1− Ls
1 +M
Ll =
ψ − ψ∗
ψ∗ − ψL
s γ =
Ls
L
(1− α)
with the following constants,
M =
1− α
α
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν) 1b
> 1 ψ∗ =
1
pc
ln(1− τ)
ln(1− ρ)
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.1.
Corollary 3.1 Base wages ww, wl, ws are also constant.
Proof. As a consequence of the outcome that the occupational choice is constant over time,
ww, wl, ws do not change over time.
The next proposition determines the risk and skill premium of agents who are educated and/or
bear risk over the low–skilled certain remuneration in the formal sector. A sufficient condition
is derived which guarantees that educated obtain a higher skill and risk premium than informal
low–skilled, who, nevertheless, may suffer an income loss if they are detected to work in the
shadow economy. The skill and risk premia are related to the ex–post realization of income and
do not include the ex–ante perception of earnings, which informal workers have.
Proposition 3.4 Risk averse high–skilled workers obtain (i) a skill and risk premium over
the certain low–skilled wage in the formal sector because of a higher labor productivity and as
reimbursement for facing uncertainty in the accumulation of human capital (ii) a skill and risk
premium over the low–skilled wage in the informal sector if they bear more uncertainty in income
than shadow economy workers. Risk averse low–skilled workers in the informal economy obtain
a risk premium over the certain low–skilled wage because of the uncertainty of being detected
working in the shadow economy. The risk and skill premia expressed as ratios are constant over
time.
8We leave the subindex t for the variables which are proved to be constant.
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Proof. The proposition above shows that agents who are skilled and/or face risky income
require a skill and/or risk premium. The skill and risk premium prw that skilled workers
require over the low–skilled wage in the formal sector can be defined as a ratio between the
expected wage of a high–skilled worker and the wage of a low–skilled worker in the formal sector.
The skill and risk premium prw should be higher than one and is defined as,
prw =
(1− τ)wwht
(1− τ)wlhlt
=⇒ prw = αL
(1− α)Lw
When we use the equilibrium occupational choice, it follows that
prw =
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν) 1b
(3.23)
Because exp
(
σ2
2
)
> (1− ν) 1b , due to σ22 > 1/b ln(1− ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
, prw > 1 is always true.
The skill and risk premium prw
′
, which skilled obtain over the expected income of low–skilled
in the informal economy, is defined as,
prw
′
=
(1− τ)wwht
(1− pc)wshlt + pc(1− ρ)wshlt
=
1− τ
1− pcρ
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν) 1b
prw
′
> 1 if human capital risk is strong enough, i.e. exp
(
σ2
2
)
> (1− ν) 1b 1−pcρ1−τ .
The risk premium of low–skilled working in the informal sector prs vs. formal employment is,
prs =
(1− pc)wshlt + pc(1− ρ)wshlt
(1− τ)wlhlt
=
1− pcρ
1− τ (3.24)
The risk premium prs > 1 for τ > pcρ, which is an assumption of the model.
3.3.3 Income Distribution and Growth
The income shares of the formal sector, of skilled workers, low–skilled formal and low–skilled
informal workers out of total production are respectively,
Yt
Qt + Yt
=
1
1 + γ
wwhtL
w
Qt + Yt
=
α
1 + γ
wlhltL
Qt + Yt
=
1− α
1 + γ
wshltL
s
Qt + Yt
=
γ
1 + γ
(3.25)
In line with the neoclassical growth theory, income shares are constant. Skilled workers’ income
is lognormally distributed because of the presence of the uncertainty in human capital invest-
ment. Low–skilled workers in both sectors obtain low–skilled wages. As we already showed,
skilled workers obtain a risk and skill premium in contrast to low–skilled agents working in the
formal sector because risk averse skilled individuals bear occupational risk and are more pro-
ductive than low–skilled. Risk averse low–skilled workers in the shadow economy require a risk
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premium over the sure low–skilled wage in the formal sector because they face the probability of
paying a penalty fee for working in the informal sector. Skilled workers receive a higher skill and
risk premium than low–skilled in the informal sector if the risk in human capital accumulation
is large enough.
The average human capital in the economy, on the other hand, is equal to the human capital
which is accumulated by skilled individuals and the human capital which is inherited for free
by low–skilled. Therefore, the growth gat+1 of the average human capital h
a
t+1 for period t+ 1 is
determined as,
1 + gat+1 =
hat+1
hat
=
Lwht+1 + ϕ(1− Lw)ht+1
Lwht + ϕ(1− Lw)ht =
Lw + ϕ(1− Lw)
Lw + ϕ(1− Lw)(1 + g
h
t+1)
where ght+1 is the growth of average skilled workers’ human capital, which is defined as 1+g
h
t+1 =
D(ν)ξ
Sφt
hφt
. Therefore, the growth of average human capital and average skilled human capital
are equal because the occupational choice is constant over time. We can substitute for the
educational expenditure, for the income in the formal sector and for the equilibrium occupational
choice to obtain ght+1,
1 + ght+1 = D(ν)
ξ
[
dA
(1− d)β(τ + pcργ)1+β
(1 + γ)βγ
( 1
M
)α
(ϕ)1−α
(1− α)(M − 1)
2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
]φ
(3.26)
The growth rate of average skilled workers’ human capital is constant (because the distribution
of agents across professions does not change over time) and equal to ght+1 = g
h. It is then easy
to see that gat+1 = g
a = gh (a balanced growth condition).
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Because we already determined the occupational choice of agents in society, i.e. Lw, Ll, Ls
and the share of the shadow sector γ in the economy, individual income and growth, it is now
possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis of these variables with respect to the government
policies τ , ρ, pc, d and the risk measure σ. This is a necessary step if the shadow economy
exerts a negative effect on growth (and long–term welfare), what we prove later in this chapter.
We aim, furthermore, at determining which policies are effective in reducing the share of the
shadow economy without causing lower human capital accumulation. We investigate the effect
of the risk measure in this respect as well. The implications are summarized in what follows.
Proposition 3.5
(i) The influence of the tax rate τ on the occupational choice and γ is,
∂Ls
∂τ
> 0
∂Lw
∂τ
< 0
∂Ll
∂τ
< 0
∂γ
∂τ
> 0
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(ii) The influence of the penalty rate ρ on the occupational choice and γ is,
∂Ls
∂ρ
< 0
∂Lw
∂ρ
> 0
∂Ll
∂ρ
> 0
∂γ
∂ρ
< 0
(iii) The influence of the audit rate pc on the occupational choice and γ is,
∂Ls
∂pc
< 0
∂Lw
∂pc
> 0
∂Ll
∂pc
> 0
∂γ
∂pc
< 0
(iv) The influence of the share of government expenditure on education d on the occupational
choice and γ is,
∂Ls
∂d
= 0
∂Lw
∂d
= 0
∂Ll
∂d
= 0
∂γ
∂d
= 0
(v) The influence of the risk measure σ on the occupational choice and γ is,
∂Ls
∂σ
> 0
∂Lw
∂σ
< 0
∂Ll
∂σ
> 0
∂γ
∂σ
> 0
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.2.
A higher tax rate τ increases the costs of employment in the formal sector so that the share of
skilled and low–skilled in the formal economy decreases to the advantage of a higher population
of informal workers. As a consequence, the share of the shadow economy out of official income
jumps. A higher penalty rate ρ or an audit rate pc has an unfavorable effect on the expected
utility of those employed in the shadow economy, which results in a larger share of skilled
and low–skilled agents in the formal economy and a smaller share of informal workers in the
population. As a result, the share of the shadow economy out of official income falls. The share
of government spending on education d has no impact on the occupational choice of economic
agents, because government investment in education is a public good. As a consequence, the
share of the informal sector remains unaffected. A higher risk measure σ in human capital
accumulation reduces the share of professionals due to risk aversion and improves the share of
low–skilled in both sectors. This leads to a higher share of the informal sector.
Before we address the question about the impact of the government policies and the risk measure
on growth, we investigate the relationship between the share of the informal sector and human
capital accumulation. By doing this, we want to explore whether economic policy directed
against the informal sector is justified or not.
Corollary 3.2 The impact of the share of the informal sector γ on growth gh is negative.
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.3.
The negative relationship between γ and gh determined by the corollary can be explained
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as follows: from one hand, a larger share of the shadow economy crowds out more intensively
government investment in infrastructure and implies lower employment in the tax–paying formal
sector, which decreases growth; from the other hand, a larger informal sector is associated with
a higher government revenue from penalty fees (all other things being constant), which supports
higher government expenditure on infrastructure (per unit of production) and, therefore, growth.
Because the afore–mentioned negative effect of γ on human capital accumulation is dominant,
higher γ leads to lower gh. This outcome justifies government intervention directed to reduce
the share of the informal sector in terms of alternative policies of τ , ρ, pc, d. We address also
the question about the impact of σ for comparison reasons.
Proposition 3.6 The influence of the tax rate τ , the penalty rate ρ, the audit rate pc, the
government budget share on education d, and the risk measure σ on growth is9,
(i)
∂(1 + gh)
∂τ
≷ 0
(ii)
∂(1 + gh)
∂ρ
> 0 if β >
pcρ(1 + γ)
τ − pcρ
(iii)
∂(1 + gh)
∂pc
> 0 if β >
pcρ(1 + γ)
τ − pcρ
(iv)
∂(1 + gh)
∂d
≷ 0 if d ≶ 1
1 + β
(v)
∂(1 + gh)
∂σ
≶ 0
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.4.
As the above proposition states, the impact of the tax rate τ on growth is ambiguous. The
tax rate has a direct (positive) impact on human capital accumulation through the tax revenue
per unit of production and indirect (positive) influence on gh through the penalty fees revenue
per unit of production (for growing γ) but indirect (negative) impact on growth through the
rising share of the informal sector, which congests the productivity of government expenditure
on infrastructure. The ambiguity of the indirect relationship between gh and τ is additionally
reinforced by the fact that rising τ decreases the employment in the formal sector, which is the
main tax payer.
A higher penalty rate ρ or an audit rate pc has a positive effect on human capital accumulation
only if β is large enough. Both policies, similar to the tax rate, exert a direct positive effect on
the government revenue per unit of production (here out of fees, all other things being constant),
and contrary to the tax rate, decrease the share of the shadow economy. A reduction in the
9The structure ∂y
∂x
≶ 0 if a ≷ b is to read: ∂y
∂x
< 0 if a > b and ∂y
∂x
> 0 if a < b in all propositions
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informal sector implies, from on hand, a decrease in the congestion effect on infrastructure, which
augments human capital accumulation, but also a fall in the share of government revenue out of
penalty fees per unit of production depending on the size of the informal sector. Additionally,
lower γ implies improvement of the employment in the formal sector paying taxes. This makes
the relationship between gh, pc and ρ inconclusive also in this case.
An increase in the educational expenditure share d leads to a higher growth rate independent
of the share of the shadow economy if d is small enough. In fact, with empirically admissible
values for β ∈ [0.03 − 0.39] (see calibration) and d ∈ [10% − 20%] this condition holds. The
latter can be explained with the nature of this policy. While the government expenditure on
infrastructure has a consumption character (and a relatively low elasticity in gh), the spending
on education has an investment character (and a relatively high elasticity in gh).
A higher risk measure in the earnings of skilled σ has an ambiguous impact on growth. The
share of the informal sector jumps, which, from one hand, reduces the positive externality
of the government spending per unit of production through more intensive congestion but
increases government revenues out of penalties per unit of production, from the other hand.
Moreover, a higher risk measure decreases the employment in the tax–paying formal sector,
which contributes additionally to a fall in growth. This implies that the impact of σ on human
capital accumulation is not straightforward.
In the end we can conclude that it is possible to apply even the tax rate (or the risk measure)
in reducing the share of the shadow economy. Because a lower tax rate or a lower risk measure
reduces γ unambiguously, but the impact of a lower tax rate/risk measure on growth is not
straightforward, it is possible to increase the share of the government spending on education d
in order to counteract the presumably negative effect of τ and σ on growth.
Proposition 3.7 The influence of the tax rate τ , the penalty rate ρ, the audit rate pc, the
government budget share on education d, and the risk measure σ on wages in the short run is,
(i)
∂(wwht)
∂τ
≶ 0 ∂(w
lhlt)
∂τ
≶ 0
(ii)
∂(wwht)
∂ρ
> 0
∂(wlhlt)
∂ρ
> 0
(iii)
∂(wwht)
∂pc
> 0
∂(wlhlt)
∂pc
> 0
(iv)
∂(wwht)
∂d
< 0
∂(wlhlt)
∂d
< 0
(v)
∂(wwht)
∂σ
≶ 0 ∂(w
lhlt)
∂σ
< 0
Proof: See Appendix 3.10.5.
Proposition 3.7 shows how the income variables react to changes in the policy instruments
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and to the risk measure in the short run, i.e. before a parameter change is incorporated in
growth. A tax increase raises the government revenue out of taxes and penalties per unit of
total production (directly and indirectly by improvement in γ), which supports a higher positive
government externality on production and drives wages up. Nevertheless, a higher congestion
effect on production results due to a rise in the shadow sector in response to higher τ , which
drives wages down. This trade–off is reflected in the ambiguous relationship between wages and
the tax rate. Competition does not play a role in the formation of both wages in response to
τ , because a rise in τ reduces simultaneously the share of skilled and low–skilled in the formal
sector, so their ratio M , vital for the base wage, stays constant.
A higher penalty rate or an audit rate improves the government externality on production unam-
biguously. First, both policy measures decrease the shadow economy sector and the congestion
effect of γ falls. Second, both policies raise the share of levied penalty revenue per unit of total
production (all other things being constant) and dominate the negative impact that lower γ
has on the government levies from penalty fees per unit of total production. Therefore, pc and
ρ have a positive impact on labor productivity in the short run. Competition does not play
a role in the formation of both wages in response to pc and ρ, because both policies increase
simultaneously the share of skilled and low–skilled in the formal sector.
A higher share of government spending on education has a negative effect on the base wage as
higher d reduces the expenditure share on infrastructure. That is why higher d makes wages
decline in the short run.
A higher risk measure makes agents deviate from the risky skilled profession to low–skilled
employment in the formal and informal sector due to risk aversion. The share of the informal
sector rises. The lower supply of skilled labor and the higher levies out of penalties per unit
of total production due to rising γ, which drives skilled wages up, counteract the higher share
of informal sector, which crowds out the positive externality of government expenditure on
production, and drives skilled wages down. Therefore, the impact of a higher risk measure on
skilled labor productivity is ambiguous in the short run. The negative effect of a larger supply
of low–skilled labor on low–skilled wages combined with the congestion effect of rising γ on
production exceeds the positive effect of higher penalty levies per unit of total production on
low–skilled wages due to larger γ. Therefore, low–skilled labor productivity falls in the short
run in response to larger σ.
Proposition 3.8 The long–run influence of τ , pc, ρ, d and the risk measure σ on the long–term
income of economic agents depends on the impact of τ , pc, ρ, d and σ on growth gh.
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Proof: See Appendix 3.10.6.
Proposition 3.8 discusses the effect of τ , pc, ρ, d and σ on the long–term income of individuals.
While in the short term policies’ changes and changes in σ influence the income variables through
occupational choice and the government externality on workers’ productivity, in the long term
the growth of average human capital is vital for the effect of τ , pc, ρ, d and σ on the income
variables. In the long–run a parameter change is incorporated in growth so many times so that
the growth effect dominates the short run effect of altered occupational choice and government
externality on workers’ productivity.
3.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model by defining the parameters: α, β, η, b, ψ, ψ, σ, τ , ρ, pc, d, A, D, φ,
ξ, ϕ and ν to match empirical data on the real economies of European transition countries for
the benchmark model (BM).10 We assume that at period t = 0 the average human capital of
skilled is h0 = 1. Under the postulation of an annual growth rate of 2.5%, and a period of
30 years we can determine D in the human capital accumulation function (D = 6.26). We set
the elasticity of educational time and the elasticity of educational expenditure in the human
capital accumulation function respectively equal to ξ = 0.8 and φ = 0.1 following Glomm and
Ravikumar (1998). The share of time spent on education ν is set equal to 0.5 to reflect the
fact that agents who live 30 years during their first period spend around 15 years for education.
The weight of government expenditure on education d in most countries in Eastern Europe (the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria) is approximately 10-15% of
their budget according to the World Bank for the period 2007–2010 (see Appendix 3.10.7). We
choose the lowest value (10%) to be able to investigate increases in the share of government
expenditure on education. The spillover ϕ is set equal to 0.4. It does not influence the skill
premium, but it has an indirect impact on human capital accumulation via the government
spending on education, which can be corrected by adjusting D.
The values of α = 0.5, σ = 0.52, ψ = 0, and ψ = 7 are defined to correspond to an empirically
observable share of high–skilled workers in the formal economies, the share of informal workers
and the share of the shadow economy in some European transition countries. We target a
share of skilled individuals of around 18% in the population according to data by Eurostat (See
Appendix 1.9.5) and a value of 27% for the share of the shadow economy out of official income
in compliance with Bu¨hn and Schneider (2012) (see Appendix 3.10.7). The share of unofficial
10It is not necessary to define B and δ because of the assumption that low–skilled base wages in the formal and
informal sector are equal.
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workers out of official labor lies between the average estimate of 9% for France in 1997 and 1998
and the maximum estimate of 48% for Italy in 1997 and 1998 according to Schneider (2000)
(see Appendix 3.10.7). Unfortunately, no recent estimates about the share of participants in
the shadow economy are available for European transition countries, so we just put up with the
share of informal labor L
s
L+Lw , which our base model predicts (around 40%).
For the baseline model we further assume that τ = 0.3, which corresponds to the largest tax
rate of personal income and social insurance contributions in Eastern Europe paid by workers
according to OECD (2011) (see Appendix 3.10.7). By choosing the largest tax rate, we are
interested in finding out how a general tax fall influences the share of the shadow economy,
economic development and later welfare. The probability of a tax audit is set at pc = 0.089,
following Fullerton and Karayannis (1994). We set ρ to be equal to 0.47 so that it does not
contradict earlier targets. The value of ρ implies that the penalty rate is 57% higher than the
tax rate, which is close to the value that Fullerton and Karayannis (1994) use in their paper.
We choose b to correspond to an annual discount factor of 0.99 of the utility of future consump-
tion, which implies that b = 0.9930 = 0.74. A is normalized to 1. According to the literature
review of Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), the empirical elasticity of public goods in produc-
tion varies between 0.03 and 0.39. We conduct our calibration analysis with the average value
β = η = 0.2.
In Table 3.1 we report the qualitative and quantitative impact of τ , pc, ρ, d and σ and combi-
nations of τ, d on the occupational choice variables,11 the share of the shadow economy, growth
and the income variables. The income variables refer to period t = 1, the starting period is
t = 0. We report the income variables one period after the starting period to investigate the
combined effect of growth and the government externality on labor productivity when a policy
changes. Nevertheless, the base income (ww, wl) is also shown. The results in Table 3.1 reflect
alternative steady states, when certain policies dominate.
We report only those policies which reduce the share of the shadow economy and endeavor to
find which do this most effectively. That is why we show (i) changes in the tax rate τ and σ
below the benchmark by reducing the benchmark stepwise by 25% and (ii) a stepwise 25% rise
in pc, ρ and additionally d (which increases by 25%, 50% and 100%). By the sensitivity analysis
of d we try to determine whether a lower tax rate, which may lead theoretically to a lower share
of the shadow economy, can be combined with higher d so that a lower share of the shadow
economy is attained without hurting human capital accumulation. The same question is not
posed with respect to the interaction of a lower risk measure σ and higher d because lower σ
11Lw + L+ Ls may not sum exactly to one due to approximation errors.
80
results in higher growth according to the calibration.
As Table 3.1 shows, a decrease in the tax rate τ makes the occupation as a shadow worker a
Table 3.1: Calibration Results for τ , pc, ρ, d, σ and Policy Combinations
BM τ1 τ2 p
c
1 p
c
2 ρ1 ρ2 ...
Lw 0.1819 0.2264 0.2069 0.1998 0.2107 0.2067 0.2218 ...
L 0.5313 0.6612 0.6042 0.5835 0.6154 0.6037 0.6478 ...
Ls 0.2869 0.1124 0.1889 0.2167 0.1739 0.1896 0.1305 ...
γ 0.27 0.085 0.1563 0.1857 0.1413 0.1571 0.1007 ...
gh 0.025 0.0229 0.0243 0.0253 0.0255 0.0254 0.0257 ...
ww 0.3995 0.3579 0.3836 0.4046 0.4075 0.4062 0.4097 ...
wl 0.3419 0.3063 0.3284 0.3463 0.3487 0.3476 0.3507 ...
wlhlt 0.2866 0.2419 0.2696 0.2932 0.297 0.2953 0.3001 ...
wwht 0.8371 0.7065 0.7874 0.8565 0.8675 0.8627 0.8766 ...
Parameters calibrated as follows: τ1 = 0.15, τ2 = 0.225 p
c
1 = 0.1112, p
c
2 = 0.1335, ρ1 = 0.5875,
ρ2 = 0.7050
Calibration Results for τ , pc, ρ, d, σ and Policy Combinations (cont’d)
... d1 d2 d3 σ1 σ2 τ1, d2 τ1, d3
Lw ... 0.1819 0.1819 0.1819 0.2006 0.1926 0.2264 0.2264
L ... 0.5313 0.5313 0.5313 0.5294 0.5302 0.6612 0.6612
Ls ... 0.2869 0.2869 0.2869 0.27 0.2772 0.1124 0.1124
γ ... 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.255 0.2614 0.085 0.085
gh ... 0.0257 0.0263 0.0273 0.0251 0.0251 0.0243 0.0252
ww ... 0.3972 0.3949 0.3902 0.3805 0.3883 0.3538 0.3496
wl ... 0.34 0.338 0.3339 0.3604 0.3526 0.3029 0.2992
wlhlt ... 0.2912 0.2947 0.2993 0.3035 0.2963 0.2487 0.2526
wwht ... 0.8507 0.8608 0.8742 0.8011 0.8159 0.7265 0.7378
Parameters calibrated as follows: d1 = 0.125, d2 = 0.15, d3 = 0.2, σ1 = 0.26, σ2 = 0.39,
τ1 = 0.15
less attractive option, which increases the share of low–skilled and skilled agents in the formal
economy. As a result, the share of the shadow economy decreases from 0.27 to 0.085 if τ falls
to 0.15. A disadvantage of this policy is that it reduces growth by 0.21 percentage points (from
0.025 to 0.0229). Lower government externality on infrastructure and lower human capital
accumulation drive both skilled wages and low–skilled wages down by approximately 16% (to
0.7065 and to 0.2419 respectively) for τ declining by 50%.
A higher penalty rate ρ or an audit rate pc improves the share of skilled and low–skilled workers
in the official sector. A rise in pc and ρ by 50% leads to a fall in the share of the shadow
sector respectively to 0.1413 and to 0.1007. Growth rises stronger in case of higher ρ (to 2.57%)
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than pc (to 2.55%) in these cases. Wages improve because of the positive spillover effect of the
government externality on base income wl and ww and improved human capital accumulation.
The surge in skilled and low–skilled remuneration for 50% larger pc (amounting for both wages
to approximately 3.6% increase to wwht = 0.8675 and w
lhlt = 0.297) is lower than the positive
effect which 50% larger ρ has on (low–)skilled labor productivity (which is around 4.7% increase
to wwht = 0.8766 and w
lhlt = 0.3001).
A higher government expenditure share on education d does not create an incentive for agents
to change occupations, because educational expenditure is a public good available to all and
low–skilled are entitled to a share of skilled agents’ human capital. That is why the share of
the informal sector remains unaffected. Still, growth rises as high as 2.63% if the government
invests in education 15% of its revenue out of taxation and penalties. Skilled wages rise to
0.8608, while low–skilled to 0.2947 for d going up to 0.15 (which constitutes improvement of
around 2.8% for both) due to enhanced human capital accumulation in spite of the fall in base
wages.
A lower risk measure σ leads to a higher skilled labor supply to the disadvantage of the pool of
low–skilled in the formal and the informal economy. The shadow economy share falls to 0.255 if
σ declines by 50%. Growth improves to 2.51% in the same case. The higher competition among
skilled workers in the formal sector makes high–skilled wages decrease by approximately 4.3%
to 0.8011 for a decline in σ of 50% despite higher human capital accumulation. Low–skilled
wages improve by around 5.9% to 0.3035 in the same case because of lower competition among
low–skilled (triggering higher base income) and a higher growth rate.
The policy mixes τ, d presented in Table 3.1 are selected among combinations of τ, d which
could lead to the strongest decline in the shadow economy in response to lower τ . If τ de-
creases by 15% and d rises by 50% or 100%, the resulting occupational choice and the share
of informal sector (γ = 0.085) are solely dictated by τ . Because the positive impact of higher
d on gh is stronger than the negative influence of lower τ on gh, growth improves to 2.52% in
case of realization of the policy mix τ = 0.15, d = 0.2. The short–run impact of the policy mix
(τ = 0.15, d = 0.2) leads to a fall of (low)–skilled wages by 11.9% (to wwht = 0.7378, w
lhlt =
0.2526) as growth is not strong enough to compensate for the fall in wl, ww.
To sum up, the most effective policy in combating the share of the unofficial economy without
an adverse impact on growth is the policy mix of a lower tax rate τ and a relatively high share
of government expenditure on education d, followed by an increase in the penalty rate ρ, and
the audit rate pc. A fall in the risk measure σ ranks last in decreasing the share of the informal
sector without causing an unfavorable effect on long–term economic development.
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3.6 Welfare Analysis
For the welfare analysis we calculate the ex–post welfare of young agents who work later in the
formal sector Vy,t (addressed also as formal young), young who participate later in the informal
sector V sy,t (addressed also as informal young), middle–aged skilled V
w
m,t, middle–aged formal
low–skilled V lm,t, and middle–aged informal low–skilled workers V
s
m,t at period t. The welfare
of young, who become skilled workers or low–skilled in the formal sector, is equal due to the
equilibrium occupational choice. The index y stands for young, m for middle–aged. We define
Vt as the sum of lifetime utilities of all domestic individuals at time t. For the ex–post welfare,
Vt = L
w
t Vy,t + L
l
tVy,t + L
s
tV
s
y,t + L
w
t−1V
w
m,t + L
l
t−1V
l
m,t + L
s
t−1V
s
m,t
Vy,t = U(c
w
t ) +
∫
a∈A
βU(cwi,t+1)f(a)da = U(c
l
t) + βU(c
l
t+1)
V sy,t = U(c
s
t ) + (1− pc)βU(cst+1) + pcβU(csct+1)
V wm,t =
∫
a∈A
U(cwi,t)f(a)da
V sm,t = (1− pc)U(cst ) + pcU(csct )
V lm,t = U(c
l
t)
We perform a welfare analysis from period t = 0 till period t = 4, i.e. we look at the influence of
the policies and the risk measure on the welfare of the individuals for the next 150 years, given
that the parameter change takes place at period t = 0 (h0 = 1). In accordance with Soares
(2008), we weight equally the welfare of present and future generations.
We expect that the long–term influence of pc, ρ, τ , d, σ on welfare is reciprocal in sign to pc, ρ,
τ , d, σ on growth. This is a natural consequence of the prevailing growth effect of any policy in
the long term in an overlapping generations model (see Yakita (2004), Wong and Yip (1999)).
A change in pc, ρ, τ , d, σ alters the lifetime utility of young agents with the introduction of
a new parameter (t = 0) through a new distribution of young across professions, new wages
and human capital accumulation. In case of alternative values of σ, young agents in t ≥ 0 who
remain formal experience additionally declining/increasing utility due to risk aversion. The
lifetime utility change of middle–aged in t = 0 in response to different government policies
except for σ is reflected only in the adjustment of base wages. This outcome is put down to the
fact that the occupational choice remains fixed. The latter is presented by the subindex t − 1
in the share of middle–aged Lwt−1, Llt−1 and Lst−1 in the welfare equations above, which implies
that the decision on an occupation is taken at period t−1. An analogical interpretation applies
for Lwt , L
l
t and L
s
t . Alternative values of σ in t ≥ 0 cause an additional effect on the utility of
middle–aged skilled due to the assumption of risk aversion.
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Table 3.2: Transitional Welfare Analysis with Respect to τ , pc, ρ
BM τ1 τ2 p
c
1 p
c
2 ρ1 ρ2
Vy,t=0 −3.5349 −3.4541 −3.4582 −3.5162 −3.5049 −3.5108 −3.4972
V sy,t=0 −3.3128 −3.3756 −3.3114 −3.3045 −3.3037 −3.3052 −3.3136
V wm,t=0 −1.4095 −1.3468 −1.3629 −1.4077 −1.4059 −1.4077 −1.4059
V sm,t=0 −2.046 −2.1775 −2.1011 −2.0583 −2.0707 −2.0665 −2.0946
V lm,t=0 −2.3462 −2.2835 −2.2995 −2.3444 −2.3426 −2.3444 −2.3426
Vt=0 −2.731 −2.7698 −2.7345 −2.7426 −2.751 −2.7492 −2.765
Vy,t=1 −2.2476 −2.2492 −2.1924 −2.2003 −2.1737 −2.1853 −2.152
V sy,t=1 −2.0255 −2.1707 −2.0456 −1.9886 −1.9725 −1.9797 −1.9684
V wm,t=1 −0.6697 −0.6452 −0.6291 −0.6468 −0.634 −0.6396 −0.6235
V sm,t=1 −1.3062 −1.4758 −1.3674 −1.2974 −1.2988 −1.2984 −1.3122
V lm,t=1 −1.6064 −1.5818 −1.5658 −1.5835 −1.5707 −1.5763 −1.5602
Vt=1 −1.7174 −1.7873 −1.7274 −1.7051 −1.6993 −1.7028 −1.6973
Vy,t=2 −0.9604 −1.0659 −0.9413 −0.8954 −0.8588 −0.8747 −0.8286
V sy,t=2 −0.7382 −0.9874 −0.7945 −0.6837 −0.6576 −0.669 −0.6451
V wm,t=2 0.0701 0.0349 0.0899 0.1031 0.1217 0.1137 0.137
V sm,t=2 −0.5664 −0.7958 −0.6484 −0.5475 −0.543 −0.5452 −0.5516
V lm,t=2 −0.8666 −0.9018 −0.8468 −0.8335 −0.815 −0.823 −0.7997
Vt=2 −0.7039 −0.8557 −0.7423 −0.6777 −0.664 −0.6708 −0.6553
Vy,t=3 0.3269 0.1174 0.3099 0.4095 0.4561 0.436 0.4948
V sy,t=3 0.549 0.1958 0.4567 0.6212 0.6573 0.6416 0.6783
V wm,t=3 0.8099 0.7149 0.809 0.8531 0.8774 0.8669 0.8976
V sm,t=3 0.1734 −0.1157 0.0707 0.2025 0.2127 0.2081 0.2089
V lm,t=3 −0.1267 −0.2218 −0.1277 −0.0836 −0.0593 −0.0698 −0.0391
Vt=3 0.3097 0.076 0.2428 0.3498 0.3714 0.3612 0.3867
Vy,t=4 1.6142 1.3007 1.561 1.7145 1.7711 1.7467 1.8182
V sy,t=4 1.8363 1.3791 1.7078 1.9262 1.9723 1.9523 2.0017
V wm,t=4 1.5498 1.395 1.528 1.6031 1.6331 1.6202 1.6582
V sm,t=4 0.9132 0.5643 0.7897 0.9524 0.9684 0.9614 0.9695
V lm,t=4 0.6131 0.4583 0.5913 0.6664 0.6965 0.6835 0.7215
Vt=4 1.3232 1.0077 1.2279 1.3772 1.4067 1.3931 1.4286
Parameters calibrated as follows: τ1 = 0.15, τ2 = 0.225, p
c
1 = 0.1112, p
c
2 = 0.1335, ρ1 = 0.5875,
ρ2 = 0.7050
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Table 3.3: Transitional Welfare Analysis with Respect to d and σ and Policy Combinations
BM d1 d2 d3 σ1 σ2 τ1, d2 τ1, d3
Vy,t=0 −3.5349 −3.5286 −3.5256 −3.5263 −3.4924 −3.5101 −3.4448 −3.4455
V sy,t=0 −3.3128 −3.3065 −3.3035 −3.3042 −3.2703 −3.288 −3.3664 −3.3671
V wm,t=0 −1.4095 −1.4151 −1.4209 −1.4331 −1.3081 −1.3504 −1.3583 −1.3704
V sm,t=0 −2.046 −2.0517 −2.0574 −2.0696 −2.046 −2.046 −2.189 −2.2011
V lm,t=0 −2.3462 −2.3518 −2.3576 −2.3697 −2.3462 −2.3462 −2.295 −2.3071
Vt=0 −2.731 −2.7306 −2.732 −2.7385 −2.6121 −2.6616 −2.7709 −2.7773
Vy,t=1 −2.2476 −2.2035 −2.1698 −2.1226 −2.1443 −2.1874 −2.1713 −2.1241
V sy,t=1 −2.0255 −1.9814 −1.9477 −1.9004 −1.9222 −1.9653 −2.0929 −2.0456
V wm,t=1 −0.6697 −0.6536 −0.6417 −0.6263 −0.6123 −0.6362 −0.6172 −0.6018
V sm,t=1 −1.3062 −1.2901 −1.2782 −1.2628 −1.2488 −1.2727 −1.4479 −1.4324
V lm,t=1 −1.6064 −1.5903 −1.5784 −1.563 −1.549 −1.5729 −1.5539 −1.5384
Vt=1 −1.7174 −1.6873 −1.6645 −1.6332 −1.5447 −1.6164 −1.7344 −1.7031
Vy,t=2 −0.9604 −0.8784 −0.814 −0.7188 −0.8488 −0.8953 −0.9195 −0.8243
V sy,t=2 −0.7382 −0.6562 −0.5918 −0.4967 −0.6267 −0.6732 −0.8411 −0.7459
V wm,t=2 0.0701 0.108 0.1375 0.1805 0.1322 0.1063 0.1023 0.1452
V sm,t=2 −0.5664 −0.5285 −0.499 −0.456 −0.5043 −0.5302 −0.7284 −0.6854
V lm,t=2 −0.8666 −0.8287 −0.7992 −0.7562 −0.8045 −0.8304 −0.8344 −0.7914
Vt=2 −0.7039 −0.6439 −0.597 −0.5279 −0.5247 −0.5991 −0.7488 −0.6797
Vy,t=3 0.3269 0.4468 0.5419 0.685 0.4467 0.3968 0.3323 0.4755
V sy,t=3 0.549 0.6689 0.764 0.9071 0.6688 0.6189 0.4108 0.5539
V wm,t=3 0.8099 0.8696 0.9167 0.9873 0.8768 0.8489 0.8217 0.8923
V sm,t=3 0.1734 0.233 0.2802 0.3507 0.2403 0.2124 −0.009 0.0616
V lm,t=3 −0.1267 −0.0671 −0.02 0.0506 −0.0599 −0.0878 −0.115 −0.0444
Vt=3 0.3097 0.3994 0.4705 0.5774 0.4953 0.4183 0.2369 0.3437
Vy,t=4 1.6142 1.7719 1.8977 2.0888 1.7422 1.6888 1.5842 1.7753
V sy,t=4 1.8363 1.994 2.1198 2.3109 1.9643 1.911 1.6626 1.8537
V wm,t=4 1.5498 1.6311 1.6959 1.794 1.6213 1.5915 1.5412 1.6393
V sm,t=4 0.9132 0.9946 1.0594 1.1575 0.9848 0.955 0.7105 0.8086
V lm,t=4 0.6131 0.6944 0.7592 0.8573 0.6846 0.6548 0.6045 0.7026
Vt=4 1.3232 1.4427 1.5381 1.6827 1.5153 1.4356 1.2225 1.3671
Parameters calibrated as follows: d1 = 0.125, d2 = 0.15, d3 = 0.2 σ1 = 0.26, σ2 = 0.39, τ1 = 0.15
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We follow the calibration of the previous section and conduct a welfare analysis by investigating
what is the impact of a 25% stepwise decline in τ or σ, and a 25% stepwise improvement in
ρ or pc. We are interested in what is the individual influence of a 25% stepwise increase in d
on welfare in order to be able to draw a conclusion about the effect of the policy mix of lower
taxation and higher government investment in public education on social utility.
As Table 3.2 shows if the tax rate τ falls to 0.15 or 0.225 at t = 0, formal middle–aged and
formal young workers are better–off as they are exempted from taxation (despite a decline in
the base wage in t = 0 for constant γ and a fall in growth in the expected utility of formal
young). Even young agents who become later shadow workers profit in t = 0 for a relatively
mild decline in τ to 0.225. If the tax rate declines to 0.15, the welfare of formal middle–aged
skilled and formal middle–aged low–skilled remains higher than the benchmark in t = 1. The
individual utility of all agents after t = 1 drops in the same case. For τ declining to 0.225,
formal middle–aged and formal young workers experience higher welfare in t = 1 and t = 2,
but afterwards their utility also is reduced and no more winners in society can be found. The
decrease in welfare in all periods in response to lower τ is due to a declining positive government
externality on income combined with a declining growth rate.
A higher audit probability pc improves the welfare of all agents with the exception of middle–
aged informal workers in t = 0. This outcome can be explained as follows: a higher probability
of detection pc stimulates human capital accumulation and improves the base wages wl and ws
of future generations as it discourages participation in the informal sector. This also leads to
a rise in the welfare of young in t = 0. In t = 0 labor productivities (wl and ws) rise due to
improvement in the penalty revenue per production unit (for constant γ). As the utility from
a higher base wage (for constant γ in t = 0) is lower than the disutility of being detected with
a higher probability, shadow economy middle–aged workers in t = 0 are worse off in contrast to
all other middle–aged workers in the same period. As a consequence, total utility falls in t = 0,
but it remains larger than the benchmark in all other periods.
A 25% higher penalty rate ρ similar to the audit rate is accompanied by a fall in the utility
of middle–aged shadow economy workers and total social utility in t = 0 and improvement in
overall social welfare after this period. If, however, ρ increases by 50%, informal middle–aged
and informal young workers in t = 0 are worse off, which results in lower first period welfare. The
latter can be explained with the prevailing effect of the disutility of paying a higher penalty rate
in t = 0. In t = 1 in the same case, the only losers are middle–aged shadow economy workers.
Nevertheless, higher total welfare in all periods after t = 0 is observed in case of ρ = 0.7050.
This can be explained with the favorable impact of ρ on human capital accumulation and labor
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productivities.
Higher d (Table 3.3) leads to higher welfare of young in t = 0 due to higher human capital
accumulation despite a fall in wl and ww. The decline in base income results in lower welfare of
all middle–aged agents in the same period. If the increase in d is relatively small (25%), social
welfare is beyond the benchmark at period t = 0. If d rises by 50% or higher, total utility in
t = 0 declines. Welfare gain is observed in all periods after t = 0 irrespective of d because there
are no losers in society from t = 1 onwards. This can be explained with the prevailing positive
effect that d exerts on growth, which compensates for the permanent fall in ws and wl.
Lower risk in skilled earnings σ improves the expected welfare of formal young individuals in
t > 0 directly via the higher utility of a lower income volatility (due to risk aversion) and
indirectly via increased human capital accumulation, which raises also social welfare in t = 0.
The positive indirect effect of lower σ on gh boosts as well the utility of young who become later
informal workers for t > 0. Middle–aged low–skilled at t = 0 do not experience any welfare
change because of the assumption that the occupational choice stays constant. Middle–aged
skilled workers are better–off in response to lower variance of the income distribution due to
risk aversion. This is true also for periods beyond t = 0 for middle–aged skilled workers in case
of higher σ although higher competition is supposed to drive their expected wages and utility
down. Welfare gain is observed in all periods as there are no losers in any period. This is also
partly due to higher human capital accumulation.
A combination of a lower tax τ = 0.15 and higher d = 0.2 leads to a short–term welfare loss due
to the fall in the utility of informal middle–aged workers and young shadow workers in t = 0.
The welfare fall of middle–aged informal and young informal agents is determined by the decline
in the base wage in t = 0. While young informal workers take advantage of a higher growth
rate after t = 2, the utility of informal middle–aged is unable to recover over the considered
period due to the prevailing unfavorable impact of the policy mix τ = 0.15, d = 0.2 on the
base income. The welfare of formal young in t ≥ 0 rises because of the expectation of higher
growth and tax exemption (despite a fall in future base wages). Middle–aged formal workers are
exempted from taxation and benefit additionally from rising base income (for constant γ), which
makes their (expected) utility go up in t = 0. The favorable effect of tax exemption on gross
income is strengthened by a positive growth effect after t = 0, which drives up further formal
middle–aged individuals’ welfare. The overall welfare improves after t = 0. As expected, the
policy mix τ = 0.15, d = 0.15 leads to gradual deterioration of welfare. This is to be explained
with the falling human capital accumulation, which makes the policy mix τ = 0.15, d = 0.15
ineligible to combat the shadow economy.
87
In terms of absolute welfare, according to Table 3.2 and 3.3, a decline in the risk measure (also
compared to the rest of the policies which reduce γ) leads to the strongest rise in welfare in the
short run (till the end of period t = 4), followed by the penalty rate and the audit rate. A policy
mix of a larger tax rate and a larger share of government expenditure on education ranks last
in this respect. In the very long run, we expect that the penalty rate has the strongest welfare
rise due to its superior impact on growth, followed by the audit rate pc, a combination of τ, d
(for relatively high d) and the risk measure σ. A lower risk measure, compared to the other
government policies which decrease the share of the informal economy, is the only alternative,
which does not create a trade–off between short term and long term social welfare. Therefore, an
insurance system for skilled in the formal economy may, nevertheless, turn out to be a favorable
way to fight the unofficial economy.
3.7 Comparison with Related Literature
Our results can be compared most successfully with the work of Ihrig and Moe (2004), Chen
(2003), and Turnovsky and Basher (2009). Contrary to our model, Ihrig and Moe (2004) find
that the existence of a shadow economy does not necessarily lead to an efficiency loss. This is
mainly due to their assumption that the unofficial sector employs only labor and does not grow
over time.
The superiority of the income tax rate in fighting the informal sector has been already verified
by Ihrig and Moe (2004) (but not by Turnovsky and Basher (2009) for the labor income tax).
Ihrig and Moe (2004), however, find that a decline in the tax rate leads to an increase in the
standard of living, a result, which we cannot replicate due to the assumption that production
is augmented by government expenditure on infrastructure. Contrary to our model, Turnovsky
and Basher (2009) find that a decrease in the labor tax rate leads to a short–term welfare loss
and a long–term welfare gain. This result is due to the lack of a government expenditure on
infrastructure in their production function.
Similar to your work, Ihrig and Moe (2004), Chen (2003), Turnovsky and Basher (2009) find
that the penalty rate and the audit rate have a positive impact on growth. Our theoretical model
predicts that the effect of the tax enforcement policies on growth depends on the elasticity of
government expenditure on infrastructure in the production function. Chen (2003), in the same
spirit, argues that the effectiveness of the audit rate and the penalty rate to influence growth is
strengthened by a larger government externality in production. In terms of welfare, Turnovsky
and Basher (2009) find that an increase in auditing may lead to a short–term welfare loss, which
we can also replicate in our model.
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper is embedded in the literature on occupational choice under risk and risky investment
in public education in a two–period overlapping generations endogenous growth model with a
shadow sector and productive government spending. We follow the work of Kanbur (1979) for
occupational choice under risk, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) for developing risky human cap-
ital accumulation with public eduction, and Loayza (1996) for the construction of the shadow
sector with a congestion effect on productive government expenditure in production. Ex–ante
homogeneous and risk–averse agents are free to determine their education (skilled vs. low–
skilled) and sector of employment (informal vs. formal) at the beginning of their life. Formal
skilled bear risk in earnings due to ex–ante uninsurable abilities to accumulate human capital.
Formal low–skilled are exempted from uncertainty in income. Informal low–skilled are subject
to the risk of being detected evading taxes and misperceive the probability of the audit rate.
The equilibrium occupational choice in the formal sector is determined by the equality of the
(expected) utility of formal skilled and formal low–skilled workers. Low–skilled in the shadow
economy self–select on the basis of a relatively optimistic idea about the audit rate. Growth
depends positively on the government expenditure on education, which is financed by taxes
levied in the formal sector together with penalty fees gathered from the informal sector, so it is
related to the occupational choice of economic agents.
We show that a decrease in the share of the unofficial income improves growth (and long–term
welfare). According to our theoretical analysis, a fall in the shadow economy can result in
response to a lower tax rate, a higher audit rate, a higher penalty rate or a lower risk measure.
Nevertheless, the impact of the policies and the risk measure on human capital accumulation
(and long–term welfare) is inconclusive. According to our calibration, the policies in combating
the shadow sector without adverse consequences for growth ranked with respect to their effec-
tiveness are the combination of lower taxation and a higher share of government expenditure on
education, the penalty rate, the audit rate, and at last the risk measure. A lower risk measure
attains the highest welfare in the short run, followed by a higher penalty rate. Nevertheless,
in terms of long–term welfare, the penalty rate ranks first, the audit rate taking up the next
position. The risk measure is inferior to all other policies in this respect.
Moreover, our analysis shows that while government policies may lead to substantial changes
in the share of the informal sector, and economic development, they are all related to some
trade–off in welfare in the short run vs. the long run. This result does not apply for a decline in
the risk measure. Given the positive impact of lower risk on growth, the individual and overall
utility, a government may consider it worthwhile to implement an insurance mechanisms for
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skilled agents working in the formal economy. If, on the other hand, the government target
is to attain the smallest share of the unofficial economy, it should apply a policy mix of lower
taxation and higher investment in education. This approach will cause, however, a temporal
loss in social welfare.
For future research the present work can be extended to incorporate physical capital accumula-
tion as well. The interplay between physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation
and occupational choice under risk with alternative taxation on physical capital can give a
new insight on further government policies aiming to reduce the shadow sector (if necessary).
Moreover, given the significantly positive effect of a lower risk measure on welfare, which simul-
taneously reduces the share of the informal sector, the construction of an insurance system for
skilled agents may also be considered.
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3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Simplifying the condition E(V wi,t,t+1) = V
l
t,t+1, we obtain,
Lt
Lwt
=
1− α
α
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν)1/b
Simplifying the condition V si,t+1 = V
l
t+1, and using that w
s
t+1 = w
l
t+1, we have,
ln(1− τ) = ψ∗pc ln(1− ρ)
The perceived risk weight by the agent who is indifferent between participating in the shadow
economy and the formal sector ψ∗ in equilibrium is equal to,
ψ∗ =
1
pc
ln(1− τ)
ln(1− ρ)
A middle–aged low–skilled agent with perceived risk weight higher than ψ∗ will participate in
the formal economy, while the agents with a lower risk perception will prefer to work in the
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formal sector. This implies that the share of the middle–aged low–skilled labor force working
in the formal sector could be determined as follow,
Llt
Llt + L
s
t
=
∫ ψ
ψ∗
f(ψ)dψ =
ψ − ψ∗
ψ − ψ =⇒ L
l
t =
ψ − ψ∗
ψ∗ − ψL
s
t
We use the relationship between low–skilled in the formal and informal sector and the normal-
ization of the population to one, Lt = 1− Lst − Lwt to obtain,
Lt
Lwt
=
1− α
α
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν)1/b =⇒
1− Lst − Lwt
Lwt
=
1− α
α
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1− ν)1/b =⇒ L
w
t =
1− Lst
1 +M
where M = 1−αα
exp
(
σ2
2
)
(1−ν)1/b > 1 because Lt > L
w
t by assumption. With the derived relationship
between Llt and L
s
t , as well as L
w
t with L
s
t , and, moreover, L
l
t = 0.5− Lst − Lwt , we obtain that
the share of agents across occupations is constant because Lst is constant and equal to,
Ls =
M − 1
2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
The share of the shadow economy out of the formal economy is by definition,
γt =
Qt
Yt
=
B
(
δ(1−d)(τ+pcργ)
(1+γt)
)η
Hst
A
(
(1−d)(τ+pcργt)
1+γt
)β
(Hwt )
α(H lt)
1−α
=⇒ γtH
l
t
Hst
=
B
(
δ(1−d)(τ+pcργt)
(1+γt)
)η
A
(
(1−d)(τ+pcργt)
1+γt
)β (Hwt )α
(Hlt)
α
On the other hand, we know that ws = wl, therefore,
B
(
δ(1−d)(τ+pcργt)
(1+γt)
)η
(1− α)A
(
(1−d)(τ+pcργt)
1+γt
)β(Hwt
Hlt
)α = 1 =⇒ γ = LsL (1− α)
Because wl = ws, we could determine the sector efficiency parameter B endogenously for given
A from the following condition,
B
(δ(1− d)(τ + pcργ)
(1 + γ)
)η
= (1− α)A
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β(Hwt
H lt
)α
Let A = 1, then B for given δ is,
B =
1− α
δη
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β−η(Lw
ϕL
)α
3.10.2 Proof of Proposition 3.5
The sensitivity analysis of ψ∗ for 0 < ρ, τ < 0 is,
∂ψ∗
∂τ
=
1
pc
1
(1− τ) ln(1− ρ)(−1) > 0
∂ψ∗
∂ρ
=
1
pc
ln(1− τ)
(ln(1− ρ))2
1
(1− ρ) < 0
∂ψ∗
∂pc
=
1
(pc)2
ln(1− τ)
ln(1− ρ) (−1) < 0
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The influence of τ , ρ, pc and σ on the share of low–skilled working in the shadow economy is,
∂Ls
∂τ
= 2(1 +M)
∂ ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
∂ψ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂ψ∗
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(−1) (M − 1)
(2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ )
2
> 0
∂Ls
∂ρ
= 2(1 +M)
∂ ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
∂ψ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂ψ∗
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−1) (M − 1)
(2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ )
2
< 0
∂Ls
∂pc
= 2(1 +M)
∂ ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
∂ψ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂ψ∗
∂pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−1) (M − 1)
(2M + 2(1 +M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ )
2
< 0
∂Ls
∂σ
=
Ls
M − 1
∂M
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
[1− 2Ls − 2Ll]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 because
1
2
> Ll + Ls
The influence of τ , ρ, pc and σ on the share of skilled is,
∂Lw
∂τ
= − 1
1 +M
∂Ls
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
∂Lw
∂ρ
= − 1
1 +M
∂Ls
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
∂Lw
∂pc
= − 1
1 +M
∂Ls
∂pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
∂Lw
∂σ
= − (1− L
s)
(1 +M)2
∂M
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
− 1
1 +M
∂Ls
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
The influence of τ , ρ, pc and σ on the share of low–skilled working in the formal economy is,
∂Ll
∂τ
=
∂ ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
∂ψ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂ψ∗
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Ls
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1− Ls 2(1 +M)
M − 1
ψ − ψ∗
ψ∗ − ψ
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< 0
∂Ll
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<0
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1− Ls 2(1 +M)
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ψ − ψ∗
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Notice that 1 − Ls 2(1+M)M−1 ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ > 0 can be transformed into 1 >
2(1+M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
2M+2(1+M)ψ−ψ
∗
ψ∗−ψ
(when we
substitute for Ls), which is always true. The influence of τ , ρ, pc and σ on the share of the
shadow economy is,
∂γ
∂τ
=
1− α
L
∂Ls
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−(1− α) L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂τ︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0
∂γ
∂ρ
=
1− α
L
∂Ls
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−(1− α) L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
>0
< 0
94
∂γ
∂pc
=
1− α
L
∂Ls
∂pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−(1− α) L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂pc︸︷︷︸
>0
< 0
∂γ
∂σ
=
∂Ls
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1− α
L
[
1− L
l
L
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
3.10.3 Proof of Corollary 3.2
By differentiating the growth rate with respect to γ, we obtain,
∂(1 + gh)
∂γ
= (1 + gh)φ
[(1 + β)pcρ
τ + pcργ
− β
1 + γ
− 1
γ
]
∂(1 + gh)
∂γ
=
(1 + gh)φ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)γ
(βγ(pcρ− τ)− τ(1 + γ)) < 0
The relationship between the share of the shadow economy and the growth is negative because
τ > pcρ by assumption.
3.10.4 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The impact of τ on growth is,
(1 + gh)
∂τ
=(1 + gh)
φ
τ + pcργ
[
εL
s
τ γ
β(pcρ− τ) + pcρ(1 + γ)
τ(1 + γ)
+ (1 + β)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≷0
− (1− α) L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂τ︸︷︷︸
<0
φ
[
βγ(pcρ− τ)− τ(1 + γ)
]
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≷ 0
The influence of the penalty rate and the audit rate on growth is,
(1 + gh)
∂ρ
=(1 + gh)
[
φ
∂Ls
∂ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
γ
β(pcρ− τ) + pcρ(1 + γ)
Ls(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− (1− α)L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
>0
φ
[
βγ(pcρ− τ)− τ(1 + γ)
]
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
φ(1 + β)
τ + pcργ
pcγ
]
> 0
and
(1 + gh)
∂pc
=(1 + gh)
[
φ
∂Ls
∂pc︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
γ
β(pcρ− τ) + pcρ(1 + γ)
Ls(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− (1− α)L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂pc︸︷︷︸
>0
φ
[
βγ(pcρ− τ)− τ(1 + γ)
]
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
φ(1 + β)
τ + pcργ
ργ
]
> 0
if γ
β(pcρ− τ) + pcρ(1 + γ)
Ls(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)
< 0 which is true if β >
pcρ(1 + γ)
τ − pcρ
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The influence of risk on growth is defined as follows,
(1 + gh)
∂σ
= (1 + gh)
[
φ
∂Ls
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
γ
β(pcρ− τ) + pcρ(1 + γ)
Ls(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≷0
− (1− α)L
s
(L)2
∂Ll
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
φ
[
βγ(pcρ− τ)− τ(1 + γ)
]
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−φα
M
∂M
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
]
≶ 0
For the impact of educational expenditure share on growth, we obtain,
(1 + gh)
∂d
= (1 + gh)
φ(1− d− βd)
d(1− d) > 0 if d <
1
1 + β
and the other way around.
3.10.5 Proof of Proposition 3.7
The short–run income variables for h0 = 1 are defined as follows,
wwh0 = αA
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β
(ϕM)1−α
wlhl0 = (1− α)A
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β
(ϕM)−αϕ
The skilled wage is influenced ambiguously by τ ,
∂(wwh0)
∂τ
= wwh0
[ ∂γ
∂τ︸︷︷︸
>0
β
[ pcρ− τ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
+
β
τ + pcργ
]
≶ 0
The same is valid for the low–skilled wage. The skilled wage is influenced positively by an
increase in ρ and pc,
∂(wwh0)
∂pc
= wwh0
[ ∂γ
∂pc︸︷︷︸
<0
β
[ pcρ− τ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
+
βργ
τ + pcργ
]
> 0
∂(wwh0)
∂ρ
= wwh0
[ ∂γ
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
<0
β
[ pcρ− τ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
+
βpcγ
τ + pcργ
]
> 0
The same applies for the low–skilled wage. The influence of σ on the high–skilled wage is,
∂(wwh0)
∂σ
= wwh0
[ ∂γ
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
β
[ pcρ− τ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
+
1− α
M
∂M
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
]
≶ 0
The influence of σ on the low–skilled wage is,
∂(wlhl0)
∂σ
= wlhl0
[ ∂γ
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
β
[ pcρ− τ
(τ + pcργ)(1 + γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
− α
M
∂M
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
]
< 0
The high–skilled wage is influenced positively by higher d,
∂(wwh0)
∂d
= − β
1− d(w
wh0) < 0
The same proof can be derived for the low–skilled wage.
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3.10.6 Proof of Proposition 3.8
The long–term equilibrium wages in the model for h0 = 1 are,
wwht = αA
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β
(ϕM)1−α(1 + gh)t
wlhlt = (1− α)A
((1− d)(τ + pcργ)
1 + γ
)β
(ϕM)−α(1 + gh)tϕ
In the long–run t −→ ∞ the impact of τ , pc, ρ, d, and σ on the income variables depends
not only on the short–run changes in occupational choice and the government externality on
production but also on the growth rate gh. This can be easily seen if we differentiate wlhlt and
wwht with respect τ , p
c, ρ, d, and σ (which we here substitute for x in order to simplify our
illustration),
∂(wlhlt)
∂x
=
∂wl
∂x
hlt + tw
l(1 + gh)t−1
∂(1 + gh)
∂x
ϕ
∂(wwht)
∂x
=
∂ww
∂x
ht + tw
w(1 + gh)t−1
∂(1 + gh)
∂x
3.10.7 Empirical Data
Table 3.4: Shadow Economy Share (%) out of GNP from Selected Eastern European States
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Av.
Bulgaria 37.3 36.9 36.6 36.1 35.6 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.7 35.3
Bosnia&Herzegovina 34.3 34.1 34.0 33.9 33.5 33.6 33.2 32.9 32.8 33.6
CzechRepublic 33.8 33.4 33.2 32.6 32.1 31.7 31.3 30.8 30.4 32.1
Hungary 25.4 25.1 24.8 24.5 24.4 24.1 24.0 23.7 23.7 24.4
Greece 28.5 28.7 28.2 28.0 27.4 27.1 26.9 26.4 26.5 27.5
Macedonia 39.0 38.2 39.1 38.9 38.4 37.4 36.9 36.0 34.9 37.6
Poland 27.7 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.5 27.3 26.9 26.4 26.0 27.2
Romania 34.3 34.4 33.7 33.5 32.8 32.0 31.7 30.7 30.2 32.6
Slovakia 18.9 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.3 18.1 17.6 17.2 16.8 18.1
Slovenia 27.3 27.1 26.7 26.6 26.4 26.2 25.8 25.3 24.7 26.2
Latvia 30.8 30.5 30.1 29.8 29.4 29.0 28.4 27.7 27.2 29.2
Lithuania 33.8 33.7 33.3 32.8 32.0 31.7 31.0 30.4 29.7 32.0
Source: Bu¨hn and Schneider (2012)
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Table 3.5: Informal Labor Force/Sector as % of Official Labor Force/Sector from Selected West-
ern European States
Year %Inf. Labor %Inf. Sector
Austria 97/98 16.0 8.93
Denmark 1994 15.4 17.6
France 1997/98 6.0− 12.0 14.9
Germany 1997/98 19.0− 23.0 14.7
Italy 1997/98 30.0− 48.0 27.3
Spain 1997/98 11.5− 32.3 23.1
Sweden 1997/98 19.8 19.8
Source: Schneider (2000)
Table 3.6: Income Tax and Employees’ Social Security Contributions for 2010 as % of Gross
Earnings from Selected Eastern European States
Total Income Tax SSC
Slovenia 33.1 11.0 22.1
Greece 18.8 2.8 16.0
CzechRepublic 22.5 11.5 11.0
Poland 24.6 6.7 17.8
Hungary 31.2 14.2 17.0
Estonia 19.4 16.6 2.8
SlovakRepublic 21.5 8.1 13.4
Source: OECD (2011)
Table 3.7: Government Expenditure on Education as % of Total Government Spending from
Selected Eastern European States
2008 2009 2010
Bulgaria 12.3 11.3 10.8
CzechRepublic 9.5 9.8 9.7
Hungary 10.4 10.0 9.8
Poland 11.8 11.4 11.4
Romania 10.3
Slovakia 10.3 9.8 10.6
Estonia 14.2 13.5 14.0
Latvia 14.7 12.8 11.3
Lithuania 13.1 12.9 13.2
Slovenia 11.8 11.6 11.4
Source: The World Bank
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS, Last accessed on 1.12.2013
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4 Pollution, Environmental Tax Evasion, and
Corruption in an Endogenous Growth Model
4.1 Introduction
Environmental regulation (in terms of government abatement activities sponsored with pollu-
tion taxation1) has been highlighted extensively in economic discussions (see Marrewijk et al.
(1993), Nielsen et al. (1995), Smulders and Gradus (1996), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994,1997),
Chen et al. (2003), Vondra and Zagler (2004)). Neverthless, some authors have questioned the
immediate implementability of environmental regulation due to corruption. As Fredriksson and
Svensson (2003), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) and Woods (2008) show empirically, environ-
mental policy stringency can be easily decreased in the presence of corruption.
Inspired by previous research, our work builds an endogenous growth model on environmental
policy and corruption by additionally allowing for environmental regulation incompliance (here,
environmental tax incompliance). Biswas et al. (2011) explore the existence of a relationship
between low-scale pollution, environmental regulation with the existence of an unofficial sector
and corruption. They find that the informal sector (involved in filthy production) in some devel-
oping countries leads to higher pollution and that the interaction between the shadow economy
and corruption also plays a role in local environmental degradation. Although our model does
not exclusively assume that the shadow economy is the sole culprit in creating pollution, we
show that a shadow economy evading environmental taxation used for abatement activities con-
tributes to pollution. We oppose the conventional notion that environmental taxation is hard
to evade. We argue that the latter is possible because of the presence of corruption. Corruption
and the informal sector in our model reinforce each other (to a degree where corruption costs
are small enough). This assumption is backed up empirically by Dreher and Schneider (2010)
1In fact, there is a gradual trend of switching from distortionary (capital and labor) taxation to environmental
taxation (see Eurostat (2009)), which is justified by the double dividend hypothesis, so not all environmental
taxes are spent on abatement activities.
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for low–income countries2.
Our interest in the relationship between environmental policy, corruption and the shadow econ-
omy has an empirical background as well. According to CPI (Corruption Perception Index) for
2012, the level of perceived corruption in most European transition economies has a scale lower
than 60 points3 in Poland (58), Hungary (55), the Czech Republic (49), Romania (44), and
Greece (36). Bu¨hn and Schneider (2012) show, on the other hand, that the average share of
the shadow economy out of GNP for 1999-2007 in some EU Eastern European countries ranges
from 18% in the Slovak Republic to 35.3% in Bulgaria.
The literature on tax evasion and growth has been mostly focused on finding the impact of tax-
ation and tax enforcement policies on economic development and welfare (see Loayza (1996),
Lin and Yang (2001), Ihrig and Moe (2004), Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2005), Turnovsky and
Basher (2009)). On the other hand, economists are not unanimous on the relationship between
corruption and growth, taking account of the fact that corruption may (i) divert resources from
productive investment (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995, 2004), Ehrlich and Lui
(1999)) but also (ii) alleviate administrative borders (see Barreto (2000)). In this respect Sarte
(2000), Blackburn et al. (2010), Barreto and Alm (2003), Chen (2003) examine the interplay
between income tax evasion and corruption. While Sarte (2000) and Blackburn et al. (2010)
focus on the consequences of this interaction for growth and welfare, Barreto and Alm (2003)
investigate the optimal taxation policy (on income vs. consumption) in the presence of cor-
ruption. Chen (2003), on the other hand, determines the impact of tax enforcement policies
reducing income tax evasion in the presence of corruption on economic development. In our
paper we relate tax evasion and corruption to environmental quality. In particular, we are in-
terested in: What is the impact of green tax evasion on pollution, growth and welfare? Which
government policies maximize environmental quality when environmental tax incompliance and
corruption are present? Which government policies decreasing pollution are favorable to growth
and welfare in the same context and under what conditions? What is the impact of corruption
costs on environmental quality, growth and welfare? In our work we try to find answers to the
afore–mentioned questions.
Our model combines the literature on pollution in a capital accumulation context, (environ-
mental) tax evasion with corruption (a´ la Chen (2003)) considering two types of production
functions: with pollution externalities (a´ la Smulders and Gradus (1996)) and without pollu-
2For an alternative view of the relationship between corruption and the informal sector, see Dreher et al. (2009)
and Friedman et al. (2000).
3According to CPI, the countries with the lowest level of corruption perception are the ones with the highest
scores. The scale of CPI ranges from 0 to 100.
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tion externalities (a´ la Gradus and Smulders (1993)). Pollution is modeled as a flow variable,
which depends positively on the economic activity represented by capital stock and negatively
on abatement. The representative firm pays a pollution tax and decides on the optimal share of
environmental tax compliance by incurring additionally corruption costs. In our setting the firm
cooperates with corrupt officials in evading environmental taxation. Corruption costs do not
contribute to output. The government (non-corrupt officials) enforces penalties on the evaded
environmental taxes. The environmental taxes and penalties are spent on abatement activities.
Growth is induced by capital accumulation (of the infinitely lived household) net of pollution
taxation and corruption costs.
We find that green taxation compliance increases environmental quality, capital accumulation,
and welfare. Environmental quality is positively influenced by higher green taxation as long as
the environmental tax compliance rate is stronger than 42.3% (for a penalty rate equal to 1.5
and an audit rate of 0.089). A higher audit rate as well as a higher penalty rate and higher cor-
ruption costs lead unambiguously to lower pollution, higher growth and larger welfare. Higher
pollution taxation has an ambiguous impact on capital accumulation in the model with pollution
externalities in production, a negative effect on growth in the model without pollution external-
ities on production and an ambiguous influence on welfare in both models. These results imply
that the best policies which a government may apply in order to ensure higher environmental
quality when corrupted officials coordinate with environmental tax evaders is a larger audit rate
or a larger penalty rate. Alternatively, the government may choose to fight corruption.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the model with pollution externalities
in production and the accompanying assumptions on the representative household, the output
and the government sector; Section 4.3 presents the market equilibrium; Section 4.4 implements
a sensitivity analysis of the government policies and corruption costs, while Section 4.5 does the
same exercise but in a model without pollution externalities in production; Section 4.6 makes
a conclusion.
4.2 The Model with Pollution Externalities in Production
4.2.1 The Production Sector
As in the work by Rebelo (1991), we assume that the production function has constant returns
to scale with respect to capital, which in this case can be interpreted as physical and human
capital altogether. Furthermore, the production function is negatively influenced by pollution
P similar to Smulders and Gradus (1996) (with the elasticity of pollution in the production
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function equal to γ). Given these assumptions, the production function has the form,4
Y = AKP−γ A > 0 0 < γ < 1 (4.1)
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993)5, we assume that pollution is triggered by capital K,
but reduced by abatement activities undertaken by the government G,
P =
K
G
if P < P (4.2)
Moreover, sustainability requires that pollution is lower than the pollution level P , at which the
economy goes extinct due to lower environmental quality. Alternatively, we could assume that
pollution is a stock variable. However, as Smulders and Gradus (1996) show, the steady state
of an endogenous growth model related to pollution, which can be modeled either as a stock or
as a flow variable, remains the same for a constant depreciation rate although an endogenous
growth model with pollution as a stock variable leads to some transitional dynamics.
The representative firm works in a perfectly competitive market where the price of the produced
good is normalized to 1. It hires capital services from the household and pays interest on it.
The firm has to pay pollution income to the government τP , where τ is the pollution tax. The
firm transfers 0 < β < 1 of the due taxes to non–corrupt authorities, while 1 − β is the share
of environmental taxation that the firm evades. Following Chen (2003), we assume that the
firm pays corruption costs PH(1 − β)2 to corrupt government officials, which are increasing
in the share of pollution evaded 1 − β, with H > 0 being a corruption cost parameter. The
corruption costs embody an efficiency loss as they are not an income source for any sector of
the economy. The firm takes the risk of being caught not paying environmental taxes by non–
corrupt officials with a probability p. In this case it has to pay a penalty rate pi > 1 over the
evaded environmental taxation.
As already mentioned, we assume that the relationship between corruption and environmental
tax evasion is complementary, which implies that the representative firm cooperates with corrupt
officials when evading taxes. Alternatively, we could postulate that the firm goes underground
to avoid higher bribery costs. Still, as Dreher and Schneider (2010) claim, small companies are
relatively less accessible to corrupt officials than big corporations, moreover, big corporations are
simultaneously big (environmental) tax payers. That is why we choose to model the interaction
between corruption and the environmental tax evasion rather as cooperative than competitive.
4For simplicity the time index is omitted.
5In their work the elasticity of pollution with respect to capital to abatement is normalized to one in the
calibration.
102
Given the above assumptions, the firm, whose expected profit is defined as,
Π = AKP−γ − rK − P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ +H(1− β)2) (4.3)
has to choose its optimal capital stock K and the optimal green tax compliance rate β. By
setting ∂Π∂K = 0 and
∂Π
∂β = 0, we obtain that
β = 1− τ(1− pip)
2h
(4.4)
r = AP−γ − P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2) (4.5)
where τ/K = τ is the detrended tax rate, h = H/K is the detrended corruption cost parameter.
It should be noticed that 1− pip > 0 so that the expected value of a unit tax evaded is always
positive. The pollution flow in the production function is perceived as an externality by the
representative firm, which is why pollution in the production function is not considered in the
optimization problem. The specification of pollution and corruption costs additionally implies
that it is always optimal for the firm to engage in tax evasion paying corruption costs instead
of submitting the total amount of due pollution taxes Pτ .
Furthermore, we can conclude from (4.4) that the environmental tax compliance β increases in
response to a lower tax τ , a higher penalty rate pi, a higher audit rate p and higher corruption
costs represented by an increase in the detrended parameter h. The influence of τ , p, pi, h on
the interest rate and growth will be discussed later.
4.2.2 The Government
The government (here non–corrupt officials) collects taxes from the production sector in order
to invest them in abatement activities G. Its budget is balanced every instant, so
G = τP (β + (1− β)pip) (4.6)
We assume that the execution of tax audits is for free. The government sets the tax τ , (from
which the detrended tax τ results), the audit and the penalty rate, p and pi. We assume that
corruption costs h are exogenous to the decision making of the government.
4.2.3 The Household Sector
An infinitely lived household derives positive utility out of consumption C, while pollution P
influences negatively his welfare. Following Smulders and Gradus (1996), we assume that the
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preference for environment quality θ is constant over time. The utility function has the form,
U(C,P ) =

(CP−θ)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
if σ 6= 1, σ > 0, 1 > θ > 0
lnC − θ lnP if σ = 1, 1 > θ > 0
(4.7)
σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and UC > 0, UCC < 0, UP < 0 and UPP < 0,
UCP < 0. The representative household decides on the optimal growth of consumption and
savings each instant by optimizing its infinite utility function,∫ ∞
0
U(C,P )e−ρtdt (4.8)
subject to the budget constraint with income from renting capital services K at the interest
rate r,
K˙ = rK − C (4.9)
given the initial level of capital stock K0 = 1 and assuming that pollution is external to its
optimization problem. The resulting Hamiltonian function has the form,
H =
(CP−θ)1−
1
σ
1− 1σ
e−ρt + λ(rK − C) (4.10)
For simplicity we neglect depreciation. The subjective discount rate ρ is constant over time,
λ is the shadow price of capital. By applying the usual optimality conditions, ∂H∂C = 0 and
−∂H∂K = λ˙, we obtain together with the transversality condition,
C˙
C
= σ(r − ρ) + θ(1− σ) P˙
P
(4.11)
lim
t−→∞K(t)λ(t) = 0 (4.12)
Equation (4.11) is the Euler equation, which shows that consumption growth does not depend
only on the difference between the interest rate r and the preference rate ρ but also on pollution
growth. Equation (4.12) is the transversality condition, which bounds the growth rate.
4.3 Market Equilibrium
Definition 4.1 A general market equilibrium is a set of allocations {β, {C,K}∞t=0} and prices
{r} such that for the given prices and fiscal policy {{τ}∞t=0, pi, p}: (i) {C,K}∞t=0 maximizes
household welfare (4.8) subject to the budget constraint (4.9), taking pollution {P} and K0
as given (ii) {β, {K}∞t=0} are chosen in a manner to maximize the representative firm’s profit
(4.3) taking pollution {P} in the production function as given, (iii) the government budget
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constraint (4.6) is balanced each instant and (iv) {{C,K,G,H}∞t=0, P, β} obey the aggregate
resources constraint,
K˙ = Y − C −G− PH(1− β)2 (4.13)
As we assumed earlier, corruption costs are assumed to lead to an efficiency loss, that is why
they reduce the value of total output. The model lacks transitional dynamics and its competitive
equilibrium on the balanced growth path is characterized by the following conditions:
1. C,K,G,H, Y, τ grow at one and the same rate g. Therefore, τ , h and P are constant.
2. The sustainable level of equilibrium pollution P has the form,
P =
Ê
1
τ(β + (1− β)pip) < P (4.14)
3. Equilibrium government spending on abatement is equal to,
G = K
È
τ(β + (1− β)pip) (4.15)
4. The growth rate g is constant and defined as,
g =
C˙
C
= σ(AP−γ − P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2)− ρ) (4.16)
5. Consumption to capital ratio µ or initial consumption C0 = µK0 is constant,
µ = (1− σ)(AP−γ − P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2)) + σρ (4.17)
6. Welfare U(C,P ) converges if ρ− (σ−1)σ g > 0 and it is equal to,
U(C,P ) =
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
1− 1σ
Ł (4.18)
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we discuss the role of the environmental policy, corruption costs and the tax
compliance for the endogenous variables P, g, U(C,P ). The government invests in abatement
activities in order to keep the pollution level sustainable, to correct the market failure of not
internalized pollution externalities from the production function and satisfy the preference of
the representative household for environmental quality. In this respect, we are interested in
whether reduction in pollution tax evasion contributes to higher environment quality, faster
economic development and higher welfare; and if so, which policies are effective in attaining
lower pollution tax incompliance without harming growth and welfare. The question about the
impact of corruption costs on P, g, U(C,P ) is addressed as well.
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Proposition 4.2 Higher environmental tax compliance β results in lower pollution, higher
growth, as well as larger welfare.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.1
A higher environmental tax compliance rate β decreases pollution (all other things being con-
stant). This stems from the fact that β increases the detrended tax base τ(β+(1−β)pip), which
is spent immediately on abatement activities. Higher environmental compliance also stimulates
growth by decreasing the pollution level, which results in higher capital productivity and lower
green taxation costs. Because β is optimally chosen by the firm, corruption costs equalize ex-
pected pollution costs, so there are no further influence of β on growth. Welfare improves due
to higher β and there is no trade–off between C0 and g
h because of the assumption of constant
returns to capital services in the production function (where pollution is not perceived as a
negative externality on production).
Proposition 4.3 A higher pollution tax τ has a positive effect on environmental quality as long
as the compliance rate β is strong enough, β > 1−2pip2(1−pip) and vice versa. A higher audit rate p, a
higher penalty rate pi and higher corruption costs h lead unambiguously to lower pollution.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.1
Proposition 4.3 determines the relationship between policy changes as well as corruption costs
and environmental quality. The impact of a larger audit rate and a penalty rate is straight-
forward. This should be put down to the fact that these policies influence the detrended tax
base used for abatement not only directly, but also indirectly via β. Because the direct effect
of these policies on the detrended tax base is positive (all other things being constant) and
by the indirect effect, larger β is attained, pi and p have a favorable impact on environmental
quality. The same outcome applies for higher corruption costs h. In contrast to pi, p and h,
the pollution tax τ reduces the compliance rate β. That’s why the influence of a higher tax on
pollution is positive only if β is large enough. However, assuming empirically observed values
for p = 0.089 and pi = 1.5 as in the work of Fullerton and Karayannis (1994), we obtain that the
relationship between τ and environmental quality is also positive if the green tax compliance
rate is at least higher than 42.3%. This threshold β is far below the observed average share of
the formal economy in EU Eastern European states according to Bu¨hn and Schneider (2012),
which makes also the green tax eligible for a policy aiming to decrease pollution (at least in
countries of EU Eastern Europe).
Proposition 4.4 Growth is positively influenced by pi, p and h and behaves ambiguously with
respect to τ .
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Proof: See Appendix 4.8.1
The impact of τ on growth is ambiguous. This can be explained as follows: the indirect impact
of the green tax on growth is positive only if it leads to lower pollution i.e. if β > 1−2pip2(1−pip)
holds. However, the direct influence of τ on g via the taxation costs is negative, which makes
the relationship between the pollution tax and capital accumulation unclear. The penalty rate
and the audit rate create the same trade–off between their indirect (via P and β) and direct
effect on g. However, their positive influence on growth is stronger, and, therefore, higher pi
and pc cause higher g. Larger corruption costs increase the environmental tax compliance rate
and environmental quality, which boosts growth, but also represent an efficiency loss to the
economy because no agent obtains income out of corruption. Nevertheless, the former effect is
more pronounced than the latter, which is why higher corruption costs also bring about higher
growth.
Proposition 4.5 Larger pi, p, and h result in higher welfare because they promote better envi-
ronmental quality and higher capital accumulation. The impact of τ on utility is ambiguous.
See Appendix 4.8.1
According to Proposition 4.5, a trade–off in welfare between initial consumption and consump-
tion growth in case of changes in pi, p and h is not observed. This condition implies that in
response to a policy change or corruption costs the representative household will experience
higher utility only if growth and environmental quality are positively affected. Therefore, wel-
fare will behave favorably with respect to pi, p and h. As we already alluded, this result stems
from the assumption that capital, which is the sole input factor in production perceived by
the firm, is linear in output. Due to the inconclusive relationship between the green tax and
environmental quality, as well as the green tax and growth, the impact of τ on welfare is not
clear.
4.5 The Model without Pollution Externalities in Production
In this section we change the previous model by postulating a production function without
pollution externalities a´ la Gradus and Smulders (1993), equal to Y = AK but preserve the
rest of the assumptions. The representative firm operating in a competitive market (the price
of the good is set to one) chooses the optimal green tax compliance rate β and the optimal
investment in capital K by maximizing its expected profit,
Π = AK − rK − P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ +H(1− β)2) (4.19)
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with respect to β, i.e. ∂Π∂β = 0 and K, i.e.
∂Π
∂K = 0, from where we obtain that
β = 1− τ(1− pip)
2h
(4.20)
r = A− P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2) (4.21)
The government tax and penalty levies are spent on abatement activities G as before, so
G = τP (β + (1− β)pip) (4.22)
where pollution is a flow variable equal to,
P =
K
G
< P (4.23)
The household optimizes its infinite utility function,
∫ ∞
0
U(C,P )e−ρtdt with U(C,P ) =

(CP−θ)1−
1
σ
1− 1
σ
if σ 6= 1, σ > 0, 1 > θ > 0
lnC − θ lnP if σ = 1, 1 > θ > 0
(4.24)
and UC > 0, UCC < 0, UP < 0, UPP < 0, UCP < 0 subject to the budget constraint,
K˙ = rK − C (4.25)
The Hamiltonian function reads as,
H =
(CP−θ)1−
1
σ
1− 1σ
e−ρt + λ(rK − C) (4.26)
Depreciation is neglected. By choosing the optimal share of consumption and savings out of
income (∂H∂C = 0 and −∂H∂K = λ˙), taking the pollution flow in the utility function as exogenous
and K0 = 1, the growth rate of household’s consumption and the transversality condition are
defined as,
C˙
C
= σ(r − ρ) + θ(1− σ) P˙
P
(4.27)
lim
t−→∞K(t)λ(t) = 0 (4.28)
In equilibrium corruption costs are sunk, which is why they embody a loss to total output in
the aggregate resources constraint,
K˙ = Y − C −G− PH(1− β)2 (4.29)
The only equilibrium variables which change compared to the model with pollution externalities
in production are the equilibrium growth rate,
g = A− P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2) (4.30)
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and the consumption to capital ratio,
µ = (1− σ)(A− P (βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2)) + σρ (4.31)
Statements 2, 3, 6 in the model with pollution externalities in production are valid in the model
without pollution externalities in production. As there is a necessity for combating pollution due
to the sustainability requirement and the preference for clean environment of the representative
household also in this model, we investigate the impact of green tax evasion on pollution,
economic development and social utility and the effectiveness of alternative government policies
and corruption costs in combating tax evasion, if necessary, in enhancing environment quality
and promoting growth and welfare.
Proposition 4.6 Higher environmental tax compliance β leads to lower pollution, and higher
growth. Welfare improves in response to larger environmental tax compliance.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.2
Proposition 4.6 attains results similar to the previous model confirming the positive impact
of larger environmental tax compliance on economic development and welfare. This can be
explained with the positive effect which higher β exerts on environmental quality and in this way
also on the amount of (declining) environmental taxes. Welfare depends on initial consumption,
but the differential of the welfare function with respect β does not exhibit a trade–off between
C0 and g
h similar to the model with pollution externalities in production. Therefore, the growth
effect and the pollution effect of larger β play the decisive role in determining the response of
utility with respect to β.
Proposition 4.7 A higher pollution tax τ has a positive effect on environmental quality as long
as the compliance rate β is strong enough, β > 1−2pip2(1−pip) and vice versa. A higher audit rate p, a
higher penalty rate pi and larger corruption costs h lead unambiguously to lower pollution.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.2
Proposition 4.7 determines the impact of government policies and corruption costs on pollution.
As before, the tax rate τ has an ambiguous effect on P (due to the negative relationship
between τ and β) in contrast to the other government policies and corruption costs. However,
for empirical values of p and pi we already discussed (p = 0.089 and pi = 1.5), τ has a positive
effect on environmental quality as long as the green tax compliance rate is at least higher than
42.3%.
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Proposition 4.8 Growth is negatively influenced by τ and positively influenced by pi, p and h.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.2
Proposition 4.9 Changes in welfare in response to pi, p, h are solely dictated by changes in
growth and pollution. The impact of τ on welfare is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix 4.8.2
Propositions 4.8 and 4.9 determine the impact of government policies and corruption costs
on capital accumulation and welfare. In contrast to the model with pollution externalities in
production, a higher green tax here has an unfavorable impact on growth. The effect of τ on
g can be explained with the lower positive direct effect of τ once pollution does not augment
output. Although a higher green tax has a positive indirect effect on g in reducing pollution
taxation via P and β (at least for β > 1−2pip2(1−pip)), its direct negative impact on g via the pollution
taxation costs is stronger and capital accumulation falls in response to τ . The influence of pi and
pc on growth is at first glance contradictory as well: first, these policies stimulate g indirectly
through the environmental tax compliance, which reduces taxation related to environmental
quality; second, both of them lead simultaneously to a rise in expected (taxation enforcement)
costs. Because the first effect is higher than the second one, a larger audit rate or a larger penalty
rate leads to higher capital accumulation. Higher corruption costs also have a favorable effect
on capital accumulation similar to the model without pollution externalities in production. Also
here, the positive effect which h exerts on growth via higher environmental tax compliance and
better quality of environment is larger than its negative effect on g due to increased efficiency
costs.
For welfare to rise in response to pc, ρ, h, and τ , it is necessary that growth and environmental
quality are affected positively. This is the case for larger values of the tax enforcement policies
(p and pi) as well as corruption costs. The household’s utility behaves ambiguously with respect
to τ because of the contradictory impact of a larger green tax on environmental policy and
growth. The welfare effects with respect to government policies and corruption costs are not
dictated by the level of initial consumption (in addition to pollution and growth). This result
stems from the assumption of constant returns to scale of capital services in production.
4.6 Conclusion
This work combines the literature of capital accumulation and environmental tax evasion and
corruption (see Chen (2003)) considering two types of production functions: with pollution
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externalities and without pollution externalities (similar to Smulders and Gradus (1996) and
Gradus and Smulders (1993)). Pollution is a flow variable depending positively on capital stock
and negatively on abatement undertaken by the government. The representative firm coop-
erates with corrupt officials in the evasion of environmental taxes. Corruption costs are sunk
costs. If caught by non-corrupt authorities, the firm pays a penalty on the evaded amount of
environmental taxes. Non-corrupt authorities have several regulatory instruments: the environ-
mental tax, the penalty rate and the audit rate. We assume that corruption costs are exogenous
to government decision–making. Growth is generated by capital accumulation of the infinitely
lived household net of pollution taxation and corruption costs.
We find that environmental tax compliance decreases pollution and increases growth and wel-
fare. Environmental quality rises in response to higher corruption costs, a higher penalty rate
and a higher audit rate, while the impact of the pollution tax is positive only if the propensity to
pay green taxes is at least higher than 42.3% (for a penalty rate equal to 1.5 and an audit rate of
0.089). The influence of corruption costs, the penalty and the audit rate on growth and welfare
in both models is positive. The impact of the pollution tax on growth, on the other hand, is
ambiguous in the model with pollution externalities in production and negative in the model
without pollution externalities in production. A larger pollution tax stands in an ambiguous
relationship with welfare in both models. Therefore, the best policy response of a government
maintaining environmental quality when green tax evasion and corruption are complements is
(i) enforcement of a larger audit rate, a larger penalty rate or (ii) reducing corruption.
We already highlighted that the welfare effects in response to stricter environment policies or
corruption costs are dictated solely by growth, with no divergent impact of initial consumption
on utility due to the assumption of AK production function with constants returns to capital
(with or without pollution externalities). It is interesting then for future research to test the
robustness of our analysis with respect to a production function which is subject to increasing
returns including labor similar to Romer (1986) (with or without pollution externalities).
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 The Model with Pollution Externalities in Production
Proof. The impact of β on the endogenous variables P , g, µ, U(.) is,
∂P
∂β
= − P
2(β + (1− β)pip)(1− pip) < 0
∂g
∂β
= γ
σAP−γ
2(β + (1− β)pip)(1− pip) +
σP
2(β + (1− β)pip)(1− pip)B > 0
∂U(C,P )
∂β
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂β︸︷︷︸
<0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
1− σ µ
−1
σ
∂µ
∂β︸︷︷︸
≷0
The latter can be rewritten as,
∂U(C,P )
∂β
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂β︸︷︷︸
<0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂β︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
where B = βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2 = τ − τ2(1−pip)24h
Proof. The influence of τ on the endogenous variables P , g, U(.) is,
∂P
∂τ
= − P
2τ(β + (1− β)pip)
[
1− τ(1− pip)
2
h
]
=⇒
∂P
∂τ
> 0 if β <
1− 2pip
2(1− pip) ;
∂P
∂τ
< 0 if β >
1− 2pip
2(1− pip)
∂g
∂τ
= σ
P
2(βτ + (1− β)τpip)
∂A′
∂τ︸︷︷︸
≷0
[
AγP−γ−1 +B
]
− σP ∂B
∂τ︸︷︷︸
>0
=⇒
∂g
∂τ
≷ 0 if ∂A
′
∂τ
> 0 and AγP−γ−1 +B ≷ 2Bε
B
τ
εA
′
τ
∂g
∂τ
< 0 if
∂A′
∂τ
< 0
∂U(C,P )
∂τ
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂τ︸︷︷︸
≶0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂τ︸︷︷︸
≷0
where A′ = τβ + τ(1− β)pip = τ − τ2(1−pip)22h , εyx = ∂y∂x xy and
εB
τ
εA
′
τ
= (2h−τ(1−pip)
2)2
(4h−τ(1−pip)2)(h−τ(1−pip)2) > 1
for εA
′
τ =
2(h−τ(1−pip)2)
2h−τ(1−pip)2 > 0 or h > τ(1 − pip)2 which can be transformed into β > 1−2pip2(1−pip) ;
εA
′
τ =
2(h−τ(1−pip)2)
2h−τ(1−pip)2 < 0 for h < τ(1 − pip)2 which can be transformed into β < 1−2pip2(1−pip) ;
εBτ =
2(2h−τ(1−pip)2)
(4h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0
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Proof. The influence of pi on the endogenous variables P , g, U(.) is,
∂P
∂pi
= − P
2τ(β + (1− β)pip)
τ2(1− pip)p
h
< 0
∂g
∂pi
= σ
P
2(βτ + (1− β)τpip)
∂A′
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
[
AγP−γ−1 +B
]
− σP ∂B
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
=⇒
∂g
∂pi
≶ 0 if AγP−γ−1 +B ≶ 2Bε
B
pi
εA′pi
with
εBpi
εA′pi
=
2h− τ(1− pip)2
4h− τ(1− pip)2
∂g
∂pi
< 0 if P <
[2B
Aγ
] −1
1+γ
[2h− τ(1− pip)2
4h− τ(1− pip)2 −
1
2
] −1
1+γ
where
2h− τ(1− pip)2
4h− τ(1− pip)2 <
1
2
Because P cannot be negative, it must hold that ∂g∂pi > 0.
∂U(C,P )
∂pi
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂pi︸︷︷︸
<0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
Notice that εBpi =
2τppi(1−pip)
(4h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0, ε
A′
pi =
2τppi(1−pip)
(2h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0. The impact of p and h on g, and
welfare can be derived analogically.
4.8.2 The Model without Pollution Externalities in Production
Proof. The impact of β on the endogenous variables P , g, U(.) is as follows,
∂P
∂β
= − P
2(β + (1− β)pip)(1− pip) < 0
∂g
∂β
=
σP
2(β + (1− β)pip)(1− pip)B > 0
∂U(C,P )
∂β
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂β︸︷︷︸
<0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂β︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
where B = βτ + (1− β)pipτ + h(1− β)2 = τ − τ2(1−pip)24h
Proof. The impact of τ on the endogenous variables P , g, U(.) is,
∂P
∂τ
= − P
2τ(β + (1− β)pip)
[
1− τ(1− pip)
2
h
]
=⇒
∂P
∂τ
> 0 if β <
1− 2pip
2(1− pip) ;
∂P
∂τ
< 0 if β >
1− 2pip
2(1− pip)
∂g
∂τ
= σ
P
2(βτ + (1− β)τpip)
∂A′
∂τ︸︷︷︸
≷0
B − σP ∂B
∂τ︸︷︷︸
>0
=⇒
∂g
∂τ
> 0 if
∂A′
∂τ
> 0 and
1
2
>
εBτ
εA
′
τ
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However,
εBτ
εA
′
τ
=
(2h− τ(1− pip)2)2
(4h− τ(1− pip)2)(h− τ(1− pip)2) > 1
Therefore, it must hold that ∂g∂τ < 0 for ε
A′
τ > 0, which is equivalent to h > τ(1 − pip)2 or
β > 1−2pip2(1−pip) . If
∂A′
∂τ < 0 or ε
A′
τ < 0
∂g
∂τ
= σ
P
2(βτ + (1− β)τpip)
∂A′
∂τ︸︷︷︸
<0
B − σP ∂B
∂τ︸︷︷︸
>0
< 0
Therefore, the impact of τ on g is always negative.
∂U(C,P )
∂τ
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂τ︸︷︷︸
≷0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂τ︸︷︷︸
<0
where A′ = τβ + τ(1 − β)pip = τ − τ2(1−pip)22h , and εyx = ∂y∂x xy , εA
′
τ =
2(h−τ(1−pip)2)
2h−τ(1−pip)2 > 0 for
h > τ(1 − pip)2 or β > 1−2pip2(1−pip) ; εA
′
τ =
2(h−τ(1−pip)2)
2h−τ(1−pip)2 < 0 for h < τ(1 − pip)2 or β < 1−2pip2(1−pip) ;
εBτ =
2(2h−τ(1−pip)2)
(4h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0
Proof. The influence of pi on the endogenous variables P , g, U(.) is,
∂P
∂pi
= − P
2τ(β + (1− β)pip)
τ2(1− pip)p
h
< 0
∂g
∂pi
= σ
P
2(βτ + (1− β)τpip)
∂A′
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
B − σP ∂B
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
=⇒
∂g
∂pi
> 0 if
1
2
>
εBpi
εA′pi
which is always true because
εBpi
εA′pi
=
2h− τ(1− pip)2
4h− τ(1− pip)2 <
1
2
∂U(C,P )
∂pi
= − θ
P
(P−θK0)1−
1
σµ
−1
σ
∂P
∂pi︸︷︷︸
<0
+
1
µ
(P−θK0)1−
1
σ
σ
µ
−1
σ
∂g
∂pi︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0
Moreover, εBpi =
2τppi(1−pip)
(4h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0, ε
A′
pi =
2τppi(1−pip)
(2h−τ(1−pip)2) > 0. The influence of p and h on the
endogenous variables P , g, U(.) can be derived analogically.
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5 Extended Summary
In the first part of this dissertation we discuss the interaction of brain drain, growth and wel-
fare under the assumption of risky occupational choice (Brain Drain, Occupational Choice under
Risk, and Endogenous Growth) or the existence of credit constraints (Brain Drain, Borrowing
Constraints, and Endogenous Growth in an Economy with Perfect Physical Capital Mobility).
In both cases we test the robustness of the brain gain theory, which claims that brain drain
may result in higher human capital accumulation because the prospect of migration may ex–
ante create an educational incentive.
The value of our paper Brain Drain, Occupational Choice under Risk, and Endogenous Growth
is the introduction of the endogenous risky occupational choice of entrepreneurs and skilled
workers vs. sure low–skilled employment within a probabilistic brain drain model. The tradi-
tional brain drain literature is based on the assumption that agents in the domestic country are
employed as (educated) workers and are not subject to risk–taking. In this way the conventional
brain drain theory downsizes the importance of risk in the occupational choice of skilled workers,
which has an impact on the decision to invest in education (being a prerequisite for skilled mi-
gration). Moreover, (risk–taking) entrepreneurship has also been assumed away as a production
augmenting factor although its impact on economic development is verified as relevant. In this
respect, brain drain may influence entrepreneurship via changes in the occupational choice of
agents and changes in the entrepreneurial production due to alteration in the supply of skilled
labor.
Our first paper is embedded within a two–period overlapping generations endogenous growth
model based on the work of Kanbur (1979) and Clemens (2008) for occupational choice un-
der risk and Beine et al. (2001) for the construction of probabilistic skilled migration. The
economy consists of two sectors operating in perfect competition: a traditional sector (em-
ploying low–skilled) and a modern skilled sector (with entrepreneurs hiring skilled workers).
Agents may invest in education when young. While skilled are subject to risk in earnings due
to ex–ante unknown abilities in human capital (for educated workers) or a technology shock
(for entrepreneurs), low–skilled obtain safe income. Skilled workers are randomly singled out
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to work abroad for a higher wage (depending on their ex–ante unknown labor productivities),
which defines the brain drain phenomenon. Because agents choose an occupation and make an
education decision under the veil of ignorance, their (expected) utility is equal in equilibrium,
which defines the distribution of individuals across occupations. The accumulation of average
human capital hinges on the human capital of skilled remaining at home and the human capital
of low–skilled, i.e. on the level of risk in occupational choice and the brain drain rate.
The calibration with economic targets of Eastern European countries shows that a higher brain
drain rate has a positive effect on growth because it attracts more agents into the employment
as skilled workers despite a fall in entrepreneurship. In this case average welfare in all periods
is beyond the benchmark because brain gain takes place. Still, entrepreneurs are temporally
worse off due to a fall in skilled labor force, while skilled workers have to recover later from
lower expected utility due to higher competition induced by a larger brain drain rate. The
wedge in skilled wages at home and abroad leads to a decrease in entrepreneurship, but always
stimulates growth and results in higher welfare because it increases the total share of skilled
agents. Nevertheless, skilled workers have to suffer transitionally lower welfare due to higher
competition in response to a rise in the gap in skilled earnings at home and abroad. Brain
drain has a stronger positive effect on growth and social utility in the short and the long term
compared to the gap in skilled earnings at home and abroad. Growth decreases in response to
higher levels of occupational risk because it leads to a fall in the share of skilled. The (nega-
tive) impact of larger risk in skilled wages on growth and, therefore, long–term welfare is much
more stronger that the effect of the technological shock. However, larger risk in entrepreneurs’
profits leads to stronger changes in the income of agents immediately after its introduction and
has a more pronounced (negative) effect on short–term welfare compared to the risk in skilled
workers’ earnings.
Our second work Brain Drain, Borrowing Constraints, and Endogenous Growth in an Economy
with Perfect Physical Capital Mobility concentrates on the impact of probabilistic brain drain
on growth and welfare for different levels of credit market liberalization. We challenge the tra-
ditional brain gain theory once borrowing constraints are relaxed. Another merit of this paper
is that it draws conclusions about the behavior of the aggregate savings rate with respect to
brain drain, which is innovative for the brain drain literature.
Our second paper builds a three–period overlapping generations model with human capital
accumulation subject to binding borrowing constraints in a setting of perfect physical capital
mobility (a` la De Gregorio (1996)) and probabilistic brain drain (a` la Beine et al. (2001)).
Young agents invest optimal time in education and borrow but are subject to a credit con-
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straint. Middle–aged work as high–skilled and save repaying their debt. Old consume savings
made when middle–aged. Some educated individuals may migrate in the second period of their
life and earn a higher wage abroad. Agents supply inelastically their labor and capital is bor-
rowed as an input by the firm, which operates in a setting of perfect competition. Human
capital accumulation, which is the triggering growth factor, depends on the optimal investment
in education determined by skilled migration and the stringency of borrowing constraints.
According to the calibration with economic targets of Eastern European countries, once credit
exceeds the threshold 74% of current income, a higher migration probability reduces the optimal
educational time due to the availability of economic resources. Welfare is beyond the benchmark
in the short run (as the expected utility of young improves in response to a rising probability to
gain more income abroad) although middle–aged and old–aged suffer a loss in utility due to de-
clining human capital accumulation. In this case, social utility, however, falls in the long run. A
higher wedge in skilled wages at home and abroad leads to higher human capital accumulation,
and higher social utility compared to the benchmark case. More relaxed borrowing constraints
enhance growth and (domestic) welfare monotonically in all periods although a generation of
middle–aged, and later old agents have to experience a temporary welfare loss due to increased
credit costs. The aggregate savings rate declines in response to a higher brain drain probability
independent of the tightness of borrowing due to the lower share of native agents, who accu-
mulate physical capital. The aggregate savings rate increases with the gap of skilled earnings
at home and abroad due to stronger growth. Further credit market liberalization leads to a fall
in the aggregate savings rate because credit distribution implies dissaving of credit takers.
In the second part of the dissertation, we are interested to find what is the impact of the
shadow economy on growth and welfare in the presence of risk in the formal sector when
the government can invest in infrastructure and public education (The Shadow Economy, and
Risky Human Capital Accumulation in an Environment of Productive Government Spending,
and Public Education), or the influence of pollution tax evasion on environment quality, growth
and welfare when corruption exists (Pollution, Environmental Tax Evasion, and Corruption in
an Endogenous Growth Model). We investigate, furthermore, alternative approaches, which (if
necessary) reduce the share of the informal sector or green tax evasion.
In The Shadow Economy, and Risky Human Capital Accumulation in an Environment of Pro-
ductive Government Spending, and Public Education, we follow Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)
for developing risky human capital accumulation with public education, and Loayza (1996) for
the construction of the formal and informal sector and the congestion mechanism of public ser-
vices by private services in production. The value of this paper is that it considers the presence
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of risk in the occupational choice of growth–driving skilled agents and suggest that uncertainty
in skilled workers’ earnings (in the formal sector) could be one of the reason for the existence
of the shadow economy. In this way we are able to compare the impact of a declining risk
measure and the usually cited policies (penalty, audit, tax rate), which are claimed to influence
the share of the unofficial sector. Moreover, we allow the government to be able to invest in
public education to enrich the number of policies, of which the state avails to act against the
informal sector (if necessary).
The model is a two–period overlapping generations model with human capital accumulation.
When young, agents decide on education and on employment in one of the production sectors
(formal or informal, both operating in a perfectly competitive market). High–skilled work only
in the formal sector when middle–aged. They obtain a skill and risk premium over the safe
low–skilled wage in the official sector because of their education and due to ex–ante unknown
abilities to accumulate human capital. Low–skilled may decide to switch to the informal sector
in the second period but are subject to the probability of paying a penalty if caught. In equilib-
rium the expected utilities of skilled and low–skilled in the official sector are equal, which defines
the distribution of agents across occupations in the formal sector. The decision of low–skilled
on employment in the shadow economy is based on their relatively optimistic perception of the
audit rate. Growth in this model depends positively on the government expenditure on public
education, which hinges on the occupational choice of economic agents choosing to be taxpayers
or tax evaders.
We show that the share of the unofficial economy is detrimental to growth and any policy to
reduce it is justified. According to the calibration with Eastern European countries, this can be
attained most effectively by a lower tax rate with a higher share of government expenditure on
education (to counteract the negative impact of lower taxation on growth), a higher penalty rate
or a higher audit rate (ordered by the magnitude of their impact on the share of the shadow
sector). These policies are connected with a short–term welfare loss. An exception to this rule is
a lower risk measure. It attains the highest rise in utility in the short run and does not create a
trade–off between short–run and long–run social utility although it induces the smallest decline
in the share of the unofficial sector compared to the rest of the government policies. Therefore, a
government which is interested to reduce the share of the informal economy, without hindering
economic development or accepting a trade–off in individual and aggregate welfare, should find
a mechanism to insure high–skilled agents in the formal sector. If a government, on the other
hand, aims at attaining the lowest possible share of the shadow economy, it should decrease the
tax rate and counterbalance this effect with a rise in the share of educational expenditure. This
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policy mix, however, leads to a short–run welfare loss.
Our aim in the paper Pollution, Environmental Tax Evasion, and Corruption in an Endogenous
Growth Model is to determine a relationship between environmental tax evasion, growth and
welfare in the presence of corruption (based on the model of Chen (2003)) and explore the
effectiveness of government policies and corruption reduction in combating green tax evasion
(if necessary), when production does not exhibit or does exhibit pollution externalities (a` la
Gradus and Smulders (1993) as well as Smulders and Gradus (1996)). This paper is innovative
in connecting pollution tax evasion and corruption to environmental quality in a growth and
welfare context.
The representative firm operating in a perfectly competitive market cooperates with corrupt
officials in the evasion of environmental taxes by incurring additionally corruption costs. Cor-
ruption costs are sunk. The firm stands a possibility to be caught evading pollution taxes by
non–corrupt authorities and in this case it pays a penalty on the evaded amount of environ-
mental taxes. Non-corrupt government representatives are entitled to decide on the level of the
environmental tax, the penalty rate and the audit rate. Pollution is modeled as a flow variable
depending positively on abatement undertaken by government authorities and negatively on
economic activity represented by the level of capital stock. Growth in the model is triggered by
capital accumulation of the infinitely lived household net of pollution taxation and corruption
costs.
We show that higher environmental tax compliance leads to lower pollution, higher growth, and
higher welfare in both models. Pollution falls unambiguously in response to higher corruption
costs, a higher penalty rate and a higher audit rate, while the green tax is favorable to environ-
mental quality if the propensity to pay green taxes is at least higher than 42.3% (for a penalty
rate equal to 1.5 and an audit rate of 0.089). The influence of larger corruption costs, a larger
penalty or a larger audit rate on growth and welfare in both models is positive. The impact
of a higher pollution tax on growth in the model with pollution externalities in production is
ambiguous, while in the model without pollution externalities in production it is negative. The
impact of a higher pollution tax on welfare is inconclusive in both models. These results imply
that a government which would like to enhance environmental quality, when environmental
tax evasion with corruption takes place, has to strengthen tax enforcement policies or curb
corruption rather than apply green taxation.
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